Wage differentials and government corruption by Le, Van Ha
  
 University of Groningen
Wage differentials and government corruption
Le, Van Ha
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2014
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Le, V. H. (2014). Wage differentials and government corruption. Groningen: University of Groningen, SOM
research school.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
  
Wage Differentials and 
Government Corruption 
 



















Publisher: University of Groningen 
Groningen, The Netherlands 
Printer:  Ipskamp Drukkers B.V. 
Enschede, The Netherlands 
 
 




Copyright 2014 © Le Van Ha 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored 
in a retrieval system of any nature, or transmitted in any form or by any 
means, electronic, mechanical, now known or hereafter invented, 






Wage Differentials and Government 
Corruption 
 








ter verkrijging van het doctoraat aan de  
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
 op gezag van de 
rector magnificus, prof.dr. E. Sterken 
 en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties.  
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op  
 






Le Van Ha 
 
geboren op 18 januari 1983 
te Thanh Hoa, Vietnam  
Promotor:  
Prof. Dr. J. de Haan 




Prof. dr. A. Jain 
Prof. dr. M. Paldam 
Prof. dr. A.E. Steenge 
 
  










Con kính tặng bố mẹ, tặng em yêu và hai con 




An important conclusion of this thesis is that: “Increasing government wages may 
substantially reduce corruption in relatively poor countries. Also in these 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Many developing countries have very poorly paid civil servants. Although at independence 
most former colonies inherited civil service pay scales that exceeded private sector wages, 
this advantage has eroded over time. Wages relative to private sector wages have fallen in 
countries in transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The pattern varies 
across countries and over time. In some parts of the developing world public sector pay is 
so low that officials must supplement their pay with second jobs or payoffs. 
Rose-Ackerman (2004, pp. 72-73). 
1.1 Introduction 
Starting with the pioneering studies of Leff (1964) and Rose-Ackerman (1975), the 
literature on corruption has grown exponentially in the last 40 years. Also the attention for 
corruption of policymakers and the general public has increased. At the moment of drafting 
this introduction, a search using “corruption” as keyword in Google gave about 135 million 
results. The same search in the Web of Knowledge database resulted in 1,186 articles in 
political science, 348 articles in law, and 416 articles in international relations. When the 
Econlit database was employed, the search resulted in 7,220 academic studies out of which 
2,032 articles contain the word “corruption” in the title. These simple statistics suffice to 
highlight that corruption is an important subject not only to economists but also to other 
social scientists as well as policymakers and the general public.  
Research on corruption in economics has gone through several stages. In the early days, 
corruption was viewed as a principal/agent problem and authors focused on a positive 
analysis of the mechanisms that cause the problem (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Some authors 
argue that corruption is bad and suggest correction measures (Rose-Ackerman, 1975) while 
others express a more tolerant view, arguing that corruption may not be necessarily 
inconsistent with economic development.  
However, when economic development became an important policy concern, corruption 
was regarded as one of the most severe obstacles for growth (Bardhan, 2006). Research on 
corruption has been burgeoning since then. The problem has been studied extensively from 
both theoretical and empirical perspectives. New insights into the causes and the 
consequences of the problem have been uncovered. Many factors have been identified as 
determinants of corruption and the consequences of corruption to socio-economic 
development are better understood now. More than 70 factors have been suggested as 
potential causes of corruption (Aidt, 2011). These factors can be classified into major 
groups such as economic factors, political factors, institutional factors, and geographical 
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However, these factors should be viewed as belonging to only two groups. The first group 
comprises factors that are constant or rigid, such as distance to trade routes, colonial 
history, or religious fractions. The second group refers to factors that are within the 
capacity of the government to change. Typical examples in this group are trade policies, 
competition policies, and government transparency. While it is interesting and important to 
uncover the underlying factors that determine the level of corruption between countries or 
even between subnational units, it is more important for the process of socio-economic 
development that economists attach more weight to the second group of factors. Such 
research may shed light on mechanisms that impact corruption. Understanding these 
mechanisms may help to device policy suggestions that can bring low-income countries out 
of the vicious circle of rampant corruption and stagnant economic outcomes.  
This thesis contributes to the literature by studying the impact of government remuneration 
policies on corruption. The topic has been investigated in a large number of studies over the 
past decades (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Besley and McLaren, 1993; Bond, 2008; Bose, 
2004; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Dutt, 2009; Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003; Macchiavello, 
2008; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2008; Treisman, 2000, 2007; UlHaque and Sahay, 1996; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Government wages can be raised by the government. Still, 
governments in most countries are reluctant to use this option to combat corruption, 
possibly because academic research has so far failed to generate any conclusive evidence 
on the effectiveness of this instrument. This thesis aims at bridging this gap. 
Fighting corruption is difficult and very few anticorruption campaigns appear to be 
successful, leading several authors to conclude that corruption is persistent (Dawid and 
Feichtinger, 1996; Mauro, 2004). However, empirical evidence in the last 30 years shows 
that corruption converges in the long run. That is, many corrupt countries became ‘cleaner’ 
between 1984 and 2008, while many ‘clean’ countries became more corrupted (Seldadyo 
and de Haan, 2011). At the same time, several theoretical studies suggest that higher 
government wages are the key to the success of anticorruption reforms (Bond, 2008; Bose, 
2004). It is, therefore, important for the process of socio-economic development that the 
relationship between government wages and corruption is addressed in a comprehensive 
manner. 
1.2 Problem statement 
1.2.1 What is corruption? 
Corruption is defined as “the abuse of public office for private gains” (Rose-Ackerman, 
2004) or “an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner 
that contravenes the rules of the game” (Jain, 2001). Corruption as the “abuse of public 
office for private gain” is often equated with bribery which occurs when government 
employees—with a certain discretionary power to distribute scarce public goods to or 
impose some costly regulations on other agents—ask payments for some favors. However, 
corruption also encompasses a wide range of other illegal misconducts such as 
embezzlement (stealing of public funds), fraud (abusing the public office to deceive other 
people to gain money), self-dealing (abusing the public office to organize transactions to 







person or group at the expense of another) and nepotism (favors granted to relatives) 
(Morris, 2011). 
1.2.2 Why is corruption bad for socio-economic development? 
It is quite straightforward to show that most forms of corruption, such as embezzlement, 
fraud and self-dealing, have bad effects on economic development. However, the story 
about bribery is more complicated. Some authors, including Leff (1964) and Lui (1985), 
argue that bribery is the second-best solution to the problem of over-regulation. Law 
enforcers who accept bribes and turn a blind eye to black markets and smuggling might 
improve social welfare in case of excessive government regulation. Similarly, bribery 
introduces competition to the monopolistic government sector and brings firms most 
willing to pay, which are arguably the most efficient ones, ahead of a slow queue of firms 
not willing (or not able) to pay.  
However, the argument that bribery enhances social welfare is highly problematic (Rose-
Ackerman, 2004). First, bribe-prices are secret and entry to bribes may be blocked. 
Therefore, corrupt markets are not efficient. Second, the basic purposes of some public 
programs (such as social housing, pro-poor finance and disaster reliefs) would be violated 
by sales to the highest bidders. Third, profit-maximizing firms and individuals will not 
distinguish between socially efficient and socially inefficient rules. If corruption is allowed, 
they will want to be exempted from all rules and regulations. Finally, bribery breeds further 
bribery. Government employees have incentives to make government service artificially 
scarcer and government regulation artificially more burdensome to extract further bribes 
(Banerjee, 1997; Bose, 2004; Guriev, 2004).  
Over the past decades, a large number of studies have examined the nexus between 
corruption and development. Corruption is found to lower economic growth either directly 
(Mauro, 1995; Swaleheen, 2011) or indirectly via lowering the incentives for productive 
investments (Johnson et al., 2011). Corruption engenders unsustainable economic 
developments (Aidt, 2009) and erodes public confidence in government institutions 
(Clausen et al., 2011). Corruption can also cause budget consolidation efforts to fail (Arin 
et al., 2011).  
Most importantly, corruption sustains further corrupt activities because the public becomes 
indifferent to the problem (Mauro, 2004) while every new generation of bureaucrats 
becomes corrupt because their past and current colleagues and seniors are also corrupt 
(Dong et al., 2012; Sah, 2007). Selfish agents will also queue up for government jobs 
because it is easier to make money by becoming a bureaucrat than by making productive 
investments (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). Many developing countries seem to be 
entrapped in a bad equilibrium of rampant corruption, poverty and stagnation. 
Consequently, fighting corruption has been on top of the policy agenda of policymakers. 
1.2.3 Theory 
Raising government wages to combat corruption seems an intuitive solution because it 
lessens the bureaucrats’ incentive to extract illegal income. Several studies therefore have 
suggested to pay higher government wages so as to break the vicious circle of corruption 
and poverty (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Bond, 2008; Bose, 2004; UlHaque and Sahay, 1996; 
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First, higher government wages deter corruption via two mechanisms: raising the cost of 
corruption and increasing the probability of detection (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). When the probability that corruption is detected is high and 
the threat to lose a well-paid job is real, bureaucrats will avoid corruption because it is no 
longer an optimal choice when maximizing income.  
Second, high government wages boost the dignity of civil servants and encourage them to 
forgo corrupt activities, even when corruption is the optimal choice to maximize income 
(Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Arguably, people choose to work for the government 
because they want to serve society (Macchiavello, 2008). These civil servants might be 
tempted to engage in corruption to ensure sufficient income but each act of corruption is 
associated with some moral cost (Bond, 2008; UlHaque and Sahay, 1996). As a result, a 
proportion of the bureaucrats may forgo corruption opportunities as long as they are paid at 
a level perceived to be fair, even if the probability of corruption detection and punishment 
is low (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).  
Third, a government pay rise may serve as an exogenous shock to a high-corruption 
equilibrium. High government wages attract better people to the bureaucracy and prevent 
the movement of qualified employees to the private sector (UlHaque and Sahay, 1996). The 
public also becomes more vigilant to the operation of the bureaucracy when government 
wages are high (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), putting more pressure on bureaucrats 
to forgo corruption themselves and to report corruption by others. Hence, even a modest 
raise in government wages can lead to a new equilibrium with less corruption.  
In contrast, other studies argue that high government wages do not reduce corruption or 
may even lead to more corruption (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Chang and Lai, 2002; 
Macchiavello, 2008). In a highly corrupted environment where the probability of detection 
as well as the probability of getting punishment upon detection is very low, the threat of job 
loss is close to zero. In such a situation, higher government wages will not change the 
incentive structure faced by bureaucrats (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Selfish agents 
will also queue up for government jobs because of the high income from wages plus the 
illegal income from corruption. Government remuneration policy may unintentionally end 
up attracting too many individuals with the wrong ‘talent’ to the bureaucracy (Aidt, 2003; 
Bond, 2008; Macchiavello, 2008). Highly paid but selfish bureaucrats may also use part of 
their wage package to bribe their seniors when they are detected (Chang and Lai, 2002). 
More severely, highly paid government jobs become a scarce good that can be rationed 
only to those who can mobilize sufficient finances to buy such jobs via bribing the 
recruiting officials. In return, new bureaucrats will try to corrupt even more to recover their 
initial investment (Qijun and Kahana, 2010). 
1.2.4 Empirical Research 
Given the inconclusiveness of theoretical studies on the relationship between government 
wages and corruption, one would be inclined to think that empirical studies have shed some 
light on the issue. However, empirical research on the relationship between government 
wages and corruption in the last 20 years yielded only conflicting results.  
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find that an increase in government wages reduces 
corruption. Also Dutt (2009), Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008) 







results are often not robust to different econometric specifications. In contrast, the results of 
Ades and DiTella (1997), Panizza (2001) and Treisman (2000, 2007) suggest that there is 
no significant relationship between both variables while La Porta et al. (1999) even find 
that higher government wages are correlated with more corruption.  
Most studies on the impact of government wages on corruption so far are based on datasets 
created in the 1990s, such as Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(1997). Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997) provide a cross sectional dataset covering about 90 
countries in the period between 1992 and 1995. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) provide 
a panel dataset covering about 30 developing countries in the 1986-1994 period. For the 
construction, these authors followed Heller and Tait (1984). They use macro data to impute 
government wages (i.e. government wages were obtained from dividing the total 
government wage bill by total government employment). Only Panizza (2001) relies on 
micro data, using some 60 household surveys from 13 Latin American countries in the 
1990s to estimate government wages. 
Most empirical studies on the relationship between government wages and corruption are 
questionable due to the potential bias in the measurement of government wages. It is a 
common practice to impute government wages as the ratio of the government wage bill and 
total government employment (Afonso and Gomes, 2011; Gaetano, 2011; Heller and Tait, 
1984; Lamo et al., 2012; Pérez and Sánchez, 2011; Schiavo-Campo et al., 1997; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). However, this macro data approach is potentially biased 
because of the measurement errors in the data for both the government wage bill and 
employment. 
First, the government wage bill may not be recorded correctly (or inconsistently across time 
and space). A number of spending categories should be included in the government wage 
bill but they are often excluded (i.e. recorded somewhere else). For example, many non-
monetary benefits—such as travel, housing and other allowances—can be recorded as 
spending under other goods and services. Payments to employees in government projects 
can also be recorded as capital spending while outlays for temporary workers are in some 
countries classified as use of goods and services (Clements et al., 2010).  
Second, creating government employment data that are consistent over time and across 
countries is notoriously difficult. Issues to cope with include full time versus part time 
workers and full year versus part year employment. Some employees work full time for the 
whole year but others may work part time and only for a fraction of the year. In addition, 
casual workers—who work on contingent government projects—may account for a 
substantial proportion of government employment during some periods (Klitgaard, 1989). 
There is no agreed international standard on how to combine these different types of 
government employment into a single figure. In some developing countries, government 
employment is inflated by fictitious workers who only exist in the books (Clements et al., 
2010). 
The imputed average annual government wages can thus be biased upward or downward, 
depending on the precision of the statistics in a country. Most authors acknowledge that 
these limitations can render their results unreliable (Lamo et al., 2012; Schiavo-Campo, 
1998; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). However, this top-down, macro data based 
approach is still being used frequently in the literature. The current controversy over the 
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1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 The research question 
The research question in this thesis is twofold:  
• First, how can a reliable dataset on government wages that covers a large number of 
countries over a reasonably long period be collected to facilitate further empirical 
research on the relationship between government wages and corruption?  
• Second, what is the impact of government wages on corruption? 
As the research questions indicate, this thesis will comprise of two parts. The first part 
deals with the problem of constructing and analyzing a database on government wages. The 
second part deals with the problem of modeling the empirical relationship between 
government wages and corruption. 
1.3.2 Measuring government wages 
Instead of following the literature to impute government wages from macro data, this thesis 
will employ a bottom-up, micro survey based approach to estimate government wages. 
Micro surveys are nationally representative and often conducted annually by the national 
statistics offices. They are one of the most important sources of information on socio-
economic issues in both developed and developing countries. Micro survey data play an 
increasingly important role in social science research as well as in policy analyses. 
Virtually all countries have conducted surveys on income, work and labor force in one form 
or another. However, the potential of using survey data to study economic issues related to 
wages at aggregate levels is still largely neglected. Micro data open a new path to overcome 
the problem in most developing countries where data on the government wage bill and total 
government employment are lacking. 
To construct a database on government wages, two types of data sources are employed. The 
first type includes national data archives and international micro databases, such as the 
World Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey or the Luxembourg Income Study. The 
agencies responsible for maintaining these databases and archives were contacted to obtain 
the original micro survey datasets (which have been collected by national statistics offices 
over the last 20 years and are available under certain conditions for academic research). 
From each dataset, all working persons who report a positive amount of wages and salaries 
in the reference period are classified in to one of the 17 one-digit industries classified 
according to the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities, 
revision 3 (ISIC 3). The average wage in each industry is estimated as the weighted mean 
of wages of all persons working in that industry. The government wages are defined as the 
wages of workers in the Public administration, defense and compulsory social security 
industry. The questionnaires and the manuals are carefully consulted to make sure that only 
datasets of sufficiently good quality are retained.  
The second type of data sources are the international databases that provide the estimated 
micro survey based average wages at the ISIC 3 one-digit level industries. Three databases 
belong to this category, namely the LABORSTA and ILOSTAT databases provided by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), and the SEDLAC database provided by the Center 







the World Bank's Latin America and the Caribbean Poverty and Gender Group (LCSPP). 
LABORSTA and ILOSTAT cover a large number of countries on a worldwide basis, while 
SEDLAC provides data for 25 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. One 
drawback of these secondary databases is that many countries only report data which are 
based on a representative survey of the private sector. As result, the data on government 
wages are often missing.  
In total, a worldwide database on wages for 126 countries over the late 1980s – 2011 period 
is collected. The database consists of 1,488 observations and provides data on wages for 
each of the 17 ISIC 3 industries as well as the total economy. From this database, a panel 
dataset of about 1,350 observations on government wages can be extracted, which will 
serve as the basis for the empirical studies on the relationship between government wages 
and corruption. The database will also be made publicly available online. The data may also 
facilitate further research on issues related to wages in (one of the) ISIC 3 one-digit 
industries. 
We also use the micro-based government wages to examine the potential bias of macro-
based government wages. The literature on survey methodology shows that estimates from 
micro household survey datasets are unbiased as long as the surveyed samples are random 
and representative (Lohr, 2010). A large body of survey validation literature indeed reports 
that household survey data yield unbiased estimates of the true wages (Akee, 2011; Bound 
et al., 2001). As the results in Chapter 2 will show, the macro-based government wages are 
biased for most countries that have data of sufficiently good quality. The sign and size of 
the bias are country-specific and remain relatively stable over time. 
1.3.3 Modeling the relationship between government wages and corruption 
With the availability of the new, worldwide panel dataset on government wages, 
corresponding econometric methods will be used to study the impact of government wages 
on corruption. Previous studies on this issue often employed cross-country regression 
models. The relatively long time dimension of the data allows using panel data econometric 
models. The model in Chapter 4 uses an aggregate measure of corruption, namely, an index 
of perceived corruption at the country level from the International Country Risk Guide 
Database, which is maintained by the Political Risk Analysis Group. This database covers a 
large number of countries since 1984. 
While such country level perception-based corruption measures have been vital to further 
our understanding of the problem (Rose-Ackerman, 2004), they may not fully reflect 
corruption in each country (Olken, 2009; Treisman, 200;). Aggregate measures also ignore 
that corruption may vary substantially within a country (Sah, 2007). To improve on the 
measurement of corruption, the World Bank’s Enterprise Unit conducts a large number of 
firm level surveys focusing on developing and transition economies. The program started in 
2002 and is still in progress. A large database of about 130,000 firms from 135 countries 
has been made available for economic research. The Enterprise Survey database provides 
data on both perceptions of corruption and actual costs of corruption. Using these data, 
nonlinear econometric models, i.e. Ordered Probit and Tobit models, will be employed in 
Chapter 5 to study the impact of government wages on corruption at the firm level. In 
comparison with the models in Chapter 4, the application in Chapter 5 covers a shorter time 
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1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 presents the newly collected worldwide 
database on wages, while Chapter 3 compares different approaches of measuring 
government wages. Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of government wages on corruption at 
the country level using panel data econometric methods. Chapter 5 focuses on the 
relationship between wages and corruption at the industry level using nonlinear 
econometric methods. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
Industrial wages across countries 
and over time: A new database of 
micro survey data 
2.1 Introduction1 
This chapter presents a newly collected database of industrial wages for a large number of 
countries between the late 1980s and 2011. The main sources of this database are micro 
surveys, such as household budget surveys, labor force surveys or labor-related surveys. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to combine a diverse, scattered pool of 
survey data—which have been available for a large number of countries over the last two 
decades—into a unified database. As more data on micro surveys are being made available 
online through national data archives as well as cross-country databases, this database will 
be updated and expanded regularly in the future. The most recent version of the database 
can be downloaded online at http://www.levanhab28.com. 
Industrial wages in this chapter are defined as the average nominal wages and salaries of all 
employees working in an industry. We determined the wages for each of the 17 one-digit 
level industries classified by the International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities, Revision 3 (ISIC 3). Different from the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO), which classifies workers according to the skill 
content of their jobs, the ISIC describes the type of goods or services produced by the 
industry in which a person works. Although survey data are far from perfect and contain 
systematic (next to random) errors, validation studies have found that survey reported mean 
wages are the unbiased estimate of the true figures, i.e. the average wages in the population 
(Bound, 2001; Le et al., 2013a). Le et al. (2013a) showed that industrial wages as obtained 
from macro data (i.e. by dividing the wage bill by employment) yield biased results. As 
such, this dataset enables a better understanding of the variation of inter-industry wages, 
both between and within countries. It will also provide a more reliable source of data to 
support empirical research on the determinants of such variations as well as their 
implications for other aspects of the economy. Micro survey data play an increasingly 
                                                          
1This chapter is based on Le, V.H., De Haan, J., Dietzenbacher, E., 2013. Industrial wages across 
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important role in social science research as well as policy analyses. However, the potential 
of using survey data to study economic issues related to wages is still largely neglected.  
Virtually all countries have conducted surveys on income and work in one form or another. 
Some countries, such as the US, Sweden and Argentina, maintain very long series of 
surveys with comprehensive data on income and work starting in the 1970s or even earlier. 
Other countries, such as Vietnam, Albania and Uganda, have only recently made household 
surveys a source of information for policy analysis thanks to the financial and technical 
support from international organizations. The results of such surveys are often made 
available via the World Bank or the International Labor Organization. Several countries 
offer free access to the original micro datasets for academic research via their own national 
data archives or international micro databases, such as the World Bank Living Standard 
Measurement Study or the Luxembourg Income Study. This availability enabled us to build 
a database on industrial wages across countries and over time. Our dataset was collected 
from 9 different international databases and a number of national data archives. The final 
database is a panel which consists of 1,488 observations from 126 countries. On average, 
there are almost 12 observations per country, but the number of observations varies 
substantially across countries.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 2.2 presents the methodology to compute 
industrial wages. Section 2.3 documents the data sources and the statistical operations 
applied to the data. Section 2.4 presents some detailed information about the database. 
Section 2.5 gives some suggestions on how the database could be used and Section 2.6 
concludes. 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 The ISIC 3 
The ISIC system was introduced in 1958 by the United Nations. Since then, it has been 
revised several times to meet the changes in industrial structure as well as the introduction 
of new economic activities. The first revision took place in 1968 (ISIC 2), the second 
revision was in 1989 (ISIC 3), and the latest revision (ISIC 4) was in 2008. Most micro 
survey data available by 2013 still follow the ISIC 3 classification. Some countries have 
employed the ISIC 4 classification, but parallel information based on ISIC 3 is often 
provided. The data prior to the 1990s, which mostly follow the ISIC 2 classification, are 
difficult to obtain and are incompatible with the data classified according to ISIC 3. For this 
reason, we only focused on the late 1980s – 2011 period.  
Table 2.1 presents the ISIC 3 industrial structure. Column (1) presents the first level 
industries, which is labeled alphabetically from A to Q. The ISIC 3 classification, therefore, 
consists of 17 one-digit industries. Column (2) gives the definition for each industry. 
Columns (3), (4) and (5) present the range of the ISIC 3 classification at the two, three and 
four digits levels, respectively. For example, industry D is classified into 23 two-digit 
industries, numbering from 15 to 37 as column (3) of Table 2.1 indicates. Examples of 
these two-digit industries are Manufacture of textiles (17); Manufacture of basic metals 
(27); and Manufacture of other transport equipment (35). The three-digit level further 
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industry 35 includes 3 three-digit industries, namely Manufacture of basic iron and steel 
(271); Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals (272); and Casting of metals 
(273). Similarly, the four-digit level divides each three-digit industry into a number of 
smaller industries. Hence, the higher the number of digits, the more detailed information is 
available for the product or services produced by an industry. 
 
 
Survey data from different countries vary. Some countries only report information at the 
one-digit level, while others collect data up to the four-digit level. We chose to present 
industrial wages at the one-digit level for two reasons. First, focusing on the first level will 
ensure that the resulting data are more reliable. There are 17 one-digit, 60 two-digit, 159 
three-digit, and 298 four-digit ISIC 3 industries. For some countries, however, the sample 
contains only about 1,000 surveyed individuals for which complete information on industry 
of work and wages is available. Extending the number of industries would then imply that 
some industries only have a few sampled individuals. A sample that is too small will result 
in estimated average wages that are unreliable. Second, many data at our disposal only 
contain information up to the ISIC 3 one-digit level, so that focusing on higher ISIC levels 
will lead to a significant reduction in the number of countries in the database. 
2.2.2 Wage concepts 
The most comprehensive wage concept is wages and salaries defined in the 2008 System of 
National Accounts (SNA 2008, see United Nations, 2009. Wages and salaries include basic 
wages and salaries, overtime payment, and regular and irregular bonuses. Wages and 
salaries also include social contributions, income taxes, etc., payable to the employee (even 
Industry Definition 2 Digits 3 Digits 4 Digits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A Agriculture, hunting and forest ry 01-02 011-015 0111-0150
B Fishing 05 050 0500
C Mining and quarrying 10-14 101-142 1010-1429
D Manufacturing 15-37 151-372 1511-3720
E Electricity, gas and water supply 40-41 401-410 4010-4100
F Construct ion 45 451-455 4510-4550
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and  household goods
50-52 501-526 5010-5260
H Hotels and restaurants 55 551-552 5510-5520
I Transport, storage and communicat ions 60-64 601-642 6010-6420
J Financial intermediation 65-67 651-672 6511-6720
K Real estate, renting and business act ivities 70-74 701-749 7010-7499
L Public administ ration and defense; compulsory social security 75 751-753 7510-7530
M Education 80 801-809 8010-8090
N Health and social work 85 851-853 8511-8532
O Other community, social and personal service activities 90-93 900-930 9000-9309
P Private households with employed persons 95 950 9500
Q Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 99 990 9900
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if they are actually withheld by the employer for administrative convenience or other 
reasons and paid directly to social insurance schemes, tax authorities, etc., on behalf of the 
employee). Wages and salaries may be paid in various ways, including goods or services 
provided to the employees as remuneration in kind instead of, or in addition to, 
remuneration in cash (SNA 2008).  
In the ideal case, a dataset of industrial wages should employ the same concept of wages 
and salaries. However, the concept of wages and salaries used in surveys varies from one 
country to the other. Some countries report gross salary/pay, while others collect data on 
wages and salaries after taxes and social contributions. Even for the same country, the 
concept of wages used in different surveys over time can be different, because surveys are 
reviewed periodically and changes in the questions on income may occur in subsequent 
rounds.  
Given this situation, we did not seek a common definition of wages in our database. 
Instead, we retain the concepts of wages used in each underlying survey. As a result, the 
industrial wages reported in our database vary across countries and sometimes over time as 
well. A variable named WAGE_CONCEPT is included in the database to outline the 
concept of wages and salaries used in a particular survey.  
Comparing industrial wages across countries may not be appropriate when the wage 
concepts used in the underlying surveys differ from each other. Similarly, the trend analysis 
of industrial wages series may be disrupted if the wage concept within a country changes 
from one year to the other. However, the differences in wage concepts used will be less of a 
problem in studies that focus on relative differences in wages and salaries across sectors. 
This is because the wage concepts always apply consistently to all sectors within one 
survey. If components of wages do not differ across industries, the relative position of 
industries will not depend on the use of a particular wage concept. 
2.2.3 Time basis 
Time basis refers to the reference period of the wages and salaries (e.g. dollars per year or 
per hour). Similar to the wages and salaries concept used, also the time basis varies between 
and within countries. Within the pool of original micro datasets that we have collected, 8 
different time bases have been used, namely yearly, 6 months, 3 months, monthly, 
fortnight, weekly, daily and hourly. The time basis may even vary within one survey. If that 
is the case, we convert the reported income into the most commonly used time basis in the 
respective survey and report the wages according to that basis. The variable 
TIME_CONCEPT in the database provides the time basis for the reported wages and 
salaries.  
Most surveys provide information on weekly hours worked. As a result, we could also 
compute hourly wages by dividing the reported wages by the corresponding number of 
hours worked. For example, if an individual works 38 hours per week and receives a 
monthly payment P, his hourly wages are computed as the monthly payment divided by the 
number of hours worked per month, which yields P×12/(38×52). The hourly wages take 
differences in working hours across individuals into account. However, survey data on 
hourly wages are less accurate than data on weekly, monthly and yearly wages (Bound et 
al., 2001). Even so, we computed hourly wages in companion with non-hourly wages 
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2.2.4 Estimation procedures 
The estimation procedures consisted of two steps. First, surveyed individuals with a 
positive amount of income from the main job are classified into one of the 17 ISIC 3 
industries as shown in Table 2.1. Second, average wages of each industry were estimated as 
the mean reported wages from the main job of all individuals within that industry. More 
specifically, the wages of industry i in a given country at time t were estimated as: 
 = ∑ 	




where  are the wages of industry i at time t,   are the reported wages of the surveyed 
individual j in industry i at time t,  is the number of surveyed individuals in industry i at 
time t, and   is the sampling weight of individual j in industry i at time t. These sampling 
weights are provided in each dataset to account for the differences in sampling probability 
between individuals. When the sampling process is completely random, individuals within 
each country will have an equal probability of being surveyed. In that case the weight  = 1 and the expression reduces to  = ∑ 
 /. However, in practice, most 
surveys are stratified along several dimensions and the probability of being interviewed is 
different from one individual to another. The sampling weight   is included to account 
for this difference. 
In most survey datasets that we obtained, the wages are paid on a non-hourly basis. As 
indicated in the previous subsection, hourly wages ( ) were obtained by dividing the 
non-hourly wages () by the corresponding number of hours worked. The hourly wages 
of each industry () were estimated in the same way as the non-hourly wages above. That 
is,  
 = ∑ 	
  ( × 
 )	
  
We also estimated the hourly () and non-hourly wages () for the whole country in 
year t as the mean wages of all individuals in all industries. For example, 
 = ∑ ∑ 	

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2.3 Data sources 
2.3.1 Original micro survey datasets 
The main sources of the original household survey datasets that we collected include 6 
international databases together with a number of national data archives. The international 
databases are the World Bank Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS), the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP), the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS), and the Economic Research Forum (ERF). National data 
archives are online databases that offer original micro survey datasets conducted in each 
country and over time, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) from the United 
States. Access to these data is often free for academic research purposes (under certain 
conditions). In total, we were able to collect 898 datasets from 64 countries between the late 
1980s and 2011.  
For some countries, the information on the ISIC 3 classification of respondents is missing. 
When the industry of work is available, some surveys do not report data on wages or fail to 
distinguish income from work and income from other sources. We consulted the 
accompanying manuals and questionnaires carefully to ensure that the necessary 
information is correctly recorded and only retained surveys with data of good quality.  
Except for the surveys for Vietnam, the United States and the EU-SILC, all other datasets 
report data on a monthly basis. However, data on bonuses and overtime payment as well as 
earnings in kind are—when available separately—often on a less regular basis, such as 3, 6 
or 12 months. In that case, we converted these incomes to a monthly basis and added the 
resulting income to the monthly wages to obtain the monthly earnings data. The obtained 
earnings data can either be in gross terms or in net terms. The resulting earnings figures 
were considered as the final reported wages and salaries of the surveyed individuals and 
were used to estimate the industrial wages and salaries. 
Most original micro datasets for Latin American countries are not processed because these 
data have been harmonized and analyzed by the Socio-Economic Database for Latin 
America and the Caribbean countries (SEDLAC). SEDLAC makes the resulting estimated 
industrial wages available. In total, we processed 363 datasets from 46 countries (excluding 
all SEDLAC countries), resulting in 363 observations. 
2.3.2 Secondary data on industrial wages 
Secondary data are international databases that provide country data on survey-based 
estimated wages for ISIC 3 industries. In constructing our dataset on industrial wages, we 
have used information from three existing databases. These are SEDLAC, the International 
Labor Organization’s LABORSTA and its successor, ILOSTAT.  
SEDLAC is a database that provides several socio-economic statistics for 25 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. It is the result of the cooperation between the Center for 
Distributional, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS) of the University of La Plata and the 
World Bank's Latin America and the Caribbean Poverty and Gender Group (LCSPP). 
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household budget survey data. Instead of reporting data by ISIC 3 industries, SEDLAC 
provide average wages for 10 sectors. These sectors are primary activities; low-tech 
industries; high-tech industries; construction; commerce; utilities and transportation; skilled 
services; public administration; education and health; and domestic servants.  
Appendix 2.A shows details on the relationship between these 10 sectors and the ISIC 3 
industries. The wages for construction (industry F in Table 2.1) can be obtained directly 
from the SEDLAC database. The wages for manufacturing (industry D) can be obtained as 
the weighted average of the wages of the low-tech and hi-tech sectors (the detailed formula 
is presented in Appendix 2.A). Each of the other 7 SEDLAC sectors combines some ISIC 3 
one-digit industries together. We report the wages for these sectors as they are reported in 
the SEDLAC database. 273 observations on wages and salaries have been collected from 
this database. 
LABORSTA provides data on average wages for ISIC 3 industries for a large number of 
countries. The ILO Department of Statistics sends questionnaires to the corresponding 
government agency in each country/territory to collect data on various labor statistics. With 
respect to industrial wages, the corresponding agency is requested to provide data on gross 
earnings by ISIC industries. When data on average earnings is not available, data on the 
average wage rates is provided instead. A detailed list of components of remuneration to be 
included in each wage concept is also included in the questionnaires. When the 
questionnaires are returned to the ILO, the data are checked for their consistency and made 
freely available online at http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (Hua, 2008). More recently, the 
LABORSTA database has been replaced by ILOSTAT, which provides data on earnings 
for 2009 and 2010.  
We included LABORSTA and ILOSTAT into our database. For the period from the late 
1980s to 2010, we were able to collect 1,156 observations from 115 countries and 
territories. However, the data are not evenly distributed between countries. For some 
countries there is a very long data series while for many other countries there is only one 
observation.  
One drawback of the ILO data is that several countries only report data on the private 
sector, leading to missing data for public administration. Some other countries exclude 
small establishments with less than a certain number of employees (mostly 5 or 10). In our 
database the variable NOTES explains such deviations in some detail. 
2.4 Results 
The final database includes three separate datasets corresponding to the three data sources 
that have been used, namely the SEDLAC, the ILO databases and the original micro 
datasets that we have collected. Appendix 2.B provides summary information on the data 
source for each country in all years covered in the database. The database documents data 
sources as well as the processing steps applied to get each observation.  
In addition, there is a unified dataset that combines these three datasets. Sometimes we 
have more than one observation for a particular country-year. In that case we retained the 
entry that provides more comprehensive data, both in terms of the number of industries 
covered and the wage concepts used. When two different sources provide the same wage 
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For France, for example, the ECHP provides data for the average gross monthly earnings in 
cash in the 1994-2001 period and the EU-SILC for gross yearly earnings in cash and in 
kind for the 2003-2010 period. At the same time, the ILO provides data on gross monthly 
earnings in cash for the 1999–2002 period. So there are multiple entries for France in 1999, 
2000 and 2001. We chose to include data for France for the 1994-2001 period from the 
ECHP because this ensures continuity of the data series.  
 
Figure 2.1. The number of countries included in the dataset by year  
and by OECD status 
The final combined dataset consists of 1,488 observations from 126 countries and 
territories. Each observation consists of up to 36 entries (non-hourly and hourly wages for 
each of the 17 industries and for the whole economy). Figure 2.1 presents the number of 
observations per year, distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD countries.2  There are 
less than 20 countries included in the database in the early 1990s. However, the number of 
countries increases gradually and reaches about 90 in the mid-2000 years. In 2010 and 
2011, the number of countries appears to be smaller because of the lag in data 
dissemination.  
                                                          
2A country is classified as an OECD member from the year it is admitted to the OECD. The increase 
in the number of OECD countries may therefore reflect that data from more OECD countries have 
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Figure 2.2 graphs the number of observations per country on the horizontal axis and the 
number of countries on the vertical axis. The figure shows that 11 countries have only one 
observation, and 14 countries have 20 observations or more. On average, there are 11.81 
observations per country.  
Table 2.2 lists the types of surveys underlying our database. More than 45% of the data are 
from labor related establishment surveys3, almost 40% are from household budget surveys, 
and about 10% of the data are from labor force surveys. Less than 6% of the data are from 
other sources, such as administrative reports, tax records and population censuses. The 
variable SOURCE in the database gives details about the type of survey for each 
observation in the database  
 
 
                                                          
3
 Labor related establishment surveys are conducted at the establishment level, while labor force 
surveys collect information by interviewing individuals. In some countries, the labor related 
establishment surveys exclude small firms having a number of employees below a certain threshold. 
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Table 2.2. Types of surveys 
 
For the estimation of industrial wages, all surveys should ideally have the same coverage of 
workers. However, this is not the case. Four different levels of worker coverage are used in 
the data sources mentioned in Table 2.2, namely: total coverage; employees; salaried 
employees; and wage earners. Total coverage includes employees and self-employed 
individuals such as business owners, own account workers and members of producers’ 
cooperatives. Employees refer to both salaried employees and wage earners, i.e. total paid 
employment. Wage earners are low-skilled workers whose wages depend on their hours 
worked, while salaried employees receive a payment that is independent of the number of 
hours worked. Table 2.3 presents the composition of the database by level of worker 
coverage. The table shows that most observations refer to data on wages paid to employees. 
Only some observations have a different level of coverage. The variable WORKER in the 
database provides information about the worker coverage of the underlying survey. 
 
 
Table 2.4 presents the composition of our database with respect to the concept of wages 
that is used. About 72% of the cases report data on a monthly basis, out of which 52% refer 
to gross monthly earnings. There are 298 observations, equivalent to 20% of the cases, 
which report data on net monthly earnings. Earnings per year, earnings per week and 
earnings per hour are the next three major categories, which account for 10%, 8% and 4%, 
respectively. Less than 6% of the data are based on other concepts of wages, such as 
monthly salary, earnings per day or wage rate per day. The variable WAGE_CONCEPT in 
the database gives details about this issue. 
Source  of data Frequency Percent
Establishment  survey 674 45.39
Household budget survey 588 39.53
Labor force survey 144 9.56
Insurance records 41 2.76
Administrative reports 29 1.95
Tax records 9 0.61
Population census 3 0.2
Worker coverage Frequency Percentage
Employees 1,434 96.57
Total coverage 4 0.27
Salaried employees 21 1.41
Wage earners 26 1.75
Total 1,485 100






Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
 
2.5 Suggestions for future usage of the database 
Most studies on cross-country industrial wage differentials thus far use macro data, mainly 
coming from the national accounts (Gaetano, 2011; Genre et al., 2011; Gittleman and 
Wolff, 1993; Hartwig, 2011). For some countries, this type of data has been found to be 
potentially biased (Bloem et al., 1998). Moreover, macro-based industrial wages are 
imputed by dividing total wages by total employment in each industry. This imputation 
practice has been found to produce biased industrial wages (Le et al., 2013a).  
In contrast, micro survey data provide an unbiased estimate of wages (Bound et al., 2001; 
Le et al., 2013a). Therefore, our database will offer an alternative and more reliable basis to 
revisit empirical findings which are based on macro data. More importantly, this database 
will open new opportunities for research on different relevant economic issues in a large 
number of countries.  
First, this database enables research—with reliable data—to further our understanding of 
the structure of industrial wages, both within and between countries. Although the concept 
of wages varies between countries and sometimes within one country, the wage concept is 
consistently used within one survey. As such, our database will be suitable for analyzing 
relative wages of different industries within a country. To the extent that taxes and 
components of wages other than the basic wages and salaries rate are proportional to total 
earnings, research concerning the inter-industry wage structure will not be likely to suffer 
from any loss of precision. 
Figure 2.3 graphs the ratio of the average wages of some industries to the average wages of 
the whole economy. Each industry is indicated by its ISIC 3 one-digit level. The figure 
reveals that the inter-industry wage structure is relatively stable over time. Previous studies 
on inter-industry wages focused on industrial countries due to lack of data for developing 
countries. Our database enables the study of the inter-industry wage structure on a 
worldwide basis and to examine differences between different sets of countries. 
Second, our database can be used to study the determinants of the inter-industry wage 
structure for a large number of countries. Based on a sample of 8 Euro area countries over 
the 1991-2002 period, Genre et al. (2011) find that human capital, firm characteristics as 
well as socio-cultural and institutional factors play a major role in explaining inter-industry 
Wage Concepts Number of O bservations Percentage
Earnings per month 771 51.92
Net monthly labor income 269 18.11
Earnings per year 153 10.3
Earnings per week 112 7.54
Earnings per hour 67 4.44
Net monthly earnings 29 1.95
Wage rates per day 24 1.62
Net monthly salary 18 1.21
Wage rates per month 118 1.08
Earnings per day 14 0.94
Net yearly earnings 13 0.88
Total 1,488 100
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wage differentials. Our database will help extending this line of research to other countries, 
especially developing countries for which data availability is often a severe problem. This 
database will also provide a basis for empirical studies on the impact of globalization, 
especially the possible impact of international trade and capital flows, on the relative wage 
position of tradable industries, such as manufacturing and mining, and non-tradable sectors, 
such as education, public administration and health. 
 
Figure 2.3. The inter-industry wage structure 
Third, our database offers a new opportunity to study the impact of the inter-industry wage 
structure on different aspects of the economy. There is a large body of literature on the 
relationship between wages and workers’ performance. According to the efficiency wage 
theory, high-paid workers will be less likely to shirk and more willing to exert effort to 
fulfill their duty. This will improve the profitability of their firms and—at the aggregate 
level—the efficiency of the whole industry. This line of argument has been applied to 
investigate the relationship between government wages and corruption (Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder, 2001) and the quality of government (La Porta et al., 1999). Similarly, our 
database can be employed to extend the analysis to the relationship between wages and 
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Finally, our database can be used to infer government wages. The database gives the 
average wages of the public administration (industry L in Table 2.1). This narrow definition 
of the government excludes government activities in areas such as education and health, 
while it includes some private sector activities. However, based on a sample of 194 surveys 
from 43 countries (for which we have data to classify government and non-government 
employment in the public administration industry) it can be shown that the wages of the 
public administration industry are a good proxy for government wages. Table 2.5 presents a 
summary of the results (detailed results are available on request).  
In Table 2.5, column All presents the information for all countries included in this analysis. 
Columns OECD, non-OECD, African, American, Asia and Europe present the information 
for respective subsets of countries. Rows A to Q show, for each of the 17 ISIC 3 industries, 
the share of government employment in the industry’s total employment. The rows Public 
sector shows its share in total employment of a country. Similar definitions hold for the 
rows General government and Public Administration. The row Wage ratio shows the mean 
of the ratio of the wages of the government part of public administration to the wages of the 
whole industry L (Public administration; defense; and compulsory social security).  
Industry/Sector ALL O ECD Non-O ECD Africa America Asia Europe
A 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.12
B 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.15
C 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.30 0.05 0.41 0.39
D 0.07 0.03 0.18 0.19 0.02 0.21 0.06
E 0.43 0.24 0.61 0.80 0.35 0.66 0.38
F 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.07
G 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.03
H 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.06
I 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.11 0.34 0.38
J 0.19 0.11 0.41 0.52 0.05 0.62 0.17
K 0.13 0.09 0.26 0.14 0.04 0.40 0.13
L 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.94
M 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.89 0.70 0.77 0.83
N 0.59 0.55 0.70 0.73 0.30 0.76 0.67
O 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.05 0.33 0.27
P 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.07
Q 0.46 0.78 0.24 0.50 0.07 0.26 0.75
Public sector 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.38 0.15 0.28 0.31
General government 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.28 0.13 0.16 0.22
Public administration 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.09
Wage ratio 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01
No. countries 43 19 24 3 14 6 20
No. surveys 194 140 54 4 44 18 128
This table presents the share of government employment by industries, government levels and by groups of countries. 
The rows labeled from A to Q represent the share of government employment relative to total employment in each 
industry. The rows Public sector, General government, and Public administration show the share of employment by 
these government levels relative to total employment. The Wage ratio row presents the mean of the ratio of 
government public administration wages to the wages of the whole public administration; defense; and compulsory 
social security industry.
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It can be seen from this table that the government part of public administration accounts for 
only less than one half of the employment in the general government sector  and less than 
one third of the total public sector employment (which includes the employment of the 
general government sector and the state owned enterprises). As expected, the share of 
government employment in industry L is 94% or higher. The row “Wage ratio” shows that 
the mean of the wage ratio is 1.01 and remains almost the same for different groups of 
countries. Its standard deviation is 0.016 (not reported in the table). These findings are quite 
similar across continents as well as between developed and developing countries. They 
clearly indicate that the wages of the public administration industry (L) serve as a good 
proxy for the wages in the government part of public administration. Using these data on 
government wages, Le et al. (2013b) find strong evidence that higher government wages 
reduce corruption in low-income countries. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Lack of data has been a stumbling block in empirical research on industrial wages at the 
cross-country level. Most studies so far relied on data from national accounts and were 
mostly confined to a group of developed countries with relatively good data at the macro 
level. This chapter introduces a micro-based database which covers a large number of 
developing—next to developed—countries. It thus makes it possible to extend analyses to 
countries which have so far been neglected due to lack of data. As more survey data 
become available, the database will be updated regularly in the future. 
The database consists of 4 datasets. The first three datasets correspond to the data collected 
from the ILO, the SEDLAC, and the original micro survey datasets we have collected from 
6 international databases and several national archives. The fourth dataset combines these 
three datasets into a unified dataset. When a particular country-year has more than one 
observation, this unified dataset includes the observation which is based on the more 
comprehensive concept of wages. When two observations are based on the same wage 
concept, the observation from the series which is available for the longest time span is 
included.  
Although the concept of wages, time basis and worker coverage vary from one country to 
another, our database is suitable for studying relative wages between industries within the 
same country and between countries. This is because the concepts of wages, time basis and 
worker coverage used in the database are consistent within each country-year. Therefore, 
analyses based on relative wages are not likely to suffer from any loss of precision. Authors 
who are interested in comparing the level of industrial wages between countries or 
analyzing the trend of wages over time should consult the explanatory notes as well as the 
concept variables which are provided in the database to ensure that data are comparable 
across countries and over time. 
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2.8 Appendices 
2.8.1 Appendix 2.A. The correspondence between SEDLAC sectors and ISIC 
industries 
Manufacturing (industry D) wages from SEDLAC are the average of the wages of the low 
tech and high tech sectors, weighted by the labor share of the two sectors in the sample. 
Suppose that a sample of   manufacturing workers is surveyed, of which  ! are in the low 
tech sector and   in the high tech sector. The corresponding average wages are ! and . The average wages for the manufacturing industry are then obtained as 
" = #$#$ + #$ +
##$ + # 
Information on the shares  !/( ! +  ) and  /( ! +  ) is given in the SEDLAC 
database. 
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2.8.2 Appendix 2.B. List of countries and data sources included in the database 
 
Country Obs Source 1*    Source 2    Source 3** 
Albania 11 ILO: 1997-2006;   LSMS: 2002-2005, 2008 
Andorra 13 ILO: 1998-2010 
Anguilla 1 ILO: 1998-2010 
Argentina 24 SEDLAC: 1986-1989; 1992-2011 
Armenia 21 ILO: 1990-2010 
Aruba 1 ILO: 1998-2010 
Australia 3 LIS: 1995, 2001, 2003 
Austria 16 ILO: 1995-2003, 2009-2010;  ECHP: 1995-2001;   EU-SILC: 2003-2010 
Azerbaijan 14 ILO: 1997-2010 
Bahamas 1 SEDLAC: 2001 
Belarus 2 ILO: 2009-2010 
Belgium 16 ILO: 1999-2007;   ECHP: 1994-1999, 2001;  EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
Belize 5 SEDLAC: 1993-1994, 1997-1999 
Bermuda 6 ILO: 2004-2007, 2009-2010 
Bolivia 15 ILO: 1996-2000, 2009;  SEDLAC: 1993, 1997, 1999-2008 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 5 ILO: 2006;   LSMS:2001-2004 
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Country Obs Source 1*    Source 2    Source 3** 
Brazil 28 ILO: 1994-2002;   SEDLAC: 1981-1993, 1995-1999, 2002-2006, 2008 - 2009 
Bulgaria 15 ILO: 1996-2010;   EU-SILC: 2005-2010 
Canada 28 ILO: 1983-2010 
Chile 11 ILO: 2006-2008, 2010; SEDLAC: 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 
China 23 ILO: 1986-2008 
Colombia 14 ILO: 2002-2007;   SEDLAC: 1992, 1996, 1999-2010 
Costa Rica 22 ILO: 1998-2008, 2010;  SEDLAC: 1989-2010 
Croatia 15 ILO: 1996-2010 
Cuba 2 ILO: 2009-2010 
Cyprus 15 ILO: 1996-2006, 2009-2010;  EU-SILC: 2004-2008 
Czech Republic 26 ILO: 1985-2007, 2008-2009;  EU-SILC: 2004-2009 
Denmark 16 ILO: 1995-2007;   ECHP: 1994-1999, 2001; EU-SILC: 2003 - 2009 
Dominican Republic 15 ILO: 1996-2010;   SEDLAC: 1996-1997, 2000-2010 
East Timor 2 LSMS: 2001, 2007 
Ecuador 13 ILO: 1995-2004;   SEDLAC: 1994-1995, 1996-2000, 2003-2010 
Egypt 12 ILO: 1996-2007;   ERF: 1998, 2005 
El Salvador 16 ILO: 1998-2006;   SEDLAC: 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998-2006 
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Country Obs Source 1*    Source 2    Source 3** 
Ethiopia 2 ILO: 2009-2010 
Finland 16 ILO: 1995-2010;   ECHP: 1996-2001;   EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
France 16 ILO: 1999-2002;   ECHP: 1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
French Guiana 4 ILO: 1998-2001 
Gambia 3 ILO: 1993, 1994, 1998 
Georgia 14 ILO: 1997-2010 
Germany 15 ILO: 2007-2010;   ECHP: 1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
Gibraltar 10 ILO: 1998-2007 
Greece 16 ILO: 2000, 2002, 2006;  ECHP: 1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2003-2010 
Guadeloupe 4 ILO: 1998-2001 
Guatemala 5 SEDLAC: 2000, 2002-2004, 2006 
Guyana 5 SEDLAC: 1993;   ILO: 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007 
Haiti 1 SEDLAC: 2001 
Honduras 19 ILO: 2006;    SEDLAC:1991-2010 
Hong Kong 2 ILO: 2009-2010 
Hungary 19 ILO: 1992-2008;   EU-SILC: 2003-2010 
Iceland 12 ILO: 1996-2008;   EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
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Country Obs Source 1*    Source 2    Source 3** 
Indonesia 4 ILO: 2007-2010 
Ireland 16 ILO: 1996-2006;   ECHP: 1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
Isle of Man 14 ILO: 1995-2008 
Israel 15 ILO: 1994-2010 
Italy 15 ECHP: 1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2003-2010 
Jamaica 11 ILO: 2001-2008;   SEDLAC: 1990, 1996, 1999-2002 
Japan 10 ILO: 1999 - 2008 
Jersey 13 ILO: 1997-2009 
Jordan 16 ILO: 1994-2008;   ERF: 2010 
Kazakhstan 18 ILO: 1993-2010 
Kyrgyzstan 18 ILO: 1990-2007 
Latvia 21 ILO: 1990-2010;   EU-SILC: 2006-2009 
Lithuania 17 ILO: 1993-2009;   EU-SILC: 2004-2009 
Luxembourg 17 ILO: 1995-2010;   ECHP: 1994-1996, 1998-2001;  EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
Macau 13 ILO: 1998-2010 
Macedonia 9 ILO: 2001-2008 
Madagascar 1 ILO: 2005 
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Country Obs Source 1*    Source 2    Source 3** 
Malta 10 ILO: 2000-2008;   EU-SILC: 2008-2009 
Martinique 4 ILO: 1998-2001 
Mauritius 12 ILO: 1999-2008 
Mexico 20 ILO: 1992-2008;   SEDLAC: 1989, even years between  1992-2010 
Moldova 15 ILO: 1996-2010 
Mongolia 11 ILO: 2000-2010 
Montenegro 4 ILO: 2007-2010 
Nepal 1 ILO: 1999 
Netherlands 16 ILO: 1994-2005;   ECHP: 1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2004-2009 
Netherlands Antilles 9 ILO: 1991-1998, 2000 
New Caledonia 1 ILO: 1999 
New Zealand 22 ILO: 1989-2010 
Nicaragua 6 ILO: 2009-2010;   SEDLAC: 1993, 1998, 2001, 2005 
Nigeria 1 LSMS: 2010 
Norway 14 ILO: 1997-2010;   EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
Panama 17 ILO: 1998-1999, 2002-2010;  SEDLAC: 1989, 1991, 1995, 1997-2007, 2009-2010 
Paraguay 14 ILO: 2007 – 2010;   SEDLAC: 1990, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 – 2010 
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Country Obs Source 1*    Source 2    Source 3** 
Philippines 15 ILO: 1996-2010 
Poland 18 ILO: 1993-2008, 2010;  EU-SILC: 2004-2009 
Portugal 17 ILO: 1998-2010;   ECHP: 1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2004-2009 
Qatar 5 ILO: 2001, 2005-2007, 2009 
Romania 19 ILO: 1992-2007, 2009-2010;  EU-SILC: 2004-2009 
Russian Federation 10 ILO: 1995-1998, 2005-2010 
Saint Helena 9 ILO: 1994-2002 
San Marino 6 ILO: 2001-2006 
Saudi Arabia 2 ILO: 1997, 2009 
Serbia 9 ILO: 2003-2010;   LSMS: 2002, 2003, 2007 
Serbia & Montenegro 9 ILO: 1997-2005 
Seychelles 24 ILO: 1986-2009 
Slovakia 20 ILO: 1991-2010;    EU-SILC: 2004-2009 
Slovenia 26 ILO: 1985-2010;   EU-SILC: 2004-2010 
South Africa 10 NDA: 1997-1999, 2002-2008 
South Korea 16 ILO: 1993-2008;   LIS: 2006 
Spain 17 ILO: 1996-2009;   ECHP: 1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2004-2010 






Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source 1*    Source 2    Source 3** 
Suriname 1 SEDLAC: 1999 
Sweden 17 ILO: 1993-2007;   ECHP: 1997-2001;   EU-SILC: 2003-2009 
Switzerland 9 ILO: 1994-2008, every even year 
Taiwan 8 ILO: 2004-2008;   LIS 1995, 1997, 2000, 2005 
Tajikistan 10 ILO: 2000-2007;   LSMS: 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009 
Tanzania 3 NDA: 2001, 2008, 2010 
Thailand 8 ILO: 2001-2008 
Turkey 13 ILO: 1993-2005 
Uganda 5 NDA: 1999, 2002, 2006; LSMS: 2009, 2010 
Ukraine 16 ILO: 1995-2010 
United Kingdom 25 ILO: 1986-2010;   ECHP:1994-2001;   EU-SILC: 2004-2010 
United States 22 NDA: 1990-2011 
Uruguay 17 SEDLAC: 1989, 1992, 1995-2010 
Uzbekistan 6 ILO: 1994-1999 
Venezuela 18 SEDLAC: 1989, 1992, 1995, 1997-2011 
Vietnam 6 NDA: 1993, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 
Vincent & the Grenadines 11 ILO: 1992-2002 






Industrial wages across countries and over time: A new database of micro survey data 
 
Country Obs Source 1*    Source 2    Source 3** 
Zimbabwe 1 ILO: 2009 
ILO: International Labor Organization 
SEDLAC: Socio-Economic Database for Latin American and the Caribbean Countries 
ERF: Economic Research Forum 
LIS: Luxembourg Income Study 
LSMS: World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Study 
IPUMS: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
NDA stands for National data archive. The specific name of the source (which can be searched and accessed online) is provided in the Explanatory notes accompanying the data. 
*Data on the public administration industry from SEDLAC include wages of extra territorial organizations and bodies (industry Q). However, the share of industry Q (also 
provided by SEDLAC) is negligible is negligible in these countries (i.e. equals zero or is less than 1% for most of the cases). 








Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
 
2.8.3 Appendix 2.C. The online explanatory notes accompanying the database 
 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Albania 11 ILO 1997-2006 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 2002-2005, 2008: data 
from LSMS. For other 
years, data are from 
ILO. The ILO data is 
less comprehensive in 
the sense that it only 




Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Andorra 13 ILO 1998-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  data are from ILO only 
Anguilla 1 ILO 1998-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  data are from ILO only 
Argentina 24 SEDLAC 1986-1989; 
1992-2011 
Net earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Monthly data is 
monthly labor 
income. Hourly 
data is wages 
from main the 
main job 
data are from SEDLAC 
only 
Armenia 21 ILO 1990-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Prior to 1994: 
roubles; 1 dram = 
200 roubles 






Industrial wages across countries and over time: A new database of micro survey data 
 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Aruba 1 ILO 1998-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  data are from ILO only 
Australia 3 LIS 1995, 2001, 
2003 
Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 




- There are some 










data are from LIS only 
Austria 16 ILO 1995-2003, 
2009-2010 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers ILO data: Prior to 
1999: ATS; 1 
Euro = 13.7603 
ATS. 
- 1995-2001: Data from 
ECHP 
- 2002: ILO 
- 2003-2010: SILC 
ECHP 1995-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Earnings in kind 
not included 
 EU-SILC 2003-2010 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Data in 2010 are 
monthly gross 






Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Azerbaijan 14 ILO 1997-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers From 2005: New 
denomination of 
AZM; 1 AZN = 
5,000 AZM. 
data are from ILO only 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
5 ILO 2006    Cleaned, check for outliers  - 2002-2004: LSMS 
- 2006: ILO 
LSMS 2001-2004 Net salary Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Bahamas 1 SEDLAC 2001 Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Only whole 
country wages 
are available 
data are from SEDLAC 
only 
Belarus 2 ILO 2009-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  data are from ILO only 
Belgium 16 ILO 1999-2007 Gross earnings Monthly 
Hourly 









Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Income in kind not 
included 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Belize 5 SEDLAC 1993-1994, 
1997-1999 
Net earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Monthly data is 
monthly labor 
income. Hourly 
data is wages 
from main the 
main job 
 
Data are from SEDLAC 
only 
Bermuda 6 ILO 2004-2007, 
2009-2010 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  data are from ILO only 
Bolivia 15 ILO 1996-2000, 
2009 
Wage rates Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers 2009 data are 
gross earnings 
- 1996, 1998, 2009: ILO 
- 1993, 1997, 1999-
2008: SEDLAC 
SEDLAC 1993, 1997, 
1999-2008 
Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  
Botswana 12 ILO 1997-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Private sector 
only 
data are from ILO only 
Brazil 28 ILO 1994-2002 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1994, 2000, 2001: ILO 
- other years: SEDLAC 
 SEDLAC 1981-1993, 
1995-1999,  
2002-2006, 
2008 – 2009 
Net earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Monthly data is 
monthly labor 
income. Hourly 
data is wages 







Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Bulgaria 15 ILO 1996-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers From 1999: New 
denomination: 1 
new lev = 1,000 
old leva. 
- Before 2005: ILO 
- From 2005: EU-SILC 
EU-SILC 2005-2010 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Data in 2010 are 
monthly gross 
earnings in cash 
Canada 28 ILO 1983-2010 Gross earnings Weekly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers There are some 
changes in the 
methodology, 
check the flag 




data are from ILO only 
Chile 11 ILO 2006-2008, 
2010 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 2007, 2008, 2010: ILO 
- Other years: SEDLAC 




Net earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Monthly data is 
monthly labor 
income. Hourly 
data is wages 
from main the 
main job 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Colombia 14 ILO 2002-2007 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data are from the 
SEDLAC only 
SEDLAC 1992, 1996, 
1999-2010 
Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Monthly data is 
monthly labor 
income. Hourly 
data is wages  
from main the 
main job 
Costa Rica 22 ILO 1998-2008, 
2010 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data are from the 
SEDLAC only 
SEDLAC 1989-2010 Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Monthly data is 
monthly labor 
income. Hourly 
data is wages 
from main the 
main job 
Croatia 15 ILO 1996-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  data are from ILO only 
Cuba 2 ILO 2009-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  data are from ILO only 
Cyprus 15 ILO 1996-2006, 
2009-2010 
Gross earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 2004-2008: EU-SILC 
- Other years: ILO 
EU-SILC 2004-2008 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 







Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Czech Republic 26 ILO 1985-2007, 
2008-2009 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 2004-2009: EU-SILC 
- Other years: ILO 
EU-SILC 2004-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Denmark 16 ILO 1995-2007 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Private sector 
only 
- 1999 - 2001: ILO 




Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
EU-SILC 2003 – 2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 




15 ILO 1996-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1998 - 1999: ILO 
- Other years: SEDLAC 
SEDLAC 1996-1997, 
2000-2010 






Industrial wages across countries and over time: A new database of micro survey data 
 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
East Timor 2 LSMS 2001, 2007 Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 Data from LSMS only 
Ecuador 13 ILO 1995-2004 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1996-1997, 2001-
2002: ILO 
- Other years: SEDLAC SEDLAC 1994-1995, 
1996-2000,  
2003-2010 
Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  
Egypt 12 ILO 1996-2007 Gross earnings Weekly Wage 
earners 
Cleaned, check for outliers Wage earners are 
low skill workers 
- 1998, 2006: Data from 
ERF 
- Other years: ILO 
ERF 1998, 2005 Net earnings Monthly  Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 









Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
El Salvador 16 ILO 1998-2006 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Prior to 2002: 
colones; 8.75 
colones = 1 US 
dollar 














Estonia 19 ILO 1992-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Data from the 
ILO is more 
continuous 
- 2003-2009: EU-SILC 
- Other years: ILO 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Ethiopia 2 ILO 2009-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  data are from ILO only 
Finland 16 ILO 1995-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1995, 2002, 2010: ILO 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
ECHP 1996-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 - 2003-2009: EU-SILC 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
France 16 ILO 1999-2002 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  -1994-2001: ECHP 
- 2002, 2010: ILO 
- 2003-2009: EU-SILC ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
French Guiana 4 ILO 1998-2001 Gross Earnings Hourly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Gambia 3 ILO 1993, 1994, 
1998 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 






Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Germany 15 ILO 2007-2010 Gross earnings Hourly 
Monthly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers - Data for 2007, 
2008 are in 
hourly basis 
- There are also 
data on hourly for 
wage earners, but 
not included 
because they are 
not compatible 
with other data 
sources 
- 2010: Data from ILO 
- Other years: Data from 
ECHP and EU-SILC 
ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Gibraltar 10 ILO 1998-2007 Gross earnings Hourly Wage 
earners 
Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Greece 16 ILO 2000, 2002, 
2006 
Gross earnings Monthly Wage 
earners 
Cleaned, check for outliers - 2006 data cover 
employees 
- 2002: ILO 
- Other years: ECHP 
and EU-SILC 
ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
EU-SILC 2003-2010 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
- 2010 data: 
Gross earnings in 
cash 
Guadeloupe 4 ILO 1998-2001 Gross earnings Hourly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Guatemala 5 SEDLAC 2000, 2006 
2002-2004  
Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from SEDLAC 
only 
Guyana 5 SEDLAC 1993 Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1993: SEDLAC 
- Other years: ILO 
ILO 2003, 2004, 
2006, 2007 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  
Haiti 1 SEDLAC 2001 Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from SEDLAC 
only 
Honduras 19 ILO 2006 Wage rates Daily Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from SEDLAC 
only 
SEDLAC 1991-2010 Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  
Hong Kong 2 ILO 2009-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Hungary 19 ILO 1992-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers - Prior to 1999: 
enterprises with 








Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
EU-SILC 2003-2010 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 - Before 2003: Data 
from ILO 
- From 2003: EU-SILC 
Iceland 12 ILO 1996-2008 Gross earnings Hourly Wage 
earners 
Cleaned, check for outliers  - Before 2003: Data 
from ILO 
- From 2003: EU-SILC 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
India 3 IPUMS 1993, 1999, 
2004 
Gross earnings Weekly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 Data from IPUMS only 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Ireland 16 ILO 1996-2006 Gross earnings Weekly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers - There is some 
data on wage 





- 2002: Data from ILO 
- Other years: ECHP, 
EU-SILC 
ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Isle of Man 14 ILO 1995-2008 Gross earnings Weekly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Israel 15 ILO 1994-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Italy 15 ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 Combining data from 
ECHP and EU-SILC 
EU-SILC 2003-2010 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 







Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Jamaica 11 ILO 2001-2008 Gross earnings Weekly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1990, 1996, 2000: 
SEDLAC 
- 2001-2008: ILO SEDLAC 1990, 1996, 
1999-2002 
Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  
Japan 10 ILO 1999 – 2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Jersey 13 ILO 1997-2009 Gross earnings Weekly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Jordan 16 ILO 1994-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers   
ERF 2010 Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 - 2010: Data from ERF 
- Other years: ILO 
Kazakhstan 18 ILO 1993-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Kyrgyzstan 18 ILO 1990-2007 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Latvia 21 ILO 1990-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers EU-SILC data is 
more 
comprehensive in 
terms of wage 
concept but the 
ILO data offers a 
longer series 
- Data from ILO only 
EU-SILC 2006-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Lithuania 17 ILO 1993-2009 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers EU-SILC data is 
more 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
EU-SILC 2004-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
comprehensive in 
terms of wage 
concept but the 
ILO data offers a 
longer series 
Luxembourg 17 ILO 1995-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Salaried 
Employees 
Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1997, 2002, 2010: ILO 




Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Macau 13 ILO 1998-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Total 
coverage 
Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Madagascar 1 ILO 2005 Gross earnings Hourly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Macedonia 9 ILO 2001-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Maldives 1 ILO 2010 Gross earnings Hourly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Malta 10 ILO 2000-2008 Gross earnings Hourly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  -2000-2007: ILO 
- 2008-2009: EU-SILC 
EU-SILC 2008-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 







Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
wages using relevant weights 
Martinique 4 ILO 1998-2001 Gross earnings Hourly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Mauritius 12 ILO 1999-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Establishment 
with 10 or more 
employees 
Data from ILO only 
Mexico 20 ILO 1992-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers New 
methodology 
from 1995 
1989, 1992, 1994, 2010: 
SEDLAC 
Other years: ILO 




Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  
Moldova 15 ILO 1996-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Establishments 
with 20 or more 
employees 
Data from ILO only 
Mongolia 11 ILO 2000-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Montenegro 4 ILO 2007-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Nepal 1 ILO 1999 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Netherlands 16 ILO 1994-2005 Gross earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 2002, 2004\3: ILO 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 EU-SILC 
EU-SILC 2004-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 




9 ILO 1991-1998, 
2000 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
New Caledonia 1 ILO 1999 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Industry N 
includes only 
private workers 
Data from ILO only 
New Zealand 22 ILO 1989-2010 Gross earnings Hourly 
Monthly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Data for 2009, 
2010 are in the 
monthly basis 
Data from ILO only 
Nicaragua 6 ILO 2009-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 2009 - 2010: Data 
from ILO 
- Other years: SEDLAC SEDLAC 1993, 1998, 
2001, 2005 






Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Nigeria 1 LSMS 2010 Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
Top and bottom 
1% drop to 
remove outliers 
Data from LSMS only 
Norway 14 ILO 1997-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  -2003-2009: Data from 
EU-SILC 
- Other years: ILO EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Panama 17 ILO 1998-1999, 
2002-2010 
Gross earnings Hourly 
Monthly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers - 1998-1999, 
2009-2010: 
Monthly 
- Other years: 
Hourly 
- 2007 - 2008: ILO 
- Other years: SEDLAC 




Net earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
SEDLAC 1990, 1995, 
1997, 1999 
2001 – 2010 
Net earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - Other years: SEDLAC 




Data from SEDLAC 
only 
SEDLAC 1997-2010 Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  
Philippines 15 ILO 1996-2010 Wage rates Daily Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Before 2001: 
Establishments 





with 10 or more 
persons 
employed. 
Data from ILO only 
Poland 18 ILO 1993-2008, 
2010 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 2003-2009: EU-SILC 
- Other years: ILO 
EU-SILC 2004-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Portugal 17 ILO 1998-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Prior to 2002: 
PTE; 1 Euro = 
200.482 PTE 
- 2002-2003: ILO 







Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
EU-SILC 2004-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 




Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers 2001: Gross 
earnings, total 
coverage. This 
data should be 
treated with care 
because there 
seems to be some 
incompatibility 





- Other years: 
Wage rates per 
month, 
employees 
Data from ILO only 
Romania 19 ILO 1992-2007, 
2009-2010 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers From 2005: New 
denomination: 1 
leu = 10,000 old 
lei. 
- 2004-2009: Data from  
EU-SILC 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
EU-SILC 2004-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 




10 ILO 1995-1998, 
2005-2010 
Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers 1997: New 
denomination: 1 
new ruble = 
1,000 old rubles 
Data from ILO only 
Saint Helena 9 ILO 1994-2002 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
11 ILO 1992-2002 Wage rates Daily Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
San Marino 6 ILO 2001-2006 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Saudi Arabia 2 ILO 1997, 2009 Gross earnings Weekly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Serbia 9 ILO 2003-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  2002: LSM 
Other years: ILO 
LSMS 2002, 2003, 
2007 
Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 







Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 




Data from ILO only 
Seychelles 24 ILO 1986-2009 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Slovakia 20 ILO 1991-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers 1997: Excluding 
enterprises with 




less than 10 
employees, 
- 2004-2009: EU-SILC 
- Other years: ILO 
EU-SILC 2004-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 






the value of 
payments in kind. 
2Prior to 2007: 
SIT; 1 Euro = 
239.64 SIT. 
- 2004-2009: EU-SILC 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
EU-SILC 2004-2010 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 





Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 - Data from SADA only 
South Korea 16 ILO 1993-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Establishments 





- 2006: LIS 
- Other years: ILO 
LIS 2006 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
Spain 17 ILO 1996-2009 Gross earnings Monthly 
Hourly 
Employees Cleaned, check for outliers - 2009: Monthly 
basis 
- Other years: 
Hourly 
- Prior to 1999: 
ESP; 1 Euro = 
166.386 Pesetas 
- 2002-2003: ILO 
- Other years: ECHP, 
EU-SILC 
ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
EU-SILC 2004-2010 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Sri Lanka 2 ILO 2009-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Suriname 1 SEDLAC 1999 Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from SEDLAC 
only 
Sweden 17 ILO 1993-2007 Gross earnings Hourly Wage 
earners 
Cleaned, check for outliers Combination of 
ILO data with 
other data is not 
advisable because 
the ILO data only 
cover wage 
earners, i.e. low 
- 1993-1997, 2002: ILO 
- Other years: ECHP, 
EU-SILC 
ECHP 1997-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
EU-SILC 2003-2009 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
skill workers 
Switzerland 9 ILO 1994, 2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers Data for even 
years only 
Data from ILO only 
Taiwan 8 ILO 2004-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1995, 1997, 2000, 
2005: LIS 
- Other years: ILO LIS 1995, 1997, 
2000, 2005 
Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Tajikistan 10 ILO 2000-2007 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  - 1999, 2003, 2007, 
2009: LSMS 
- Other years: ILO LSMS 1999, 2003, 
2007, 2009 
Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 





Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
  
Thailand 8 ILO 2001-2008 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Turkey 13 ILO 1993-2005 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 







Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 - 1999, 2002, 2006: 
Data from 
openmicrodata only 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 
 2009, 2010 Net earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
Ukraine 16 ILO 1995-2010 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
United 
Kingdom 
25 ILO 1986-2010 Gross earnings Monthly 
Hourly 




- Before 2004: ILO 
- 2004-2010: EU-SILC 
ECHP 1994-2001 Gross earnings Monthly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
EU-SILC 2004-2010 Gross earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
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1995-2010 Gross earnings Weekly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 
United States 22 National data 
archive: CPS 
1990-2011 Gross earnings Weekly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 Data from CPS only 
Uruguay 17 SEDLAC 1989, 1992, 
1995-2010 
Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from SEDLAC 
only 
Uzbekistan 6 ILO 1994-1999 Gross earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from ILO only 
Venezuela 18 SEDLAC 1989, 1992, 
1995, 1997- 
2011 
Net earnings Monthly Employees Cleaned, check for outliers  Data from SEDLAC 
only 





Net earnings Yearly Employees - Employees with positive 
income are retained 
- Payment in non-monthly basis 
is converted to monthly basis 
- Bonus, payment in kind are 
included 
- Top and bottom 1 percent 
dropped 
- Estimate average industrial 
wages using relevant weights 
 Data from GSO only 
West Bank 
& Gaza Strip 
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Country Obs Source Years Wage concept Time basis Coverage Applied Procedures Notes Combined dataset 





















   
Chapter 3 
Measuring government wages: 
Invalidating the macro data 
approach 
3.1 Introduction1 
Empirical economists have to accept the inconvenient truth that data are measured with 
errors. Data on government wages are no exception. They have commonly been obtained 
by imputation, using data at the macro level. That is, the government wages are calculated 
by dividing the government wage bill by the total government employment (Holm-Hadulla 
et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1999; Lamo et al., 2012; Lane, 2003; Schiavo-Campo et al., 
1997; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). While the wage bill from national accounts data 
has been found to be unreliable in some countries (Bloem et al., 1998), it is in particular the 
measurement of government employment that has been proven to be notoriously difficult in 
any country. This is due to the presence of part time, part year and casual workers (Heller 
and Tait, 1984; Lamo et al., 2012; Schiavo-Campo et al., 1997). Little can be said therefore 
about the reliability of imputed government wages. They may be unbiased, but they may 
also be seriously biased upward or downward, depending on the magnitude of the errors in 
the data for the wage bill and employment.  
Despite this uncertainty about the quality of the data, a large and increasing number of 
studies still utilize this macro data approach to impute government wages. Although most 
authors acknowledge the limitations of the data on government wages and employment as 
well as the possible consequences for their empirical findings (Lamo et al., 2012; Schiavo-
Campo, 1998), no research has been devoted to uncovering this methodological problem. In 
this chapter, we focus on the bias of government wages as computed from macro data. We 
use a large number of nationally representative and internationally harmonized household 
survey micro datasets to obtain unbiased estimates of the government wages. These are 
used as a benchmark to validate the government wages as computed from macro data.  
The literature on survey methodology shows that estimates from micro household survey 
datasets are unbiased as long as the surveyed samples are random and representative (Lohr, 
2010). A large body of survey validation literature indeed reports that household survey 
data yield unbiased estimates of the true wages (Akee, 2011; Bound et al., 2001; Kapteyn 
and Ypma, 2007).  
                                                          
1
 This chapter is based on Le, V.H., Dietzenbacher, E., de Haan, J., 2013. Measuring government 
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One obstacle to our validation approach is that national household surveys often employ a 
less comprehensive concept of wages than the concept used in macro databases. Wages in 
the national accounts as well as in international databases—such as the International 
Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) or the OECD.Stat database—are 
defined as gross total earnings, in cash and in kind, that are paid to employees in a given 
period of time. In contrast, household surveys often capture less comprehensive concepts 
such as net earnings (i.e. total earnings less tax), earnings in cash, or basic monthly salaries. 
To overcome this obstacle, we have used data from the European Union’s project 
“Statistics on Income and Living Conditions” (EU-SILC). It reports gross total earnings in 
cash and in kind at the individual level for 32 countries (27 EU member countries, plus 
Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey). Also the United States is included in 
our analysis, using comparable data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).   
Our results—based on 98 observations from 17 countries—show that the macro data 
approach overestimates the government wages in 11 countries. Underestimation is found 
for 2 countries and only in the remaining 4 countries does the macro data approach produce 
reasonable estimates of the government wages. We also find that the magnitude of the bias 
of the macro data approach is country specific and remains relatively stable over time. Our 
findings not only have implications for studies on government wages at the national level 
but also for studies that examine or use imputed wages at other levels (e.g. regions, 
industries, household groups). The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
motivation for this research. Section 3.3 describes the data sources. Section 3.4 offers the 
results, while Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Motivation 
In many countries, the government is the largest employer. Research questions related to 
the remuneration policies of governments have therefore received due attention in the 
literature. For example, how do governments differ across countries in terms of wages and 
remuneration policies and what are the determinants of such differences (Heller and Tait, 
1984; Schiavo-Campo, 1998)? Other examples include the influence of government wage 
policies on government efficiency, public sector quality and government corruption (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Panizza et al., 2001; Treisman, 2000; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 
2001). More recently, a new line of literature examined the effect of government 
remuneration policies on private sector wages and, thus, the general price level (Afonso and 
Gomes, 2011; Lamo et al., 2012; Pérez and Sánchez, 2011).  
 Table 3.1 presents an overview of studies in which data for government wages were 
created.2  Three observations stand out. First, the studies surveyed focus on different levels 
of government, namely the public sector, the general government sector, the central 
government, and the public administration sector. Second, the time and country coverage of 
these studies is rather limited. Except for the most recent studies on OECD countries, this 
limitation applies especially to developing countries. Third, and most importantly, studies 
on government wages have followed the macro data approach laid down by Heller and Tait 
                                                          
2
 This table only includes papers in which a data set was created, not the papers that used one of these 
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(1984). The average annual government wages are imputed by dividing the government 
wage bill by the corresponding total government employment. The only exception—to the 
best of our knowledge—is Panizza et al. (2001) who employ micro survey data in earnings 
regressions to estimate the government wage premium.  
Reviewing the literature, we also find that research which uses the datasets listed in Table 
3.1 has yielded limited and controversial results. This holds in particular with regards to the 
impact of government wages on government efficiency and corruption (Treisman, 2007). It 
is tempting to extent these studies by employing new data that have become available from 
databases by the IMF, OECD and the International Labor Organization (ILO). However, we 
feel it is essential to first investigate the current practice of imputing the average 
government wages. That is, to examine whether it provides data that are sufficiently reliable 
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3.2.1 The possible bias of the macro data approach 
The macro data approach computes the average government wages as the ratio of the 
government wage bill to total government employment. Potential biases therefore occur 
both in the numerator and in the denominator. First, the government wage bill may not be 
recorded correctly (or inconsistently across time and space). Many non-monetary 
benefits—such as travel, housing and other allowances—can be recorded as spending under 
other goods and services. In a similar fashion, payments to employees in government 
projects can be recorded as capital spending and outlays for temporary workers are in some 
countries classified as use of goods and services (Clements et al., 2010). In general, a 
number of spending categories should be included in the government wage bill but they are 
often mistakenly excluded (i.e. recorded somewhere else).  
Second, creating government employment data that are consistent over time and across 
countries is notoriously difficult. Issues to cope with include full time versus part time 
workers and full year versus part year employment. Some employees work full time for the 
whole year but others may work part time and only for a fraction of the year. In addition, 
casual workers—who work on contingent government projects—may account for a 
substantial proportion of government employment during some periods (Klitgaard, 1989). 
The key problem is that there is no agreed international standard on how to combine these 
different types of government employment into a single figure. An issue that applies to 
some developing countries is that government employment is inflated by fictitious workers 
who only exist in the books (Clements et al., 2010). 
The imputed average annual government wages can thus be biased upward or downward, 
depending on the precision of the statistics in a country. The changes in annual government 
wages within a country may simply reflect changes in the statistical methods employed 
rather than actual changes. When such measurement errors are not random, empirical 
conclusions can be rendered unreliable. 
3.2.2 Why should micro survey data be used as an appropriate benchmark? 
Survey data in general and survey data on wages and salaries in particular also suffer from 
measurement errors. A large body of literature on survey data validation has been devoted 
to analyzing the characteristics of errors in the reported wages (Akee, 2011; Bollinger, 
1998; Bound et al., 2001; Bound and Krueger, 1991; Duncan and Hill, 1985; Pischke, 
1995). These studies compare survey data on gross earnings with administrative data such 
as social security records or employer records. Both for developed and developing 
countries, the survey errors have been found to center around zero and to be mean 
reverting. Mean reversal occurs when people at the higher end of the income distribution 
underreport their income while people at the lower end of the distribution over-report their 
income. Based on this finding, let the self-reported survey wages and salaries of individual j 
be given by &. We assume 
' = '∗ − *+'∗ − ',∗- + . 
where &∗ gives the true wages and salaries for surveyed individual j, &/∗ is the population 
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&/∗-, with  δ > 0, captures the mean reversal of the errors. Suppose that a nationally 
representative sample of n government employees is collected via a survey. The sample 
mean of the government wage rate is &/ = ∑ &
 / and its expected value is 
 





 = 	 − *	  2('∗)
	






= 	 − *	 	',∗ + *',∗ = ',∗ 
 
where we have used that the sample is representative, i.e. 8+&∗- = &/∗, and that the errors 
center around zero, i.e. 8+0- = 0.  
The sample mean of the government wages in the survey is therefore an unbiased estimator 
of the population mean. This theoretical result, which rests on certain assumptions, has 
been corroborated empirically in various survey validation studies (see Bound et al., 2001, 
for a survey). Reviewing this literature, we find that in most studies the mean wages and 
salaries differ just a few percent between the survey and the administrative records. In a 
more recent study, Akee (2011) finds that the average self-reported earnings in the Federal 
State of Micronesia are only about 3% smaller than the average from administrative records 
in 1993 and the two averages are almost equal in 1999. Kapteyn and Ypma (2007) 
challenged the mean reversal of the errors for reported wages and salaries from a survey, 
arguing that also administrative records contain errors. Still, they find that the average 
wages and salaries reported in a survey for Sweden in 2003 are 2% smaller than the 
corresponding mean from administrative data.  
The finding that survey validation studies always report that the mean wages and salaries in 
survey and administrative data are close to each other suggests that mean wages from 
survey data are an unbiased estimator of the mean wages from administrative data. 
Therefore, we use the average government wages from household surveys as a benchmark 
to validate the government wages computed from macro data sources. 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Microdata 
The biggest challenge for our research is to find nationally representative survey datasets 
that provide data on wages that are comparable to the definition of wages provided in 
macroeconomic databases. In most countries, survey data often provide only some 
components of wages and salaries, such as net earnings, basic wage rates or a combination 
of basic wage rates and some other components like overtime payment or bonuses. 
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SILC) database and the Current Population Survey (CPS, March Supplementary files) from 
the United States provide data that allow us to carry out this validation exercise. 
The EU-SILC database results from a harmonized framework by the 27 EU member 
countries plus Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey to collect comprehensive 
data on income and living conditions (Clemenceau and Museux, 2007). We have used the 
cross sectional EU-SILC data from the first 7 rounds of the project, which took place 
between 2004 and 2010. In total, 177 datasets from 29 countries were obtained. Data for 
Croatia, Switzerland and Turkey are not available because these countries only participated 
in the most recent rounds.  
The EU-SILC project is an open framework that gives substantial freedom to national 
statistical offices to design their own sample. For each country, four different nationally 
representative subsamples are surveyed in a certain year. In the following year, one 
subsample is dropped and replaced by a completely new subsample. Each subsample is 
therefore included in the survey for four years.3  This design implies that the overall sample 
is representative and annually updated. 
EU-SILC focuses on different socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed individuals. 
For our research, however, the relevant questions are those about industry of work and total 
income in cash and in kind. The survey in a given year t, provides for each individual the 
following information: the industry of work in year t according to the International 
Standard of Industrial Classification of Economic Activities, Revision 3 (ISIC 3); the total 
wages and salaries in cash and in kind from work in year t-1; and whether an individual had 
a second job in year t-1. Using information that is available on a monthly basis, it is also 
known whether an individual changed jobs during the last 12 months. The wage concept 
used in the EU-SILC surveys is comparable with the definition of wages and salaries as 
used in macro databases.  
One drawback is that the EU-SILC database contains no information whether someone is 
working for the government. This prevents us from estimating the annual wages of 
government employees at different government levels. We focus therefore on the ISIC 3 
industry “Public administration and defense; compulsory social security” (indicated as 
public administration hereafter). The next section compares the micro and macro approach 
also for other industries.  
Our calculation of the wages in public administrations involved several steps. First, only 
individuals who work for the public administration industry are included. Second, public 
administration employees who report that they have changed their job since last year were 
dropped because their reported wages and salaries were earned in their previous job. Third, 
individuals who report that they had a second job were also dropped because their wages 
and salaries may contain income that is not earned in public administration. Fourth, some 
countries do not report data on whether an individual had a second job. If that information 
is not available, the whole dataset of that year is dropped. As a result, only 134 datasets in 
the EU-SILC database have been used. 
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In the final step, our micro-based estimates of annual government wages are obtained as the 
weighted averages of the gross annual earnings of the remaining individuals in the full 
sample (i.e. including all four subsamples). The weight is the probability that an individual 
is selected for the sample and reflects the population characteristics. The resulting 
government wages are the average wages of all individuals working for the public 
administration industry, who have positive wages and salaries. It should be emphasized that 
the nature of the work contract is not taken into account. Consequently, an individual 
receives a certain weight no matter whether (s)he works part time or full time. 
The proportion of public administration employees who have a second job or who have 
changed their job since last year is negligible in our data. As a robustness check, we have 
also estimated the government wages for the full sample (i.e. including also people with 
extra jobs and those who changed jobs). It turns out that our conclusions in the next section 
remain unchanged. The results are available upon request. 
The CPS is conducted monthly by the US Department of Labor and is representative for the 
whole population in the United States. Different from the EU-SILC data, the CPS only 
provides data on gross weekly earnings from the main job. For our study, we retain only 
individuals who work for the public administration industry and estimate the mean weekly 
wages for this subsample. The annual government wages are computed as the weekly 
wages multiplied by 52. This practice results in an underestimation of the annual wages if 
public administration employees enjoy non-regular earnings that are not captured in the 
weekly earnings. In the next section, we will discuss that this does not undermine our 
general conclusion for the US. 
3.3.2 Macro data 
Our macro data are taken from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database. The STAN 
database provides data on the wage bill and employment for ISIC 3 industries in 33 OECD 
countries from the early 1990s onwards and is updated regularly. The data come from the 
national accounts of the member countries. The macro average annual government wages 
(or STAN macro wages) are computed by dividing the wage bill by the number of 
employees in public administration. All countries included in the STAN database use head 
counts as the measure of employment. The macro data are thus in line with the micro data 
in the sense that no distinction is made between full time and part time workers. Some 
countries, however, also provide full time equivalent units. For these countries, we are 
therefore able to compute the corresponding full time equivalent annual government wages. 
STAN data are in the national currency while all EU-SILC data are in euros. To make a 
comparison possible, the STAN data on the wage bill are converted to Euros using the 
average annual exchange rates as obtained from Eurostat. This is done for all countries not 
in the Euro area, except the United States (for which both macro and micro data are in 
current US dollars). 
3.4 Results 
The final sample consists of 101 observations from 20 countries. The reduction of the 
sample size is due to the fact that some countries are included in the STAN database but not 
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except the annual series for the United States which spans 1998-2009. For most countries 
we have more than one observation except for Finland, Greece and Portugal. The list of 
countries and years that have been used in our study are listed in Appendix 3.A. 
3.4.1 The main results 
The macro and micro wages are difficult to compare because the wage levels differ 
substantially across countries. To ease the comparison of the macro and micro wages and 
highlight the bias of the macro data, we divide the macro government wages by the micro 
government wages. The resulting ratios are summarized in Table 3.2 and the details by 
country and year are given in Appendix 3.B.  
 
Although the average micro government wages are unbiased estimates of the true 
population mean of the government wages, they still contain sampling errors. When the 
sample—for a given country in a given year—would be repeated a large number of times, 
the average micro government wages will follow a normal distribution with the true 
average government wages as its mean. If the macro approach uses the same definition for 
the government wages and if the macro wages do not include measurement errors, they also 
reflect the true population mean. In that case, the macro and micro wages must—for 
individual years—be approximately the same and the macro-micro ratios will oscillate 
around 1. If the macro-micro ratio is consistently larger (smaller) than 1, the macro data 
Country Observations Mean StandardDeviation Min Max
Austria 7 0.99 0.05 0.93 1.09
Belgium 5 1.00 0.04 0.96 1.04
Czech Republic 6 1.20 0.03 1.16 1.23
Denmark 7 1.30 0.07 1.20 1.40
Estonia 7 1.19 0.10 1.09 1.36
Finland 1 0.82 - - -
France 5 1.09 0.05 1.02 1.15
Germany 5 0.94 0.02 0.91 0.97
Greece 1 1.03 - - -
Hungary 5 1.44 0.08 1.36 1.54
Ireland 3 1.24 0.02 1.22 1.25
Italy 4 1.06 0.03 1.04 1.10
Luxembourg 7 1.10 0.02 1.08 1.14
Netherlands 6 0.89 0.02 0.87 0.92
Poland 4 1.07 0.02 1.05 1.11
Portugal 1 1.13 - - -
Slovakia 6 1.81 0.20 1.64 2.09
Slovenia 6 1.09 0.01 1.07 1.11
Spain 3 0.96 0.04 0.94 1.01
United States 12 0.93 0.03 0.90 1.01
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approach overestimates (underestimates) the true population mean of the government 
wages. This is because the micro data approach yields an unbiased estimate (i.e. only 
contains random sampling errors). If macro and micro data use the same wage definition, a 
macro-micro ratio that is consistently larger (or smaller) than 1 suggests the occurrence of 
systematic measurement errors in the macro approach. For example, it may be the case that 
a country’s statistical practices lead to errors in the measurement of the wage bill and/or 
total government employment. Because statistical practices are often in place for some 
time, the error is likely to remain from one year to another.  
The results in Table 3.2 show that the macro data approach performs relatively poor for 
most of the 20 listed countries. It only produces good estimates of government wages for 
Austria, Belgium, and—to a lesser extent—Spain and the US. For these countries we find 
that the smallest observation is below 1 and the largest above 1. For the remaining countries 
we find that the macro wages are persistently too high for 11 countries and persistently too 
low for two countries, while for three countries we only have one observation.  
 
In the case of overestimation of the government wages, the mean macro-micro ratio varies 
from 1.06 to 1.81. Slovakia is the most extreme with an overestimation that ranges over the 
years from 64 to 109%. Hungary, Denmark, Ireland, the Czech Republic and Estonia are 
other countries in which the estimates with macro data approach are more than 15% larger 

























































































Figure 3.1. The distribution over time of the ratio of the macro to the micro 
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countries with a relatively low—but persistent—overestimation of less than 10%. The 
Netherlands and Germany are the only countries where the macro approach persistently 
underestimates the government wages. On average, the macro wages are 11% too low in 
the Netherlands and 6% in Germany. Finland, Greece and Portugal only have one 
observation because information on a second job is not available for other years. The 
macro-micro ratio is quite close to 1 for Greece, larger than 1 for Portugal, and smaller than 
1 for Finland.  
For the Unites States, we find a macro-micro ratio that is smaller than 1 in 11 out of the 12 
years of observation (the exception is 1.01 in 2007). It should be emphasized that the micro 
data for the US are not annual figures. Instead, the annual government wages have been 
computed from weekly gross earnings that were multiplied by 52. This practice may fail to 
include non-regular payments, in which case the micro government wages have a negative 
bias. If the macro approach contains no measurement errors, the imputation procedure 
would provide the correct government wages. In that case, we would expect to find that the 
calculated micro wages are smaller than the calculated macro wages. Clearly, this is not the 
case. The macro government wages are lower than the micro wages, which indicates that 
the macro data approach underestimates the government wages for the United States.  
Figure 3.1 graphs the macro-micro ratio over time and illustrates the persistence of the bias 
of the macro data approach. For instance, the ratio for Hungary fluctuates around 1.5 
suggesting that the macro data approach overestimates the government wages by about 
50%. In a similar manner, the ratio for the Netherlands oscillates around 0.9 suggesting that 
the macro wages underestimate the government wages by about 10%. The worst case is 
Slovakia, which has all data points above 1.6. 
3.4.2 Extension to other industries 
The results above indicate that the macro data approach fails to produce precise estimates 
of government wages. In the literature, macro data sources have been used to impute the 
average wages at the industry level (Genre, 2011; Gittleman and Wolff, 1993). Therefore, 
we extend our comparison in this section to other ISIC 3 industries. The classification in the 
EU-SILC and the STAN database are the same if some of the ISIC 3 industries are 
aggregated. The industries covered in our analysis are: Agriculture, hunting and forestry, 
and Fishing (ISIC 3 industries A+B); Mining and quarrying, Manufacturing, Electricity, gas 
and water supply (C+D+E); Construction (F); Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods (G); Hotels and restaurants (H); 
Transport, storage and communications (I); Financial intermediation (J); Real estate, 
renting and business activities (K); Education (M); Health and social work (N).4  For each 
industry, the macro wages have been computed using the data from the STAN database and 
the micro wages were estimated from the EU-SILC database, in the same manner as the 
government wages were estimated. Next, the ratio of macro to micro wages was computed 
for each industry. Appendix 3.C gives the detailed results and Table 3.3 provides a 
summary. 
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Table 3.3. The ratio of the macro to the micro wages by country and by industry 
 
We find that the inadequacy of the macro data approach for deriving the average wages is 
also present in industries other than public administration. Observe, however, that the 
pattern of the bias of the macro approach is not the same within a country. For example, the 
macro data approach underestimates for Austria the average wages for real estate (K), 
produces good estimates for health and social work (N), but leads to overestimation for 
hotels and restaurants (H). For most countries we find industries macro-micro ratios that are 
persistently larger than 1 as well as industries with ratios persistently smaller than 1. This 
indicates that the systematic errors in the macro approach do not—within a country—have 
the same sign across industries. If the macro data in a certain country persistently fail to 
capture some wage or employment component in one industry, this does not need to apply 
to another industry. Finally, observe that France, Hungary and in particular Slovakia are the 
exceptions, i.e. in these countries the macro approach almost always overestimates the 
average industry wages. 
3.4.3 Is the bias only due to employment statistics? 
The macro approach calculates the average government wages by dividing the government 
wage bill by total government employment. It has been argued (Heller and Tait, 1984; 
Schiavo-Campo et al., 1997) that the macro data for government employment are highly 
problematic, whereas the data for the wage bill are much more reliable. In that case, the 
poor quality of the employment statistics would be the most important cause for the bias in 
estimating the government wages. In particular, inadequate measurement of part time and 
part year workers may cause this bias. Our micro data allow us to provide some additional 
insight into these issues. 
Recall that both the macro and the micro data that led to the results in Table 3.2 and Figure 
3.1 adopted the head counts method. That is, no distinction was made whether an employee 
worked full time or part time. As a robustness check we have also focused on full time 
Country A-B C-E F G H I J K M N
Austria 0.81 1.20 1.09 1.08 1.28 1.00 1.14 0.95 1.05 1.01
Belgium 0.70 1.03 1.01 1.14 1.09 1.02 1.15 0.90 1.09 1.04
Czech Republic 1.00 1.09 1.01 1.22 1.05 1.08 1.45 1.07 1.19 1.16
Denmark 0.85 1.07 1.18 0.96 0.84 1.00 1.08 0.95 1.06 0.98
Estonia 0.98 1.03 0.86 1.31 1.01 0.97 1.36 1.61 1.07 1.18
Finland 1.35 1.03 1.28 0.95 1.07 0.98 0.98 1.21 1.09 1.07
France 0.99 1.20 1.23 1.38 1.10 1.30 1.19 1.15 1.09
Germany 0.87 1.05 0.93 1.05 1.07 0.90 0.99 0.89 1.02 1.02
Greece 1.56 1.09 0.73 1.21 1.24 1.04 1.26 1.28 1.12 1.22
Hungary 1.37 1.27 1.18 1.67 1.32 1.44 1.59 2.22 1.09 1.49
Ireland 0.93 1.05 1.48 1.20 1.26 1.27 1.22 1.03 1.33 1.47
Italy 1.05 0.98 0.95 1.03 1.54 1.25 1.14 0.94 0.98 0.94
Luxembourg 0.88 0.96 1.06 0.88 0.90 1.04 0.88 1.04 0.98
Netherlands 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.88 0.78 0.97 0.98 0.73 1.02 0.86
Poland 1.59 1.07 1.01 1.26 1.18 0.98 1.01 1.46 1.11 0.99
Portugal 0.89 1.07 1.06 1.00 1.15 1.13 0.92 1.06 1.11
Slovakia 1.32 1.47 1.28 1.62 1.31 1.43 2.14 1.50 1.24 1.36
Slovenia 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.20 1.24 1.17 1.07 1.25 1.01 1.08
Spain 0.80 1.04 1.12 1.03 1.35 1.01 1.44 1.25 1.14 1.23
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equivalent wages. The full time equivalent macro government wages from the STAN 
database are obtained by dividing the government wage bill by total government 
employment in full time equivalent units. Unfortunately, this is only possible for a few 
countries and years because data on full time equivalent employment are largely missing in 
the STAN database. The micro full time government wages are estimated as the mean 
wages and salaries of individuals who reported that they worked full time, full year in the 
income reference period. The results (which are available upon request) for these full time 
equivalent wages show that the bias remains almost the same as for the case with data 
based on the head counts method. For some observations, the overestimation seems to be 
even larger.  
Next, suppose that the government wage bill is determined correctly so that the bias from 
using the macro approach is due to the employment data. Suppose further that the macro 
employment data are flawed because part time and part year employment is incorrectly 
taken into account. In that case, one would expect the error to be larger for countries and 
years that have a larger share of total government employment for part time and part year 
work. Let the error be measured by the absolute difference of the macro-micro ratio from 1. 
One would thus expect that the error be positively correlated with the share of part time and 
part year work. Using the EU-SILC database we have calculated the share of public 
administration employees who report that they had a temporary contract or worked part 
time during the income reference period. In contrast to the expectation, this share correlates 
negatively with the errors (although the correlation coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level).  
Our results cannot fully answer the question of what causes the bias of the macro approach. 
However, they clearly point out that the failure—in the employment statistics—to take part 
time and part year employment appropriately into account cannot be the sole cause of the 
bias. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Based on a large number of high-quality household survey micro datasets, we have 
calculated the average wages (which are known to be an unbiased estimate of the true 
population average) in public administration. The method that is commonly used is the 
macro approach. It arrives at the average government wages by imputation using macro 
data, i.e. by dividing the government wage bill by government employment. Comparing the 
outcomes, we find serious discrepancies between the micro and macro results. Given the 
unbiasedness of the micro wages, this indicates that government wages computed from 
macro data sources are not reliable. Because the macro data approach has been widely 
applied in empirical research, this may have important consequences for the results.  
For some countries, the macro government wages are lower than the micro wages while the 
opposite is true for other countries. Only in a few countries are the macro government 
wages in line with the micro wages. The bias varies from one country to another but 
appears to be relatively constant over time within each country. Similar findings also hold 
for other industries than the public administration industry. It should be stressed that our 
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Previous studies often mentioned the difficulties in measuring government employment as 
a potential source of error for the macro approach because of the presence of part time and 
part year government employees. However, our results indicate that the problem is not only 
caused by inappropriately measuring employment, suggesting that there are also errors in 
the data for the government wage bill. 
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3.7 Appendices 




Country O bservations Time span Country O bservations Time span
Austria 7 2003-2009 Ireland 3 2006-2008
Belgium 5 2003-2007 Italy 4 2006-2009
Czech Republic 6 2004-2009 Luxembourg 7 2003-2009
Denmark 7 2003-2009 Netherlands 6 2004-2009
Estonia 7 2003-2009 Poland 4 2005-2008
Finland 1 2004 Portugal 1 2006
France 5 2003-2007 Slovakia 6 2004-2009
Germany 5 2004-2009 Slovenia 6 2004-2009
Greece 1 2009 Spain 3 2005-2007
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Austria 2003 29776 27365 1.09 Ireland 2008 60006 47901 1.25
Austria 2004 30195 31270 0.97 Italy 2006 32259 31145 1.04
Austria 2005 31041 31382 0.99 Italy 2007 32861 31081 1.06
Austria 2006 32124 31600 1.02 Italy 2008 34923 32724 1.07
Austria 2007 33307 34370 0.97 Italy 2009 35455 32261 1.10
Austria 2008 33887 35804 0.95 Luxembourg 2003 50818 45574 1.12
Austria 2009 35095 37751 0.93 Luxembourg 2004 53163 47863 1.11
Belgium 2003 30342 29934 1.01 Luxembourg 2005 55052 50708 1.09
Belgium 2004 31148 32476 0.96 Luxembourg 2006 57782 52119 1.11
Belgium 2005 32613 33634 0.97 Luxembourg 2007 60352 52938 1.14
Belgium 2006 33541 32707 1.03 Luxembourg 2008 61816 56864 1.09
Belgium 2007 34130 32854 1.04 Luxembourg 2009 63481 58582 1.08
Czech Republic 2004 8842 7203 1.23 Netherlands 2004 33002 35932 0.92
Czech Republic 2005 10237 8400 1.22 Netherlands 2005 33264 38265 0.87
Czech Republic 2006 11376 9799 1.16 Netherlands 2006 34555 38499 0.90
Czech Republic 2007 12437 10242 1.21 Netherlands 2007 35885 41298 0.87
Czech Republic 2008 14446 12472 1.16 Netherlands 2008 37426 43074 0.87
Czech Republic 2009 14154 11734 1.21 Netherlands 2009 37962 42762 0.89
Denmark 2003 50799 36399 1.40 Poland 2005 9005 8536 1.05
Denmark 2004 51129 37526 1.36 Poland 2006 9543 8848 1.08
Denmark 2005 51960 40465 1.28 Poland 2007 10373 9807 1.06
Denmark 2006 53714 44903 1.20 Poland 2008 12592 11368 1.11
Denmark 2007 54937 44260 1.24 Portugal 2006 18859 16653 1.13
Denmark 2008 58032 45214 1.28 Slovakia 2004 9450 4527 2.09
Denmark 2009 64286 47122 1.36 Slovakia 2005 10176 5918 1.72
Estonia 2003 7586 5588 1.36 Slovakia 2006 11907 5913 2.01
Estonia 2004 7771 6893 1.13 Slovakia 2007 12388 7127 1.74
Estonia 2005 8560 6760 1.27 Slovakia 2008 13968 8512 1.64
Estonia 2006 9155 8388 1.09 Slovakia 2009 14708 8995 1.64
Estonia 2007 11434 9304 1.23 Slovenia 2004 18917 17337 1.09
Estonia 2008 13811 12018 1.15 Slovenia 2005 19659 18172 1.08
Estonia 2009 13153 11639 1.13 Slovenia 2006 20644 18665 1.11
Finland 2004 26168 31932 0.82 Slovenia 2007 21353 19960 1.07
France 2003 24619 24115 1.02 Slovenia 2008 23652 21766 1.09
France 2004 25789 24004 1.07 Slovenia 2009 24661 22933 1.08
France 2005 26283 23584 1.11 Spain 2005 21149 22453 0.94
France 2006 27098 23596 1.15 Spain 2006 22805 24299 0.94
France 2007 28015 25294 1.11 Spain 2007 24746 24551 1.01
Germany 2004 29227 32031 0.91 United States 1998 32775 36147 0.91
Germany 2006 29313 31563 0.93 United States 1999 33976 36876 0.92
Germany 2007 29472 30509 0.97 United States 2000 35234 38550 0.91
Germany 2008 30159 32429 0.93 United States 2001 36408 40578 0.90
Germany 2009 31247 32539 0.96 United States 2002 38321 41055 0.93
Greece 2009 26697 25867 1.03 United States 2003 40305 44552 0.90
Hungary 2004 10486 7093 1.48 United States 2004 42219 46900 0.90
Hungary 2006 11267 8290 1.36 United States 2005 44185 47442 0.93
Hungary 2007 12956 9447 1.37 United States 2006 45715 48020 0.95
Hungary 2008 15204 9855 1.54 United States 2007 47787 47547 1.01
Hungary 2009 11923 8136 1.47 United States 2008 49630 52089 0.95
Ireland 2006 52442 42966 1.22 United States 2009 51039 51975 0.98
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3.7.3 Appendix 3.C. Comparison of results for other industries 
  
Country Year A-B C-D-E F G H I J K M N
Austria 2003 0.69 1.19 1.08 1.14 1.28 0.96 1.24 0.94 1.05 1.03
Austria 2004 0.68 1.22 1.11 1.13 1.34 0.94 1.22 0.91 1.03 0.97
Austria 2005 0.68 1.24 1.11 1.15 1.25 1.01 1.18 0.99 1.07 0.97
Austria 2006 0.75 1.21 1.08 1.19 1.26 1.04 1.14 0.99 1.05 1.00
Austria 2007 0.93 1.25 1.06 0.97 1.24 1.03 1.11 0.98 1.01 1.04
Austria 2008 0.82 1.19 1.09 1.01 1.41 1.02 1.04 0.94 1.10 1.02
Austria 2009 1.11 1.10 1.12 0.96 1.21 1.01 1.02 0.92 1.05 1.03
Belgium 2003 0.64 1.06 1.00 1.15 1.05 1.00 1.15 0.94 1.12 1.03
Belgium 2004 0.67 0.89 1.02 1.09 0.99 1.02 1.18 0.87 1.04 1.00
Belgium 2005 0.61 1.01 0.99 1.12 1.07 1.04 1.16 0.86 1.06 1.04
Belgium 2006 0.75 1.09 0.99 1.13 1.07 0.99 1.16 0.90 1.12 1.04
Belgium 2007 0.86 1.09 1.05 1.20 1.29 1.05 1.12 0.95 1.14 1.09
Czech Republic 2004 1.06 1.15 1.02 1.25 1.06 1.09 1.45 1.12 1.24 1.18
Czech Republic 2005 1.04 1.12 1.02 1.21 1.15 1.11 1.26 1.05 1.21 1.17
Czech Republic 2006 1.04 1.08 0.99 1.21 1.05 1.10 1.37 1.06 1.18 1.14
Czech Republic 2007 0.98 1.08 0.97 1.22 0.95 1.05 1.64 1.03 1.14 1.12
Czech Republic 2008 0.95 1.07 1.03 1.21 1.04 1.08 1.50 1.08 1.14 1.14
Czech Republic 2009 0.91 1.03 1.01 1.20 1.04 1.08 1.48 1.10 1.21 1.22
Denmark 2003 0.82 1.04 1.21 0.91 0.84 1.00 1.11 0.93 1.02 1.00
Denmark 2004 0.96 1.08 1.21 0.92 1.02 0.98 1.15 0.94 1.08 0.98
Denmark 2005 0.76 1.06 1.14 0.98 0.85 0.95 1.06 0.94 1.12 0.96
Denmark 2006 0.80 1.09 1.13 0.98 0.83 1.04 1.07 0.96 1.03 0.99
Denmark 2007 0.96 1.09 1.14 1.02 0.88 1.04 1.02 0.93 1.04 0.98
Denmark 2008 0.81 1.05 1.20 0.97 0.69 1.02 1.06 1.00 1.08 1.00
Denmark 2009 0.81 1.05 1.21 0.95 0.80 0.99 1.09 0.96 1.07 0.96
Estonia 2003 0.88 1.09 0.93 1.26 1.27 1.09 1.59 1.35 1.03 0.94
Estonia 2004 1.06 1.01 0.86 1.44 1.31 1.08 1.64 1.72 1.15 1.12
Estonia 2005 0.95 1.04 1.00 1.31 0.72 0.97 1.34 1.47 1.11 1.17
Estonia 2006 0.85 1.03 0.89 1.29 0.84 0.86 1.42 1.83 1.08 1.13
Estonia 2007 0.84 1.06 0.80 1.34 0.89 0.90 1.21 1.76 1.07 1.25
Estonia 2008 1.27 0.99 0.74 1.24 0.85 0.95 1.18 1.65 1.13 1.44
Estonia 2009 1.02 0.99 0.82 1.28 1.20 0.93 1.11 1.52 0.93 1.19
Finland 2004 1.35 1.03 1.28 0.95 1.07 0.98 0.98 1.21 1.09 1.07
France 2003 1.00 1.17 1.19 1.29 1.04 1.29 1.18 1.14 1.07
France 2004 1.07 1.25 1.25 1.30 1.06 1.26 1.12 1.10 1.09
France 2005 0.99 1.21 1.19 1.35 1.09 1.30 1.14 1.15 1.09
France 2006 0.88 1.25 1.33 1.62 1.17 1.45 1.35 1.21 1.15
France 2007 1.02 1.11 1.19 1.36 1.11 1.21 1.17 1.14 1.05
Germany 2004 0.71 0.96 0.88 0.94 0.93 0.80 1.04 0.73 0.93 0.95
Germany 2006 0.94 1.11 0.94 1.13 1.05 0.96 1.00 1.02 1.10 1.05
Germany 2007 0.88 1.09 0.90 1.09 1.22 0.87 0.98 0.97 1.10 1.07
Germany 2008 0.96 1.05 0.99 1.05 1.11 0.94 0.95 0.86 1.01 1.00
Germany 2009 1.03 0.96 1.05 1.05 0.96 0.98 0.86 0.94 1.02
Greece 2009 1.56 1.09 0.73 1.21 1.24 1.04 1.26 1.28 1.12 1.22
Hungary 2004 1.74 1.34 1.19 1.75 1.56 1.64 1.38 2.44 1.19 1.59
Hungary 2006 1.23 1.28 1.29 1.68 1.27 1.41 1.77 2.09 1.17 1.45
Hungary 2007 1.22 1.25 1.18 1.60 1.33 1.40 1.78 2.35 1.06 1.46
Hungary 2008 1.32 1.25 1.17 1.70 1.26 1.40 1.59 2.13 1.04 1.45
Hungary 2009 1.32 1.26 1.08 1.62 1.16 1.36 1.44 2.07 1.00 1.47
Ireland 2006 0.77 1.04 1.45 1.21 1.25 1.22 1.09 1.06 1.30 1.44
Ireland 2007 0.96 0.99 1.48 1.19 1.28 1.29 1.21 0.99 1.32 1.52
Ireland 2008 1.06 1.12 1.50 1.21 1.24 1.31 1.36 1.05 1.37 1.45
Italy 2006 1.18 0.97 0.94 1.04 1.68 1.20 1.12 0.94 0.95 0.90
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Country Year A-B C-D-E F G H I J K M N
Italy 2008 0.96 1.02 0.97 1.02 1.49 1.33 1.14 0.96 0.94 0.94
Italy 2009 1.04 0.98 0.95 1.02 1.58 1.26 1.11 0.91 1.02 0.97
Luxembourg 2003 0.90 0.89 1.08 0.90 0.87 1.05 0.99 1.02 0.91
Luxembourg 2004 0.92 0.90 1.06 0.82 0.88 1.11 0.87 1.03 1.06
Luxembourg 2005 0.95 1.01 1.03 0.83 0.91 1.07 0.85 1.01 1.01
Luxembourg 2006 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.85 0.93 1.02 0.90 1.06 1.01
Luxembourg 2007 0.86 0.99 1.04 0.90 0.90 1.02 0.87 1.06 1.04
Luxembourg 2008 0.84 1.00 1.10 0.99 0.87 1.02 0.81 1.04 0.84
Luxembourg 2009 0.79 0.97 1.11 0.88 0.92 0.99 0.88 1.07 0.98
Netherlands 2004 0.85 0.94 0.97 0.85 0.82 0.94 0.93 0.70 1.01 0.74
Netherlands 2005 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.84 1.01 0.94 0.73 1.01 0.87
Netherlands 2006 0.95 0.92 1.02 0.93 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.75 1.05 0.90
Netherlands 2007 1.06 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.76 1.05 1.00 0.72 1.12 0.85
Netherlands 2008 0.81 0.88 1.03 0.85 0.66 0.95 0.94 0.75 0.98 0.89
Netherlands 2009 0.91 0.91 0.99 0.83 0.71 0.91 1.05 0.74 0.93 0.88
Poland 2005 1.84 1.14 1.17 1.31 1.37 1.05 1.26 1.52 1.13 0.97
Poland 2006 1.63 1.09 1.09 1.40 1.04 1.01 1.01 1.60 1.14 0.95
Poland 2007 1.42 1.04 0.94 1.19 1.04 0.90 0.91 1.47 1.10 0.99
Poland 2008 1.47 1.02 0.84 1.13 1.26 0.97 0.88 1.25 1.05 1.02
Portugal 2006 0.89 1.07 1.06 1.00 1.15 1.13 0.92 1.06 1.11
Slovakia 2004 1.28 1.69 1.51 1.97 1.51 1.70 2.62 1.75 1.42 1.43
Slovakia 2005 1.41 1.68 1.54 1.90 1.57 1.73 2.31 1.90 1.47 1.56
Slovakia 2006 1.37 1.58 1.38 1.59 1.54 1.46 2.36 1.57 1.27 1.43
Slovakia 2007 1.32 1.45 1.23 1.57 1.18 1.35 2.15 1.29 1.15 1.25
Slovakia 2008 1.21 1.21 1.06 1.29 1.01 1.22 1.73 1.23 1.04 1.22
Slovakia 2009 1.32 1.19 0.94 1.37 1.04 1.14 1.70 1.23 1.07 1.24
Slovenia 2004 1.16 1.10 1.15 1.22 1.49 1.23 1.02 1.34 1.02 1.16
Slovenia 2005 0.94 1.12 1.03 1.23 1.24 1.17 1.05 1.28 0.96 1.09
Slovenia 2006 1.06 1.11 1.05 1.25 1.21 1.21 1.05 1.27 0.96 1.07
Slovenia 2007 1.05 1.11 1.08 1.18 1.13 1.16 1.12 1.25 1.00 1.03
Slovenia 2008 1.18 1.10 1.04 1.19 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.19 1.07 1.08
Slovenia 2009 1.04 1.08 1.05 1.16 1.22 1.11 1.09 1.15 1.07 1.07
Spain 2005 0.75 1.03 1.12 1.04 1.45 1.02 1.47 1.30 1.14 1.28
Spain 2006 0.86 1.04 1.14 1.03 1.33 1.03 1.47 1.21 1.12 1.22
Spain 2007 0.80 1.04 1.10 1.01 1.27 0.98 1.39 1.24 1.15 1.20
United States 1998 1.21 1.11 1.27 0.74 1.15 1.45 1.26 0.94 1.15
United States 1999 1.21 1.11 1.29 0.73 1.12 1.50 1.34 0.94 1.10
United States 2000 1.20 1.12 1.29 0.73 1.14 1.51 1.29 0.97 1.10
United States 2001 1.18 1.09 1.22 0.69 1.12 1.57 1.26 0.96 1.12
United States 2002 1.16 1.08 1.23 0.68 1.09 1.40 1.18 0.97 1.12
United States 2003 1.20 1.06 1.12 1.11 1.42 1.08 0.98 1.08
United States 2004 1.19 1.07 1.08 1.17 1.46 1.13 0.95 1.11
United States 2005 1.23 1.15 1.10 1.16 1.67 1.18 0.94 1.11
United States 2006 1.26 1.16 1.17 1.14 1.57 1.18 0.96 1.11
United States 2007 1.27 1.18 1.11 1.17 1.65 1.20 0.95 1.07
United States 2008 1.24 1.16 1.12 1.18 1.56 1.21 0.98 1.08
United States 2009 1.23 1.10 1.15 1.09 1.50 1.15 0.95 1.15
ISIC 3 industries: (A) Agriculture, hunt ing and forestry; (B) Fishing; (C) Mining and quarrying; (D) Manufacturing; (E)  Electricity, gas and water supply; (F) 
Construct ion; (G) Wholesale and retail t rade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods; (H) Hotels and restaurants; (I) T ransport, 
storage and communications; (J) Financial intermediation; (K) Real estate, renting and business activit ies; (L) Public administration and defense; compulsory social 
security; (M) Education; (N) Health and social work; (O) Other community, social and personal service activities; (P) Private households with employed persons; and 
(Q) Extra-territorial organizat ions and bodies. 
Notes: The results for Public Administration (industry L) are in Appendix B. Results for industries O-Q cannot be determined because data availability is insufficient. 
Also for certain countries some information is missing (e.g. industry C in France is missing in STAN or industry B in Luxembourg doesn’t exist due to the country’s 
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Chapter 4 
Do higher government wages reduce 
corruption? Evidence based on a 
novel dataset 
4.1 Introduction1 
Corruption is often identified with low government wages (Feinberg, 2009; Klitgaard, 
1989; Lindauer, 1987; Stasavage, 1999), but there is no conclusive evidence that raising 
government wages will reduce corruption (Ni and Van, 2006). On the one hand, it has been 
argued that higher government wages may deter corruption because corrupt bureaucrats and 
politicians face higher costs when detected (Becker and Stigler, 1974) or because public 
servants will forgo corrupt activities when they are paid wages that they perceive as fair 
(Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Higher government wages may also attract better 
employees thereby improving the bureaucratic quality and reducing corruption (UlHaque 
and Sahay, 1996). On the other hand, it also has been argued that corrupt bureaucrats in 
highly corrupted environments often use their power and income to influence the 
probability of corruption detection (Marjit and Shi, 1998) and/or avoid legal punishment if 
they are detected (Chang and Lai, 2002; Qijun and Kahana, 2010). Under those 
circumstances, the threat of job loss is low, thereby mitigating the effectiveness of higher 
wages as a means to deter corruption. In view of the conflicting theoretical arguments, the 
effect of government wages on corruption has to be settled through empirical research (Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).  
However, empirical studies on the relationship between government wages and corruption 
yield conflicting evidence. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find that an increase in 
government wages reduces corruption. Also Herzfeld and Weiss (2003), Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2008) and Dutt (2009) report a negative relationship between government wages 
and corruption, although the results are often not robust to different econometric 
specifications.2  In contrast, the results of Panizza (2001), Ades and Di Tella (1997), and 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is based on Le, V.H., de Haan, J., Dietzenbacher, E., 2013. Do higher government 
wages reduce corruption? Evidence from a novel dataset. CESifo Working Paper No. 4254. 
2Several studies using local data for the United States, such as Goel and Nelson (1998), and Goel and 
Rich (1989), report that higher government wages reduce corruption, measured by the number of 
corruption convicts. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) find that higher government wages reduce 
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Treisman (2000, 2007) suggest that there is no significant relationship between both 
variables while La Porta et al. (1999) even find that higher government wages are 
correlated with more corruption.  
All of the above mentioned studies use one of the three available datasets on (relative) 
government wages, created by Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997), Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(1997) and Panizza (2001), respectively. The first one is a cross sectional dataset referring 
to the early 1990s, while the other two consist of short panels for a small number of 
developing countries in the late 1980s and 1990s. Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997) and Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) follow Heller and Tait (1984), i.e. they use macro data to 
impute government wages (which are obtained from dividing the total government wage 
bill by total government employment). In contrast, Panizza (2001) relies on micro data, 
using some 60 household surveys from 13 Latin American countries in the 1990s to 
estimate government wages.  
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the relationship between government wages 
and corruption, using a new large panel dataset on government wages of about 1,200 
observations, covering 113 countries over the 1989–2010 period. It is derived from micro-
based data sources, such as household budget surveys or labor force surveys. Although 
micro data arguably yield more reliable figures on government wages than macro data (see 
Chapter 3), they hardly have been used at a large scale due to lack of data. Furthermore, our 
dataset covers a large number of developing and industrial countries; the data for each 
country cover a period of 11.8 years on average. The data allow us to control for country-
specific effects to avoid the potential endogeneity problem that occurs if corrupt countries 
deliberately choose to pay low government wages to maintain a corrupt bureaucracy for 
reasons of cost effectiveness (Besley and McLaren, 1993). 
In most of our econometric models we include an interaction term between government 
wages and the level of income per capita. When the interaction term is not included, we 
find that the impact of government wages on corruption is rather modest. When the 
interaction with income is included, the results are quite different. First, the impact of 
government wages on corruption (which is measured on a scale running from 0 to 6) varies 
with the level of income per capita. The estimated impact is significantly negative if GDP 
per capita in international US dollars (in 2012 prices) is lower than 8,842. Second, the 
impact of government wages on corruption is quite substantial in relatively low-income 
countries. Increasing government wages by the average wages in manufacturing reduces 
corruption by more than 1 point (on a scale of 0 to 6) in countries with an income per capita 
of about 1,000 dollars. This impact is about two times larger than reported by Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). Our results are robust to alternative measures of 
government wages, alternative measures of corruption as well as different econometric 
specifications.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 4.2 reviews recent studies and discusses 
limitations of previous research that our study aims at improving. Section 4.3 specifies the 
econometric model and describes the data, while section 4.4 presents the empirical results 
as well as some robustness checks and extensions. Section 4.5 discusses some policy 
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4.2 Literature Review 
The most common definition of corruption is “the abuse of public office for private gain” 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2004). Generally, corruption is regarded as problematic, but some studies 
suggest that corruption might be the second best solution to the problem of over-regulation 
(Leff, 1964; Lui, 1985).3  According to the grease-to-the-wheel view, too much government 
regulation may end up choking off economic activities. In such an environment, 
bureaucrats accepting bribes and turning a blind eye to black markets and smuggling may 
actually improve social welfare. Likewise, bureaucratic corruption reduces the delay caused 
by red tape and gets the most efficient applicants ahead of a slow queue. However, these 
arguments are only valid under very specific situations (Bardhan, 2006). The redeeming 
effects of corruption cannot offset the burden of even more regulations and delays as 
deliberately imposed by bureaucrats to extract further bribes.  
Over the past decades, a large number of studies have examined the nexus between 
corruption and development. Corruption is found to lower economic growth either directly 
(Mauro, 1995; Swaleheen, 2011) or indirectly via lowering the incentives for productive 
investment (Johnson et al., 2011). Corruption engenders unsustainable economic 
developments (Aidt, 2009) and erodes public confidence in government institutions 
(Clausen et al., 2011). Corruption can also cause budget consolidation efforts to fail (Arin 
et al., 2011). Most importantly, corruption sustains further corrupt activities because the 
public becomes indifferent to the problem (Mauro, 2004) while every new generation of 
bureaucrats becomes corrupt because their past and current colleagues and seniors are also 
corrupt (Dong et al., 2012; Sah, 2007). Many developing countries seem to be entrapped in 
a bad equilibrium of rampant corruption, poverty and stagnation. Consequently, fighting 
corruption has been on top of the policy agenda of several international development 
organizations. 
4.2.1 Theory 
Raising government wages to combat corruption seems an intuitive solution because it 
lessens the bureaucrats’ incentive to extract illegal income. Several studies therefore 
suggest paying higher government wages to break the vicious circle of corruption and 
poverty (Bond, 2008; Bose, 2004; UlHaque and Sahay, 1996; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 
2001).  
First, higher government wages deter corruption via two mechanisms: raising the cost of 
corruption and increasing the probability of detection (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). When the probability that corruption is detected is high and 
the threat to lose a well-paid job is real, bureaucrats will avoid corruption because it is no 
longer an optimal choice when maximizing income.  
Second, high government wages boost the dignity of civil servants and encourage them to 
forgo corrupt activities, even when corruption is the optimal choice to maximize income 
(Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Arguably, people choose to work for the government 
because they want to serve society (Macchiavello, 2008). These civil servants might be 
                                                          
3
 Meon and Weill (2010) claim that corruption improves efficiency in countries with a weak 
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forced to engage in corruption to ensure sufficient income but each act of corruption is 
associated with some moral cost (Bond, 2008; UlHaque and Sahay, 1996). As a result, a 
proportion of the bureaucracy may forgo corruption opportunities as long as they are paid at 
a level perceived to be fair, even if the probability of corruption detection and punishment 
is low (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).  
Third, a government pay rise may serve as an exogenous shock to a high-corruption 
equilibrium. High government wages attract better people to the bureaucracy and prevent 
the movement of qualified employees to the private sector (UlHaque and Sahay, 1996). The 
public also becomes more vigilant to the operation of the bureaucracy when government 
wages are high (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), putting more pressure on bureaucrats 
to forgo corruption themselves and to report corruption by others. Hence, even a modest 
raise in government wages can lead to a new equilibrium with less corruption.  
In contrast, other studies argue that high government wages do not reduce corruption or 
may even lead to more corruption (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Chang and Lai, 2002; 
Macchiavello, 2008). In a highly corrupted environment where the probability of detection 
as well as the probability of getting punishment upon detection is very low, the threat of job 
loss is close to zero. In such a situation, higher government wages will not change the 
incentive structure faced by bureaucrats (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Selfish agents 
will also queue up for government jobs because of the high income from wages plus the 
illegal income from corruption, and government remuneration policy may end up 
unintentionally attracting too many individuals with the wrong ‘talent’ to the bureaucracy 
(Aidt, 2003; Bond, 2008; Macchiavello, 2008). Highly paid but selfish bureaucrats may 
also use part of their wage package to bribe their seniors when they are detected (Chang 
and Lai, 2002). More severely, highly paid government jobs become a scarce good that can 
be rationed only to those who can mobilize sufficient finances to buy such jobs via bribing 
the recruiting officials. In return, new bureaucrats will try to corrupt even more to recover 
their initial investment (Qijun and Kahana, 2010). 
4.2.2 Empirical evidence 
In view of the conflicting theoretical arguments, empirical research may shed some light on 
the effect of government wages on corruption. The most commonly used empirical model 
to estimate the impact of government wages on corruption across countries is the following 
linear regression model: 
:;<< 	= 	'=	 +	>?2@	 +	A 	+ 	. 																											(B. ) 
where DEFF is a measure of corruption, & is a set of control variables, GH8 is some 
measure for government wages,	IJ, LM is the corresponding vector of coefficients and N is 
the country- specific effect. The subscript O denotes countries, P indicates time and 0 is the 
error term. To make cross-country figures comparable, GH8 usually is an indicator (Ades 
and Di Tella, 1997; Heller and Tait, 1984; Schiavo-Campo et al., 1997; Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder, 2001). Often it is constructed as the ratio of government wages and wages in 
another reference sector (such as manufacturing) or as the ratio of government wages and 
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Several problems emerge from reviewing these studies. First and foremost, they are based 
on unreliable data. Generally, average government wages are imputed by dividing the total 
government wage bill by total government employment. However, there is no 
internationally accepted statistical method to make government employment statistics 
consistent across countries. Similar difficulties arise with respect to consistency over time, 
due to the presence of different types of government workers (such as permanent vs. 
temporary, full time vs. part time). In Chapter 3 it has been shown that this leads to a 
substantial bias that may render empirical conclusions unreliable. Only Panizza (2001) uses 
micro data to construct an indicator of government wages. However, this study is limited to 
a small number of countries and covers a short time period with about 60 observations in 
total.  
Second, most studies treat the term N in Equation (4.1) as independent of GH8 and other 
explanatory variables in &. However, models estimated in cross-country studies are often 
shaped by data availability. Therefore, αi is possibly not independent of &. Panel studies, 
such as Panizza (2001) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), use pooled OLS or random 
effects estimators, which again rely on the same assumption that αi is independent from all 
the explanatory variables. The results in Seldadyo and de Haan (2011), however, suggest 
that country-specific factors may play an important role in a country’s ability to control 
corruption.4 
4.3 The econometric model specification and data description 
4.3.1 The econometric model 
We specify our empirical model as: 
:;<<	 = =' 	+ 	@>?2 	+ 	QR#:;S2	 
+	*(>?2 × R#:;S2) 		+	A 	+ 	TU	 + 	.																			(B. V) 
where W DEX8 	is the income level of country O at time P, and Y is a vector of year 
dummies to control for the time specific effects. The other variables are defined as before.  
The sign of L is expected to be negative. In our view, the impact of government wages on 
corruption is conditional upon the level of income in each country, but the sign of 1 is not 
clear a priori. In low-income countries, corruption is rampant and the amount of money 
involved in each bribe can be very small (petty corruption). Higher government wages will 
stimulate bureaucrats to forgo this petty corruption. Furthermore, highly paid government 
jobs in low-income countries are highly valued. This means that the threat of job loss is 
arguably more effective in low-income countries. Under this reasoning, government wages 
may have a strong negative impact on corruption in low-income countries. This impact is 
weaker or even close to zero in rich countries. If true, the sign of 1 will be positive.  
                                                          
4
 These authors find convergence of corruption: many corrupt countries became ‘cleaner’ between 
1984 and 2008, while many ‘clean’ countries became more corrupted. However, the speed of change 
is relatively slow, suggesting that country-specific factors play an important role in the ability of a 
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However, richer countries often have a better legal system with higher probability of 
corruption detection. Furthermore, the fair wage argument might not apply to low-income 
countries because bureaucrats know that their governments may not be able to meet the 
demand of fair wages due to budget constraints (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). This 
line of argument, instead, suggests that government wages only reduce corruption in 
relatively rich countries. In low-income countries, raising government wages may have no 
impact. The sign of 1, in this case, will be negative.  
On the basis of previous studies, we select a large number of control variables (& in 
Equation	(4.2)) that have been suggested to affect corruption. The selected variables can be 
grouped into political factors, economic factors, incentive structure factors, and other 
factors.  
Political factors are important to ensure a healthy institutional environment of sufficient 
checks and balances as well as effective mechanisms for the public to monitor the operation 
of the bureaucracy. The most important political variables are democracy (\8X), the age 
of the democracy (\8XGH8) and political polarization (]E^GF) (Brown et al., 2011; 
Rock, 2009). \8X (the Polity2 indicator) runs from -10 to 10, where a higher value means 
more democracy. \8XGH8 is measured as the number of consecutive years since the year 
the country is classified as a democracy.5  We also include \8XGH8_`, the squared term 
of \8XGH8, as democracy may need time to take effect on corruption (Rock, 2009). ]E^GF is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the difference in terms of political 
orientation of the parties in government is classified as high by Beck et al. (2001, updated 
2010). Brown et al. (2011) find that high polarization intensifies the monitoring process, 
thus reducing corruption. Finally, we include a dummy variable (XW^), which equals 1 if 
the head of the country is a military officer (Beck et al., 2001, updated 2010). When a 
country is governed by the military, the military become exposed to politics and may be 
captured by interest groups, which could increase the amount of corruption in the system 
(Brown et al., 2011). 
The most often used economic determinants6 of corruption are government consumption (HEa_Wb8) and openness to trade (YFG\8), both taken from the World Bank. A larger 
government implies more possibilities for corruption by the bureaucracy. Trade exposes 
corrupted countries to international competition and interaction, which reduce the 
monopoly power of domestic producers, shrinking the potential profits available for corrupt 
officials.   
                                                          
5
 Following Treisman (2007), we classify a country as democratic if its executive electoral 
competitiveness index provided by Beck et al. (2001) is 6.5 or higher. 
6
 Some recent studies, such as Arezki and Bruckner (2011) and Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), 
find that oil rents induce corruption when the democratic institutions are weak or when state 
participation in oil production is high. We follow Treisman (2007) and include a variable on raw 
material exports (measured as the percentage of commodity exports) to control for the impact of 
natural resource ‘windfalls’. However, this variable is not significant and makes our sample smaller, 
although it does not affect our findings. In the reported results, we therefore leave this variable out. 






Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
Finally, we include a large number of other time invariant variables that are often 
mentioned in the literature as potential determinants of corruption. Treisman (2000) finds 
that countries that have a Common Law legal origin and a UK colonial history are less 
corrupted. He also finds that ethno linguistic division is related to more corruption. We 
include three dummies accounting for English Common Law, French, and Socialist legal 
origins (source: Quality of Government Institute, Gothenburg University). There are also 
dummies for countries with a British, French and Spanish colonial origin (source: Quality 
of Government Institute, Gothenburg University) and a measure for linguistic 
fractionalization provided by Alesina et al. (2003). Finally, we add 8 dummies for 
geographical regions (Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union; Latin America; North Africa 
and the Middle East; Sub-Saharan Africa; Western Europe and North Africa; East Asia; 
Southeast Asia; and the Caribbean). Countries in the same region may follow similar wage 
and anti-corruption policies. 
4.3.2 Sources of data 
We use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index as the dependent 
variable. Previous studies frequently used the corruption perception index (CPI) provided 
by Transparency International and the control of corruption index provided by the World 
Bank World Governance Indicator (WGI) as measures of corruption.7 The CPI and the 
WGI aggregate several surveys to form a corruption perception index using the simple 
average and principal component analysis, respectively. However, the included underlying 
surveys may differ from one year to the other. As a result, changes in the CPI and WGI 
scores may be due to the changes in surveys included instead of the changes in perceived 
corruption (Teorell et al., 2011). The ICRG index has been constructed in a consistent way 
from year to year. The experts who provide input for constructing the index receive 
instructions on how to carry out the ratings, making the data comparable across countries. 
Furthermore, using country experts’ ratings may better reflect the actual situation in the 
rated countries. That is because the experts’ ratings are less likely to be affected by the 
economic situation than ratings based on public opinion sources (Kaplan and Pathania, 
2010) and because the experts’ ratings are less likely to be affected by the fear of retaliation 
by corrupted government officials (Jensen et al., 2010). We rescale the original ICRG index 
to a scale ranging from 0 to 6 where a higher score means more corruption.  
Data on government wages are taken from the worldwide database on industrial wages as 
reported in Chapter 2. This database provides data on average wages for the whole 
economy as well as for industries according to the International Standard Classification of 
Economic Activities, Revision 3 (ISIC 3). One part of the data is obtained via international 
household survey databases, such as the World Bank Living Standard Measurement Study, 
the Luxembourg Income Study or data from the International Labor Organization. The 
other part of the data is obtained by studying countries’ data archives. Next to the fact that 
survey data are more accurate than macro data obtained from statistical yearbooks (see 
                                                          
7
 The correlation of these three indices between countries is very high, see Seldadyo (2008). 
However, when it comes to the within country variation of corruption over time, the correlation 
between the indices is low. Over the 1996-2010 period, the correlation coefficients between these 







Do higher government wages reduce corruption? Evidence based on a novel dataset 
 
Chapter 3), they also open a new path to overcome the problem of missing data for 
developing countries, where reliable macro data on government wages and on employment 
are often lacking.  
Individuals with positive employment income are first classified into ISIC 3 one digit 
industries. Next, the average wages in each industry are estimated as the mean wages of all 
individuals within that industry, using relevant weights to account for missing values and 
non-response. The resulting wages computed in this manner have been found to be the 
unbiased estimates of actual wages (Akee, 2011; Kapteyn and Ypma, 2007). We define 
government wages as the wages of employees in the public administration, defense and 
compulsory social security industry (public administration from now on). Public 
administration is the core sector of the government which is responsible for carrying out 
most government programs as well as implementing laws and regulations. Furthermore, to 
compute our government wage indicator (GH8) we follow previous studies and divide 
average government wages by average wages in manufacturing. In the sensitivity analysis, 
we use average wages in the finance sector and average wages in construction as alternative 
denominators to construct the GH8 indicator. 
 
 
Our GH8 indicator features several improvements in comparison with the data used in 
previous studies. Most importantly, it is computed from micro surveys and is therefore 
more reliable than government wages computed from macro data sources. Moreover, the 
data on both the numerator and the denominator of the GH8 indicator are from the same 
survey in which the wage concept is consistently used. As a result, our GH8 indicator is 
likely to better capture the relative wage position of government employees. 
Variable N Mean Min Max Defini tion and sources
CORR 930 2.69 0 6 ICRG corruption, available for purchase at http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx
WAGE 1076 1.3 0.38 3.07 T he rat io of government to manufacturing wages, available at http://www.levanhab28.com/ 
INCOME 1076 9.4 6.67 11.37 T he natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in 2012 international dollars), available from the 
World Bank’s World Development  Indicators (WDI) database
WINCOME 1076 12.21 2.89 26.83 T he product of WAGE and INCOME
DEM 1014 7.11 -10 10 T he revised Polity2 score available at http://www.systemicpeace.org 
POLAR 1038 2.56 0 8 A dummy which equals 1 if a count ry is classified as highly polarized by Beck et al. (2001), 
as updated in 2010 and available at  www.worldbank.org
DEMAGE 1038 13.09 0 64 Age of the democracy, the number of consecutive years since the year the country is 
classified a democracy from 1930 until now. Following Treisman (2007), we classify a 
country as democratic if the execut ive electoral competitiveness index produced by Beck et 
al. (2001) is larger than or equal to 6.5. T he variable is rescaled to 10 years to prevent the 
magnitude of the corresponding est imated coefficients from becoming too small.
DEMAGESQ 1040 0.32 0 1 T he square of  DEMAGE
MIL 1028 0.02 0 1 A dummy which equals 1 if the chief executive is at the same t ime an army officer; source: 
Beck et  al. (2001)
GOVSIZE 1076 0.17 0.03 0.54 T otal final general government consumpt ion as a percentage of GDP, provided by the WDI. 
T his variable is further divided by 100 to prevent the magnitude of the corresponding 
estimated coefficient  from becoming too small.
TRADE 1076 0.87 0.14 3.2 T otal import and export as a percentage of GDP, provided by the WDI.  This variable is 
further divided by 100 to prevent the magnitude of the corresponding estimated coefficient 
from becoming too small.
GOVSTAB 930 8.32 3.33 12 ICRG government stability score
BURQUAL 930 2.69 0 4 ICRG bureaucratic quality score
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Most of our control variables are taken from standard sources such as the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI); the World Bank’s Political Institutions Database 
(Beck et al., 2001); and the Polity IV Project. In case the WDI does not provide data, the 
data for these countries are taken from the Penn World Table. Some other variables are 
taken from the Quality of Government dataset, collected from various sources by the 
Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg. Table 4.1 presents 
summary information of the main variables, while Appendix 4.A provides more detailed 
information for all variables. We only retain country/years if we have data for both 
corruption and government wages.  
 
 
Table 4.2 presents the correlation of variables included in Table 4.1. GH8 is positively 
correlated with DEFF, and the coefficient is 0.35, suggesting that the gap between 
government wages and manufacturing wages is larger in more corrupted countries. The 
correlation between W DEX8 and corruption is 0.17 while the correlation between W DEX8 and corruption is -0.63, reflecting that high-income countries are less corrupted. 
The correlation between GH8 and the other explanatory variables is quite low and the 
same holds for W DEX8. Note that the correlation between GH8 and W DEX8 is 
very high (0.94) and, not surprisingly, this applies also to \8XGH8 and \8XGH8_`. 
4.4 Results 
Although the original dataset contains about 1,200 observations for government wages, 
missing data for other variables reduces the sample to a minimum of 898 observations over 
76 countries. Appendix 4.B presents the list of countries included in the analysis. We first 
run the full model using the random effects estimator and test for the validity of the random 
effects model using the Sargan overidentifying restriction test. The random effects model is 
rejected at conventional levels of statistical significance. We therefore resort to the fixed 
effects estimator for inferences, although this choice will lead to a loss of information 
because the impact of time invariant factors cannot be estimated. 
4.4.1 Base line results 
Table 4.3 presents our estimation results. Besides 20 time dummies which are always 
included, the number of explanatory variables varies from the most parsimonious model in 
CORR WAGE INCOME WINCOME DEM DEMAGE DEMAGESQ POLAR MIL GOVSIZE TRADE GOVST AB
CORR 1
WAGE 0.35 1
INCOME -0.63 -0.19 1
WINCOME 0.17 0.94 0.15 1
DEM -0.38 0.13 0.54 0.30 1
DEMAGE -0.64 -0.24 0.71 -0.03 0.44 1
DEMAGESQ -0.65 -0.31 0.68 -0.11 0.36 0.97 1
POLAR -0.36 -0.03 0.32 0.06 0.31 0.34 0.31 1
MIL 0.17 0.03 -0.12 -0.02 -0.23 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 1
GOVSIZE -0.46 -0.20 0.36 -0.08 0.18 0.31 0.34 0.18 -0.11 1
T RADE 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.11 -0.12 0.19 1
GOVSTAB -0.02 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 -0.21 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.12 1
BURQUAL -0.74 -0.32 0.77 -0.09 0.47 0.71 0.71 0.33 -0.21 0.52 0.08 0.05
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column (2) to the most general model in column (6). In column (2), only GH8 and W DEX8 are included. We stepwise add W DEX8 in column (3), political factors in 
column (4), economic factors in column (5), and the incentive structure variables in column 
(6). This step-by-step inclusion of different sets of control variables shows the effects of 
our most important explanatory variables, GH8 and W DEX8, on corruption as well as 
the changes in these effects when other determinants of corruption are included. The results 
confirm that the impact of government wages on corruption is significant and varies with 
the level of income.  
 
 
Without the interaction term and any explanatory variables other than the time dummies 
and W DEX8, we see that GH8 has a negative and significant coefficient of -0.30 
(column (2) of Table 4.3). When all additional explanatory variables are included, the 
coefficient of GH8 is still significant and the magnitude of the impact of government 
wages on corruption becomes slightly larger, equal to -0.35, and is significant at the 1% 
level when all explanatory variables except W DEX8 (the interaction term of GH8 and W DEX8) are added (not shown). This result is similar to the findings of Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder (2001) who show that in developing countries—where corruption detection and 




and GDP O nly Interaction Political factors
Political and 
economic factors Full model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WAGE -0.30** -4.14*** -3.83*** -3.90*** -3.36**
(0.14) (1.51) (1.41) (1.38) (1.27)
INCOME 1.06*** 0.63* 0.63** 0.64** 0.87***
(0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
WINCOME 0.43** 0.39** 0.40** 0.34**
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
DEM -0.05** -0.06** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
DEMAGE 0.03 0.04 0.12
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
DEMAGESQ -0.02* -0.02 -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
POLAR 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)










CONSTANT -6.84** -3.05 -2.42 -2.91 -3.29
(3.03) (3.03) (3.13) (3.33) (3.25)
Observations 898 898 898 898 898
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.48
No. of countries 76 76 76 76 76
Notes: This table shows estimation results for equation (2). In column (2) only WAGE and INCOME are included as explanatory variables. 
In column (3) the interaction of WAGE and INCOME is added. In columns (4)-(6) polit ical, economic and incentive structure variables 
are subsequently added. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. All models control for t ime and country specific effects. 
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wages in the manufacturing sector to eliminate corruption. However, the inference based on 
the model without an interaction term is potentially misleading because the impact of 
government wages is conditioned by the level of income.  
When the interaction term is included in the full model (column (6) of Table 4.3), the 
coefficient of GH8 becomes more significant and about 10 times larger in magnitude. 
The coefficient of the interaction term is 0.34 and significant at the 5% level. Its positive 
sign implies that the negative impact of government wages on corruption reduces as income 
per capita increases.  
It should be stressed that inferences cannot be based on the significance of the interaction or 
the constitutive terms only (Brambor et al., 2006). Using Equation (4.2), the marginal 
impact of government wages on corruption is: 
c:;<<c>?2 = @ + 	* × R#:;S2 
 
 
For ease of exposition, we graph this marginal effect in Figure 4.1 with the estimated 
marginal impact of government wages on corruption on the vertical axis and the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita on the horizontal axis. The upward sloping solid line shows 
the marginal impact of government wages on corruption according to column (6) in Table 
4.3. The dashed curves show the 95% confidence interval of this estimated marginal 
impact. The dashed vertical line at 9.09 is the level of income (in logs) below which the 
estimated impact of government wages on corruption is negative and significant at the 5% 
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The estimated marginal effect is only significant at 5% level when the
natural logarithm of income per capita is less than 9.09, equivalent
to the GDP per capita level of 8,842 PPP dollar in 2012 prices.






Do higher government wages reduce corruption? Evidence based on a novel dataset 
 
countries such as Albania or Ecuador.8  299 observations from 40 countries fall into this 
region. Above this income level of $ 8,842, no significant results can be established. When 
the income level is higher than $ 19,468, the estimated impact becomes positive although 
insignificantly different from zero. 
We find that within country economic growth leads to more corruption. Based on the 
econometric specification in Equation (4.2), the marginal impact is the derivative of DEFF 
with respect to W DEX8, which is d	 + 	1 ×GH8. Because GH8 ranges between 0.38 
and 3.1, and λ and δ are both positive, the marginal impact of W DEX8 on corruption is 
always positive. We compute the 95% confidence interval of this total impact and find that, 
regardless of the value of GH8, the 95% confidence interval of d	 + 	1 ×GH8 always 
is above zero (results are available on request). 
Most control variables have the expected sign. The coefficient of \8X is negative and 
significant in all specifications. A one-point improvement in the Polity2 score leads to a 
decrease of about 0.05 point in corruption. The age of democracy has an inverted U shape 
impact on corruption. This inference is based on the fact that the coefficients of \8XGH8 
and \8XGH8_` are positive and negative, respectively. This finding is consistent with a 
recent study by Rock (2009) who argues that in the early years of a democracy, corruption 
may even thrive due to institutional weakness. As the democratization process takes effect, 
democratic countries will be able to better control corruption. However, Rock (2009) 
reports that democracies need about 12 years to grow effective institutions to control 
corruption. Our results indicate that democracies need even longer, up to 22.4 years, to 
control corruption.9   
We find that countries whose chief executive leader is a military officer are more corrupted. 
However, high polarization does not appear to be an important determinant of corruption in 
these models. As expected, HEa_YGe and efF`G^ have a significant and negative 
impact on corruption. 
The coefficients of our proxies for size of government and openness are not significant. 
4.4.2 Robustness checks and extensions 
Our regression models with corruption on the left hand side and the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita on the right hand side may suffer from an endogeneity problem. This is 
because corruption may affect GDP per capita (as argued by Treisman (2007)), which 
would imply that reverse causality is present. The ideal solution is to obtain a good 
instrument for GDP per capita which is not correlated with the error term in Equation (4.2) 
and apply instrumental variable methods. However, such an instrument is difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain.  
                                                          
8
 If we accept the 10% significance level, the impact of government wages on corruption is negative 
and significant at the income level of $ 9,721 or lower, equivalent to the income level of countries, 
such as Tunisia or Thailand. 
9
 This result comes from solving the equation ghijjgklmnol=0.1175729-2*0.0262733*DEMAGE = 0. 
This implies DEMAGE = 2.2374978, equivalent to a period of 22.4 years (this is because DEMAGE 
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We resort to a somewhat ad hoc solution by taking W DEX8 with a lag of three years as a 
proxy for itself.10  The interaction term W DEX8 is now the product of current GH8 
with the three-year lagged W DEX8. We run the model again and present the results in 
column (2) of Table 4.4. The coefficients of GH8 and W DEX8 are almost the same 
and remain significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The coefficient of INCOME 
is smaller, equal to 0.36 as compared to 0.87 in column (6) of Table 4.3, but the marginal 
impact of W DEX8 on corruption is still positive and significant at the 5% level. These 
results suggest that our findings on the impact of government wages on corruption are not 
affected by the potential endogeneity of W DEX8. 
Another important issue that can render our findings unstable is that GH8 and W DEX8 are highly correlated. As we can see in Table 4.2, the correlation coefficient is 
as high as 0.94. Multicollinearity, as noted by Treisman (2007), can lead to imprecise 
estimates of the coefficients of interest. To check whether our conclusion is affected by this 
high correlation, we follow Treisman (2000) and use the absolute value of the geographical 
latitude of the capital city of the countries in our sample (^GY) as a proxy for their income 
level and replace W DEX8 by GH8^GY, i.e. the product of GH8 and ^GY.11 The 
correlation between ^GY and W DEX8 is 0.55 while the correlation between GH8^GY 
and GH8 is only -0.04.  
The results are shown in column (3) of Table 4.4. While the coefficient of ^GY cannot be 
estimated because it is time invariant, the coefficients of GH8 and GH8^GY still have 
the same expected sign and are even more significant although their magnitude is smaller, 
equal to -0.94 and 0.03, respectively. This reduction in the magnitude of the coefficients is 
because the scale of ^GY, which runs from 0 to 65, is different from the scale of W DEX8, 
which is between 6.67 and 11.37. It is important to note that while ^GY can partly account 
for the income differences between countries whose capital cities are located at different 
latitudes, it fails to distinguish between income levels of countries with roughly equal 
distance from the equator. Even so, the estimates support our finding that the impact of 
government wages on corruption is moderated by the level of income. 
The third issue is the possible reverse causality between corruption and government wages. 
Perhaps governments can afford to raise wages because corruption is reduced and tax 
revenues increase as a consequence. We check this possibility by taking the first lag of GH8 while GH8^GY is replaced by the product of this first lag with ^GY,12 GH8^GY_1. The results in column (4) of Table 4.4 show that the coefficients of the 
                                                          
10
 The rationale for taking a lag of three years is twofold. It is necessary to take a sufficiently short lag 
of INCOME to make a good proxy. At the same time, the lag should be long enough to avoid the 
“feedback problem”. 
11
 Using the log of the mortality rate faced by European settlers at the time of colonization by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) in place of LAT as a proxy for income, we reach the same conclusion and the 
results are also significant at the 5% level for former colonies with a high rate of settler mortality. 
However, the number of observations is significantly reduced to 364 because countries that have 
never been colonized are omitted. The results are available on request. 
12
 Using LAT in place of INCOME, we get rid of the potential endogeneity problem of INCOME and 
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variables of interest are somewhat smaller but they still have the expected sign and are 
significant at the 1% level. Also when we lag GH8 by two and three years, our 
conclusions remain the same (results are available on request). These findings suggest that 
the causality runs from government wages to corruption and not the other way around. 
 
 
Our results, thus far, are based on the ICRG corruption index which is consistently ranked 
across countries and time. However, some studies have raised concerns that experts’ ratings 
may suffer from prior perception, and therefore, can be biased (Treisman, 2007). 
Furthermore, bureaucrats may target certain areas of the economy to extract rents 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WAGE -3.36*** -0.94*** -0.79*** -4.11*









DEM -0.05** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
DEMAGE 0.10 0.00 0.04 -0.74***
(0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.24)
DEMAGESQ -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07)
POLAR 0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
MIL 0.25 0.45** 0.36** 1.00*
(0.22) (0.21) (0.16) (0.60)
GOVSIZE -0.01 -0.02 -0.03** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
T RADE 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GOVST AB -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
BURQAL -0.43*** -0.41*** -0.32*** 0.03
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
CONSTANT (3.34) (0.82) (0.73)
2.16 5.70*** 6.29***
Observations 884 898 882 38,335
Within R-sq 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.09
Number of countries 76 76 74 44
Notes: Columns 2-4 of this table show the est imation results for Equation (4.2), corresponding with column (6) of 
T able 4.3. In column (2) the three year lagged level of income is used as a proxy for INCOME while in column (3) 
latitude is used as a proxy. In column (4) the one-year lag of WAGE is used as a proxy for itself. Column 5 presents 
the results from an alternative measure of corruption using firm level data, the detailed of this model are presented in 
Appendix C. Robust  standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelat ion are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance level of 10, 5 and 1% respectively. All models control for country and t ime fixed effects. 
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corruption by using a large sample of firms from the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
database which consists of about 130,000 firms from 135 countries over the 2002-2011 
period. Most of the surveyed countries are developing or former socialist countries. The 
survey has been repeated several times for each country. 
Top managers from the surveyed firms are asked to give their perception on corruption by 
rating if it is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, a major obstacle or a very 
severe obstacle to the operation of their firm. The top managers’ response to this question, 
running from 0 to 4, is comparable with the (adjusted) ICRG corruption index, with higher 
values indicating more corruption. However, the major drawback of these firm data for our 
purpose is that the surveys happen between relatively short intervals during which there 
might not be any changes in government wages, making the estimation results less stable.  
 
 
Given the micro nature of this alternative measure of corruption, we control for both 
country and firm-specific characteristics. While country-specific variables are the same 
variables used in Equation (4.2), the firm-specific characteristics aim at controlling for 






Construction O ECD Non-O ECD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WAGE -7.48*** -2.14* -21.63 -2.64**
(2.53) (1.17) (15.52) (1.17)
INCOME 0.61* 1.02*** 0.47 0.71*
(0.31) (0.32) (1.98) (0.41)
WINCOME 0.80*** 0.23* 2.17 0.27*
(0.28) (0.13) (1.52) (0.14)
DEM -0.04* -0.05** -0.13 -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02)
DEMAGE 0.24 0.11 -0.59 -0.05
(0.18) (0.17) (0.58) (0.30)
DEMAGESQ -0.02** -0.02* -0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.12)
POLAR 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.17*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
MIL 0.56** 0.57** 2.58*** 0.36
(0.22) (0.22) (0.57) (0.26)
GOVSIZE -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
TRADE 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
GOVSTAB -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.06*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
BURQAL -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.37* -0.39***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.21) (0.12)
CONSTANT -1.49 -4.88 3.31 -0.83
(3.30) (3.45) (22.25) (3.71)
Observat ions 895 907 410 488
Within R-sq 0.48 0.47 0.57 0.45
Number of countries 78 78 29 47
Notes: This table shows the est imation results for Equat ion (4.2), corresponding with column (6) of Table 4.3. In columns 
(2) and (3) government wages are calculated vis-à-vis wages in finance and construct ion, respect ively. In the final columns 
the sample is split into OECD and non-OECD countries. Robust  standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance level of 10, 5 and 1% respect ively. All models 
control for country and t ime fixed effects. 
Table 4.5. Robustness checks: alternative government wage indicators  
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only keep countries with available data on government wages in the year of the surveys. 
The final sample consists of 38,335 firms from 44 countries.  
Using an Ordered Probit model, we reach the same conclusion as in our previous estimates. 
The summary results of this model are presented in column (5) of Table 4.4, while the full 
model specification and the detailed estimation results are presented in Appendix 4.C. We 
also compute the marginal impact of government wages on this alternative measure of 
corruption and find similar results as in Figure 4.1. However, the firm level data suggest 
that the marginal impact is significant until a GDP per capita level of 10,534 dollars, which 
is higher than the threshold of 8,842 dollars which we found using macro data.  
Our findings are also robust to alternative ways of constructing the WAGE indicator. 
Instead of the wages in manufacturing, we use the wages in the financial sector and the 
wages in construction as alternative denominators of the WAGE indicator. The results are 
reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.5, respectively. For the first alternative, the 
coefficients of WAGE and WINCOME are much larger than the corresponding estimates in 
column (6) of Table 4.3. For the second alternative, however, these coefficients become 
smaller. Examining the data, we find that wages in construction are generally lower than 
wages in manufacturing so that the values for WAGE are larger when construction is taken 
as the comparing industry. In the same fashion, the values for WAGE are smaller when the 
financial sector is taken as the comparing benchmark because wages in finance are 
generally higher than wages in manufacturing. The changes in the coefficients of WAGE 
and WINCOME in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.5 when compared to those in Table 4.3 
reflect these relative wage differentials. Similar results are also obtained when we use the 
wages in other sectors, such as wholesale and retail, transportation or the whole economy as 
the benchmark to compare 
Finally, we split the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries. The results are presented 
in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.5, respectively. The coefficients of WAGE and 
WINCOME for the OECD subsample are now very large and become insignificant. The 
marginal effect of WAGE on CORR (computed in the same way as in Figure 4.1) is also 
insignificant. For the non-OECD subsample, however, the marginal impact of WAGE on 
CORR remains very much the same as in Figure 4.1, although the corresponding 
coefficients are less significant and smaller. This supports our finding that government 
wages only have a negative impact on corruption in relatively poor countries. Another 
noticeable change when the sample is split is that the age of democracy no longer has the 
inverted U-shape impact on corruption. This may reflect the limited variation in DEMAGE 
and its squared term within each subsample. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The impact of government wages on corruption is moderated by the level of per capita 
income. When income per capita is relatively low, higher government wages reduce 
corruption. This negative impact reduces as the level of income increases, and eventually 
becomes positive, though insignificant. Intuitively, petty corruption is more prevalent in 
poor countries, and well-paid bureaucrats forgo such type of corruption. However, when 
income is higher, petty corruption becomes less important. Grand corruption, involving 
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of corruption brings about larger revenues that outweigh any realistic compensation 
package to the corrupted bureaucrats. It is also more difficult to detect. To combat the latter 
form of corruption, increasing government wages might not be efficient. 
Our results are robust, even when we use an alternative (micro-based) measure of 
corruption. The impact of government wages on corruption is significant also if we lag our 
government wage indicator in order to deal with possible reverse causality. Likewise, using 
latitude instead of income to deal with multicollinearity problems does not change our main 
results. Of course, taking the lags of potentially endogenous variables and using latitude as 
a proxy for income are not perfect solutions to the econometric problems. Still, the 
robustness tests indicate that our results are not spurious. 
Several policy implications can be drawn from this study. Higher government wages only 
reduce corruption in low-income countries. Government wages may not be an efficient 
policy tool to reduce corruption in upper middle- or high-income countries with a relatively 
high level of corruption, such as Greece and Italy. In low-income countries, increasing 
wages may substantially reduce corruption. 
Just as an indication, an increase in average government wages from 100% to 200% of the 
average wages in the manufacturing industry leads to a decrease of about one point in 
corruption for countries with an income level between $ 1000 and $ 2000 (in 2012 prices). 
This drastic pay rise which, in many cases, is equivalent to doubling government wages, 
seems to be unrealistic. However, this is what happened in successful anti-corruption 
examples such as Singapore, Hong Kong and more recently, Da Nang, a city in central 
Vietnam.13 A reduction of corruption in combination with other policy reforms can improve 
the investment climate substantially, moving a country to a new equilibrium with less 
corruption and more productive economic activities. Our finding is in contrast with 
theoretical studies arguing that governments in highly corrupted countries should pay low 
wages and maintain a corrupt bureaucracy (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Chang and Lai, 
2002). The results of our study suggest that higher government wages should be used to 
combat corruption in the poorest and most corrupted countries. 
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4.7 Appendices 





Variable O bs Mean Min Max Definition and sources
CORR 930 2.69 0 6 ICRG corruption, available for purchase at ht tp://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx
WAGE 1076 1.3 0.38 3.07 T he ratio of government to manufacturing wages, available at http://www.levanhab28.com/ 
INCOME 1076 9.4 6.67 11.37 T he natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in 2012 international dollars), available from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI) database
WINCOME 1076 12.21 2.89 26.83 T he product  of WAGE and INCOME
DEM 1014 7.11 -10 10 T he revised Polity2 score available at ht tp://www.systemicpeace.org
POLAR 1038 2.56 0 8 A dummy which equals 1 if a country is classified as highly polarized by Beck et  al. (2001), as updated in 
2010 and available at www.worldbank.org
DEMAGE 1038 13.09 0 64
Age of the democracy, the number of consecutive years since the year the country is classified a democracy 
from 1930 unt il now. Following Treisman (2007), we classify a country as democrat ic if the executive 
electoral competitiveness index produced by Beck et al. (2001) is larger than or equal to 6.5. T he variable is 
rescaled to 10 years to prevent  the magnitude of the corresponding estimated coefficients from becoming too 
small.
DEMAGESQ 1040 0.32 0 1 T he square of DEMAGE
MIL 1028 0.02 0 1 A dummy which equals 1 if the chief execut ive is at the same time an army officer; source: Beck et al. (2001)
GOVSIZE 1076 0.17 0.03 0.54
T otal final general government  consumption as a percentage of GDP, provided by the WDI. T his variable is 
further divided by 100 to prevent the magnitude of the corresponding estimated coefficient from becoming 
too small.
TRADE 1076 0.87 0.14 3.2 T otal import and export as a percentage of GDP, provided by the WDI. This variable is further divided by 
100 to prevent the magnitude of the corresponding estimated coefficient from becoming too small.
GOVST AB 930 8.32 3.33 12 ICRG government stability score
BURQUAL 930 2.69 0 4 ICRG bureaucrat ic quality score
GEO1* 1076 0.32 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country is in the Eastern Europe and Post Soviet Union (Including Central Asia)
GEO2* 1076 0.23 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country is in the Latin America region, including Cuba, Haiti and T he Dominican 
Republic
GEO3* 1076 0.04 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country is in the North Africa and Middle East, including Israel, Turkey and Cyprus
GEO4* 1076 0.04 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country is in the Sub-Saharan Africa
GEO5* 1076 0.29 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country is in the Western Europe and North America, including Aust ralia and New 
Zealand
GEO6* 1076 0.03 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country is in the in East Asia, including Japan and Mongolia.
GEO7* 1076 0.02 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country is in the Southeast Asia Region
GEO8* 1076 0 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country is in the South Asia Region
LEGOR1* 1062 0.16 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country has the English Common Law origin
LEGOR2* 1062 0.41 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country has the French Commercial Law origin
LEGOR3* 1062 0.35 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country has the Socialist/Communist Law origin
COLUK* 1076 0.1 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country was formerly a United Kingdom's colony
COLFR* 1076 0.01 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country was formerly a French colony
COLSP* 1076 0.21 0 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a country was formerly a Spanish colony
LAT * 1062 36.6 1 65 T he absolute value of the latitude of the capital city.
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No. Country O bservations No. Country O bservations
1 Albania 5 39 Italy 14
2 Algeria 4 40 Jamaica 11
3 Argentina 19 41 Jordan 16
4 Armenia 12 42 Kazakhstan 11
5 Australia 9 43 Latvia 12
6 Austria 15 44 Lithuania 12
7 Azerbaijan 11 45 Mexico 16
8 Belarus 2 46 Moldova 13
9 Belgium 12 47 Mongolia 7
10 Bolivia 12 48 Netherlands 15
11 Brazil 19 49 New Zealand 19
12 Bulgaria 15 50 Nicaragua 3
13 Canada 19 51 Norway 11
14 Chile 9 52 Panama 17
15 China 19 53 Paraguay 13
16 Colombia 14 54 Peru 14
17 Costa Rica 8 55 Philippines 10
18 Croatia 12 56 Poland 17
19 Cyprus 13 57 Portugal 14
20 Czech Republic 16 58 Qatar 4
21 Denmark 13 59 Romania 17
22 Dominican Republic 13 60 Russian Federation 8
23 Ecuador 13 61 Slovakia 18
24 Egypt 4 62 Slovenia 13
25 El Salvador 16 63 South Africa 10
26 Estonia 13 64 Spain 14
27 Finland 14 65 Sweden 7
28 France 15 66 Switzerland 8
29 Germany 15 67 Taiwan 4
30 Greece 14 68 Tanzania 3
31 Guatemala 5 69 Thailand 3
32 Guyana 5 70 Uganda 3
33 Honduras 19 71 Ukraine 12
34 Hungary 18 72 United Kingdom 21
35 India 3 73 United States 21
36 Indonesia 2 74 Uruguay 17
37 Ireland 15 75 Venezuela 17
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4.7.3 Appendix C. Model specification and estimation results based on the 
firm level data. 
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the perception of the top managers on corruption is 
modeled as a latent process:  
 
q∗ 	= 	r: 	+ 	st 	+ 	A 	+ 	U 	+ 	u																																																				(B. :. )	
 
where O and v denote country and firm, D is a set of country level factors including GH8, W DEX8, GH8 × W DEX8 and all control variables included in the model in column 
(6) of Table 4.3. w is the set of firm level factors. N 	and Y	are vectors of country and time 
dummies. x 	is the error term which follows the standard normal distribution.  
In practice, we do not observe y∗. Instead, we only observe the categorical variable on the 
rating by top managers, y, which takes the value v  (v = 0,… , 4), according to the 
following pattern: 
 
           
iff        
q	 = 	 
 {| ≤ q∗ < {																																																																							(B. :. V) 
 
where | = −∞ and  = +∞. The coefficients  and  in Equation (4. D. 1) can still be 
estimated consistently using the Ordered Probit model of the form: 
I	 = 	M = 5{ − +: + t +  + U-6 
−	5{| − +: + t +  + U-6																																														(B. :. ) 
When y	 = 	0, the model in Equation 	(4. D. 3) reduces to: 
I	 = M = 5{ − +: + t +  + U-6																																														(B. :. B) 
When y	 = 	4, the model in Equation (4. D. 3)	reduces to: 
I	 = 	BM = 5{B − +: + t +  + U-6																																														(B. :. ) 
Table 4.6 presents the summary of the firm level variables, while Table 4.7 presents the full 
estimation results. 
Similar to the analysis in Section 4.1, we also compute the marginal impact of GH8 on y∗ as well as its 95% confidence interval. The results are presented in Figure 4.2. The 
figure shows that the marginal impact of GH8 on y∗	in Equation (4.C.1) is only 
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Table 4.6. Summary and definition of the firm level variables to support the 
estimation in column (5), Table 4.4 
 
 
   
Variable O bs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition
Corruption as an 
obstacle 38,335 1.56 1.42 0 4
Answer to the quest ion "Do you think that corruption are No Obstacle, a 
Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current 
operations of this establishment?"
FIRMAGE 38,335 0.19 0.18 0 3.1
The number of years since the year a firm started operation in a country. 
The variable is rescaled by dividing by 100 to prevent the est imated 
coefficient from becoming too small.
FIRMEXPORT 38,335 0.23 0.42 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm export
FIRMOWN1 38,335 0.13 0.33 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm is wholly or partly owned by foreign individuals or 
entit ies
FIRMOWN2 38,335 0.04 0.2 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm is wholly or partly owned by the government
FIRMLEGAL1 38,335 0.52 0.5 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm is publicly listed
FIRMLEGAL2 38,335 0.07 0.25 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm is a private limited company
FIRMLEGAL3 38,335 0.21 0.41 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm is a sole proprietary firm
FIRMSIZE1 38,335 0.48 0.5 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm employs between 5 and 19 people
FIRMSIZE2 38,335 0.3 0.46 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm employs between 20 and 99 people
FIRMLOC1 38,335 0.2 0.4 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm is located at a location with a population of 
between 250,000 and 1 million
FIRMLOC2 38,335 0.14 0.35 0 1 A dummy equal 1 if a firm is located at a location with a population of more 
than 1 million people











Variable Estimates Variable Est imates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WAGE -4.11* FIRMAGE -0.06
(2.20) (0.00)
INCOME -0.44 FIRMEXPORT 0.02
(0.45) (0.02)
WINCOME 0.39* FIRMOWN1 -0.06***
(0.24) (0.02)
DEM -0.01 FIRMOWN2 -0.25***
(0.04) (0.05)
DEMAGE -0.74*** FIRMLEGAL1 0.05**
(0.24) (0.02)
DEMAGESQ -0.09 FIRMLEGAL2 0.03
(0.07) (0.03)
GOVSIZE 0.06*** FIRMLEGAL3 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
T RADE 0.01*** FIRMSIZE1 0.05**
(0.00) (0.02)
POLAR -0.02 FIRMSIZE2 0.07***
(0.07) (0.02)
BURQUAL 0.00 FIRMLOC1 0.05*
(0.02) (0.03)
GOVST AB 0.03 FIRMLOC2 -0.01
(0.08) (0.04)
MIL 1.00* FIRMLOC3 0.10***
(0.60) (0.02)
Country Level Firm Level
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation (4.4). Columns (2) and (4) present the est imates of 
the coefficients of the country and firm level factors, respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance level of 
10, 5 and 1% respectively. Country and time fixed effects are included. The countries included in this analysis are 
Albania (2002, 2005), Argentina (2010), Armenia (2002, 2005, 2009), Azerbaijan (2002, 2005, 312), Brazil 
(2003, 2009), Bulgaria (2002, 2005, 2007, 2009). Chile (2010), China (2002), Colombia (2010), Costa Rica 
(2010), Croatia (2002, 2005, 2007), Czech Republic (2002, 2005, 2007), Dominican Republic (2005, 2010), 
Ecuador (2010), El Salvador (2003, 2010), Estonia (2002, 2005, 2009), Germany (2005), Greece (2005), 
Guatemala (2003), Honduras (2003, 2010), Hungary (2002, 2005, 2009), Indonesia (2009), Ireland (2005), 
Kazakhstan (2002, 2005, 2009), Latvia (2002, 2005, 2009), Lithuania (2002, 2005, 2009), Moldova (2002, 
2003, 2005, 2009), Mongolia (2009), Nicaragua (2010), Panama (2010), Paraguay (2010), Peru (2010), 
Philippines (2009), Poland (2002, 2003, 2005, 2009), Portugal (2005), Romania (2002, 2005, 2009), Russian 
Federation (2005, 2009), Slovakia (2002, 2005, 2009), South Africa (2003, 2007), Spain (2005), Ukraine 
(2002, 2005, 2008), Uruguay (2010) and Venezuela (2010).







































Log of GDP per Capita
95% Confidence Interval
The estimated marginal effect is only significant at 5% level when the
natural logarithm of income per capita is less than 9.26, equivalent
to the GDP per capita level of 10,534 PPP dollar in 2012 prices.
Figure 4.2. Marginal impact of government wages on corruption based on 
the firm level data 
   
Chapter 5 
The impact of inter-industry wage 
differentials on corruption and red 
tape: New firm-based evidence 
5.1 Introduction1 
Corruption is one of the most severe obstacles for firms’ operations in many countries. Still, 
firms within the same country - which therefore share the same institutional environment - 
often pay different amounts of bribes and have different perceptions as to whether 
corruption is an obstacle to their operation. Several explanations have been suggested in the 
literature. Svensson (2003) argues that government bureaucrats act as price discriminators 
and determine the price of public services in a discretionary manner to maximize their 
income from corruption. More profitable firms are targeted and have to pay a larger amount 
of money on bribery. Another explanation for why firms face different levels of corruption 
is that firms in less competitive industries are forced to pay more bribes because corruptible 
bureaucrats know the distribution of the monopoly rents (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). Finally, 
Alexeev and Song (2013) argue that competition induces more corruption because firms 
have to compete with each other for the distribution of public services. 
Red tape, defined as completely pointless bureaucratic procedures that one has to endure 
when dealing with the bureaucracy (Banerjee, 1997), is another equally severe problem in 
many countries. It is the result of government (over-)regulation and is often abused by 
corrupted officials as a means to corrupt. Red tape creates burdens on the firms’ operations 
and forces them to pay bribes. Corruptible government officials have an incentive to create 
red tape by making regulatory compliance artificially more costly or public services 
artificially scarcer in order to extract further bribes (Rose-Ackerman, 2004). Guriev (2004) 
shows that corruption leads to a level of red tape that is higher than the socially optimal 
level, while Banerjee (1997) demonstrates that red tape is deliberately created by 
bureaucrats in order to make money, and that the level of red tape is higher in relatively 
poor countries. Kaufmann (1997) finds that firms that spend more on bribery also face 
more red tape. 
This chapter investigates the impact of wage differences across industries and countries on 
red tape and corruption. As explanatory variable, we will use the ratio of government wages 
                                                          
1This chapter is based on Le, V.H., Dietzenbacher, E., de Haan, J., 2013. The impact of inter-industry 
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and the average wages in each of the industries that are considered. This is because the 
relative government wages are hypothesized to be the cause of corruption and determine 
which industry is targeted. Previous studies such as Dutt (2009), Le et al. (2013a), and Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) have used relative government wages that were defined as 
the ratio of government wages to the wages in the manufacturing industry. Such measure 
captures the relative wages of government employees while it helps avoiding the difficulty 
of comparing absolute values of wages across countries. However, it focuses on the 
manufacturing industry only and ignores that the wage gap (and thus the incentive to 
corrupt) may differ across industries. In this chapter we therefore focus on all industries 
classified according to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities, revision 3 (ISIC 3). Our relative government wage indicator (defined as the ratio 
of government wages and the average wages of each of the ISIC 3 industry) thus varies 
from one industry to the other. The higher the wages of an industry are, the lower the value 
of the relative government wage indicator is. The indicator thus reflects the industry wage 
differentials in each country. 
A large body of literature finds that industrial wage differences within a country are driven 
by the profitability of the firms within an industry (Genre et al., 2011; Gittleman and Wolff, 
1993; Krueger and Summers, 1988). On the other hand, firm-level studies have found that 
government bureaucrats and politicians act as price-discriminators in terms of bribery 
bargaining (Svensson, 2003). As a result, corrupt bureaucrats may consider inter-industry 
wage differentials as information in deciding which firms to target. When inter-industry 
wage differentials serve as a channel of information for the opportunities to extract bribes, 
the bureaucrats will have the incentive to “rattle” the firms that they think are most capable 
of paying bribes. That is, firms in an industry with relatively high wages and, therefore, a 
low relative government wage indicator. 
The measures of corruption and red tape in this study are both perception-based and 
experience-based. The data are collected via worldwide surveys at the firm level, carried 
out by the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey Unit. The perception-based measures are the 
responses by top managers to questions about how much of an obstacle government 
regulations and corruption are to the firms’ day-to-day operations. The experience-based 
measures are the actual amount of “unofficial payment” that top managers think “firms like 
theirs” have to pay government officials to “get things done”, and the time devoted to 
dealing with government procedures by senior managers. The database covers a large 
number of firms from mostly developing countries. The surveyed firms are representative 
of an economy’s private sector and can be classified into ISIC 3 industries. The sample 
used consists of 43,568 firms from 52 countries. 
We test our hypothesis that firms from high-wage industries face more corruption and red 
tape by modeling red tape and corruption as nonlinear functions of the relative wage 
indicator and an interaction term between this indicator and the level of income per capita. 
By including the interaction term, the impact of inter-industry wage differentials is 
moderated by the level of income per capita. The interaction term accounts for the 
theoretical prediction of Banerjee (1997) that the level of red tape is higher in relatively 
poor countries. It is also motivated by the finding of Le et al. (2013a) that relative 
government wages are more strongly related to corruption in low-income countries than in 
high-income countries. The explanation given is that higher government wages only reduce 
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in particular, at low levels of economic development. Built on these findings, the 
relationship between our indicator of relative government wages, and red tape and 
corruption is expected to be negative in low-income countries, i.e. firms from higher-wage 
industries thus having a lower indicator, face more red tape and spend more on bribes.  
However, petty corruption is less common in rich countries in which bureaucrats are also 
less likely to use red tape as a measure to rattle firms in order to extract bribes. Therefore, 
we expect no relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and corruption when 
the income level is relatively high. Furthermore, high-wage firms are often more profitable 
and therefore have enough resources to meet costly government regulations. As a result, 
they are less likely to complain about government regulations. Therefore, the relationship 
between relative government wages and red tape may be positive in relatively rich 
countries, i.e. high wage firms complain less about government regulation. 
We use several econometric models and control for country and time specific effects as 
well as firm-level characteristics. In low-income countries, we find strong evidence that top 
managers in high-wage industries (when compared to those low-wage industries) are more 
likely to view government regulations and corruption as obstacles to their firms’ operations. 
Such high-wage firms pay a larger amount of their annual sales on corruption and their 
senior management also spends significantly more time on dealing with government 
regulations.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 5.2 presents our motivation to explore the 
relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and corruption and red tape. Section 
5.3 presents the econometric models and data sources. The findings are presented in Section 
5.4 while Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Related literature and motivation 
The most important line of research related to this study deals with the relationship between 
government wages and corruption, which can be defined as the abuse of public office for 
private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 2004). A major reason for government bureaucrats to 
involve in corruption is that their wages are so low that they have to “abuse” their power to 
meet the subsistence level (Feinberg, 2009; Klitgaard, 1989; Stasavage, 1999). A natural 
question is whether raising government wages will eradicate, or at least reduce, corruption. 
Several theoretical studies such as Becker and Stigler (1974), Bond (2008), Bose (2004), 
UlHaque and Sahay (1996), and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) suggest that this is the 
case. Higher government wages make government bureaucrats feel being fairly treated and 
they may withhold from corrupt activities which would reduce corruption. Selfish 
government employees who aim at maximizing their income may also find it no longer 
optimal to corrupt because higher wages increase the economic loss of losing a well-paid 
government job in case of detection. Finally, higher government wages will attract better 
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to the private sector. The quality of the bureaucracy will then improve and the government 
may become better at controlling corruption.2 
Some empirical studies find that higher government wages reduce corruption (Dutt, 2009; 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001) while some others report no significant relationship 
between government wages and corruption (Panizza, 2001; Treisman, 2007). In these 
studies relative government wages are generally defined as the ratio of government wages 
and the wages of a benchmark sector, such as manufacturing. Alternatively, GDP per capita 
may be used as the denominator. This practice dates back to the seminal research by Heller 
and Tait (1984). In a recent study covering a large number of countries over the late 1980s-
2010 period and using data drawn from micro-based surveys, Le et al. (2013a) find that 
government wages only have a negative impact on corruption in countries with a relatively 
low income per capita. Their explanation is that corruption in poor countries mainly 
consists of petty corruption which government bureaucrats in high income countries are 
more likely to forgo because the relatively small amount of money gained may not be 
worth the effort.3  Also, petty corruption is easier to detect and government employees in 
relatively rich countries may not find the gains worth the risk of detection.    
There are several reasons why inter-industry wage differentials may be related to the level 
of red tape and corruption. First, the inter-industry wage structure is partly determined by 
the profitability of each industry (Du Caju et al., 2010; Lawrence, 1986). Studies in the last 
decades also find that the structure is relatively stable over time in both developed and 
developing countries (Erdil and Yetkiner, 2001), even in the face of major macroeconomic 
shocks (Arbache et al., 2004). Therefore, the differences in relative government wages 
across industries may serve as a signal about the profitability of firms. Selfish government 
agents who aim to maximize their income may use this information to screen and filter out 
firms which are most capable of paying bribes. Once certain groups of firms are targeted, 
bureaucrats can use their discretionary power to increase red tape in order to extract bribes. 
So firms in high-wage industries will face more red tape and may have to buy their way out 
via corruption. 
Second, the fair-wage hypothesis suggests that government bureaucrats forgo opportunities 
to extract bribes once they are paid a wage level they perceive as fair. However, the feeling 
of being fairly paid is a subjective matter and whether or not a bureaucrat feels that he is 
fairly paid may depend on the reference (Mas, 2006). A similar issue has been discussed in 
the literature on happiness. Based on a survey of this literature, Clark et al. (2008) conclude 
that individuals feel happier when their income is relatively higher than the income of 
comparable people. In another study, Clark et al. (2010) report that workers who receive an 
income at the higher end of the relevant income distribution also exert more effort to fulfill 
their duty. These results suggest that bureaucrats may feel less guilty if they extract bribes 
from firms in high-wage industries. 
                                                          
2
 At the same time, studies such as Besley and McLaren (1993) and Macchiavello (2008) argue that 
paying high government wages to combat corruption is very costly or inefficient. 
3
 Examples of petty corruption are road bribery and public fund embezzlement as documented in 
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Third, government employees may differ in terms of motivation (Macchiavello, 2008). 
Some may be highly motivated to work for the government and serve the society. However, 
others may choose to work for the government because of the possibility to corrupt. The 
latter type of bureaucrats will also seek to work for those government agencies offering the 
best opportunities to extract bribes. Therefore, selfish government employees are more 
likely to regulate high-wage industries, because the profitability of such industries might be 
a good signal that firms are able to pay bribes. As a result, firms in high-wage industries 
may face more red tape and spend more on bribery. 
5.3 Data and the estimation approach 
5.3.1 The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey 
The Enterprise Survey database4 focuses on a wide range of issues, such as infrastructure 
services, sales and supplies, and business-government relationships. We focus on two 
different sets of questions. The first one aims at capturing the top managers’ perceptions of 
dealing with the government, and the other set of questions aims at measuring the actual 
cost of corruption and red tape that firms incur. With respect to the perception measures, 
top managers are asked to judge how much of an obstacle corruption and government 
regulations are to their firms’ day-to-day operations. Besides a question on general 
corruption, there are four questions on the extent to which labor regulation, courts/legal 
system, business licensing and operating permits, and tax administration are obstacles to the 
firm’s operations.5  So we have one perception-based measure of corruption and four 
perception-based measures of red tape. The actual cost of corruption is obtained from top 
managers’ response to the question how much gifts and informal pay, in terms of annual 
sales, firms like theirs have to pay “to get things done”. Finally, the actual cost of red tape 
is measured as the reported percentage of their time that senior management spent on 
dealing with government regulations. 
Each type of measurement has some advantages but also suffers from shortcomings. While 
the top managers are likely to answer questions on their perceptions, their responses may be 
biased toward their most recent experience with the government (Kaplan and Pathania, 
2010). Managers may not find that labor regulations are burdensome if no government 
inspector visited their firm recently, while others may perceive that obtaining an operating 
permit is very difficult because they recently faced that problem. Perception measures are 
subjective and it is difficult to know whether perceptions reflect the actual situation or not.  
With respect to the experience-based measures, the question on the actual amount of 
corruption gives us a very concrete measure of the cost of corruption but many managers 
refuse to answer such questions or give a false response because they are afraid of 
retaliation (Jensen et al., 2010). The measure of actual red tape stands out to be the most 
                                                          
4
 Available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
5
 Another aspect of red tape is customs and trade regulations, which turned out to be insignificant. 
Perhaps, this is because only 23% of the sampled firms in our analysis export directly or indirectly, 
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reliable because it is comparable between firms and it is less sensitive than the question on 
corruption so that respondents are more likely to give true answers. Table 5.1 presents the 
name of the dependent variables as well as their corresponding survey questions. For the 
questions regarding top managers’ perceptions of government regulation, the resulting 
variables are categorical, running from 0 to 4, where higher values indicate more obstacles. 
The experience-based variables are continuous. Corruption cost is the reported percentage 
of annual sales spent on corruption, while Red tape cost is the reported percentage of senior 
management’s time spent on dealing with government regulations. 
 
 
Banerjee (1997), Bose (2004) and Guriev (2004) suggest that these measures are inter-
related. To extract petty bribes, corrupt bureaucrats may raise the level of red tape. 
Artificially high levels of red tape require top managers from high-wage firms to spend 
more time on dealing with government regulations and they will find government 
regulations a severe obstacle to their firm’s operations. Consequently, firms have to pay 
more bribes to overcome the red tape and their top managers will also report higher bribery 
expenditure percentages. 
5.3.2 The empirical model 
Given the differences in the nature of the dependent variables in our study, we employ two 
different econometric methods to estimate the relationship between inter-industry wage 
differentials and corruption and red tape, namely the Ordered Probit model, and the Tobit 
model. First, we model the managers’ perceptions of each aspect of government regulation 
as a latent variable, y∗, which is a function of our variable of interest and a set of control 
variables of the following form: 
Variables Definition
Actual cost measures:
Red Tape Cost Answer to the quest ion "In a typical week over the last 12 months, what percentage of total senior management's 
t ime was spent in dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations?
[Senior management means managers, directors, and officers above direct supervisors of production/sales workers. 
Some examples of government regulations are taxes, customs, labor regulations, licensing and registration, including 
dealings with officials and completing forms.]"
Corruption Cost Answer to the quest ion "We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments 
to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulat ions, services etc. On average, 
what percent of total annual sales, or est imated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal 
payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?"
Perception measures:
Corruption Answer to the quest ion "Do you think that  corrupt ion is No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very 
Severe Obstacle to the current  operations of this establishment?"
Courts/Legal
System
Answer to the quest ion "Do you think that  the legal system is No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a 
Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?"
Labor
Regulation
Answer to the quest ion "Do you think that  labor regulations are No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or 
a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?"
Business Licensing & 
O perating Permits
Answer to the quest ion "Do you think that  the business licensing and permit are No Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a 
Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?"
Tax
Administration
Answer to the quest ion "Do you think that  the tax administration is No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, 
or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current  operations of this establishment?"
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where y∗, with 	(= 	1, 2, . . ,5), indicates the different dependent variables that are taken 
into consideration. That is, the top managers’ perception of corruption and of the obstacles 
related to: the legal system, labor regulations, the business licensing and operating permits, 
and the tax administration. The indexes i, j, k and t stand for country, industry, firm and the 
surveyed year, respectively. As mentioned before, GH8 	is an indicator of relative 
government wages which is constructed as the ratio of government wages to the average 
wages of the industry that a firm is operating in. W DEX8 gives income, measured as the 
natural log of GDP per capita in 2012 PPP prices. & 	is a set of firm-level control 
variables and 0 	is the error term which is assumed to follow a standard normal 
distribution. b	represents country-year dummies. These dummies will take into account all 
differences between countries as well as the variation within each country over time. For 
this reason, we do not need to control for country-specific variables that potentially affect 
red tape and corruption.  
The coefficient of GH8	is expected to be negative for the reasons outlined in the previous 
section. The interaction term GH8 × W DEX8 is the product of the relative 
government wage indicator and the income variable. This interaction term is included in 
our model to capture the fact that bureaucrats in poor countries are more likely to use the 
relative wage information to target high-wage firms to extract petty bribes than bureaucrats 
in rich countries (Le et al., 2013a). It is also consistent with the theoretical prediction in 
Banerjee (1997) that red tape is more likely to be abused as a means to extract illegal 
income in poor countries. We expect the marginal impact of GH8	on y∗ to be negative at 
low-income levels. When the income level is relatively high, we do not expect any 
significant relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and corruption because 
petty corruption is not common in rich countries. However, the impact of GH8 on the top 
managers’ perception on government regulation in rich countries can be positive because 
high wage firms are often more profitable and have enough resources to meet the costly 
regulations and rules. 
In practice, we do not observe y∗ directly. Instead, we have the categorical variable, y, 
which is the response by top managers to the first 5 questions listed in Table 5.1. These 
categorical responses are determined by the underlying continuous variable y∗. The 
observed categorical variable will take the value , ( = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), if: 
{	$| ≤	q	∗ 	< 	{	$ 
where | = −∞ and  = +∞. Let G ≡ JGH8 +	1+GH8 × W DEX8- +		& + b, then the coefficients Jand 1	in Equation (5.1) can be estimated in a 
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Iq	 = $M	 = I{	$| ≤ 	q	∗ 	≤ 	{	$M 
= 5{	$| ≤ 	>	 + .	 	≤ 	{	$6 
= 5{	$| − 	> ≤ .	 ≤ {	$ − 	>6 
= I{	$ − >M 	− 	I{	$| − >M 
Two special cases are y = 0 and y = 4. The probability that y	takes the value of 0 can 
be simplified as: 
Iq	 = M = I−∞	 ≤ 	q	∗ ≤	{	M 
= 5>	 + .	 	≤ 	{	6 
= 5.	 	≤ 	{	 − >6 
= I{	 − >M 
In a similar manner, the probability that y = 4 can be written as: 
Iq	 = BM = 	Iq	∗ ≥ {	M 
= 5>	 + .	 	≥ 	{	6 
= 5.	 	≥ 	{	 − >6 
=  − 	5.	 	≤ 	{	 − >6 
= 	 − 	I{	 − >M 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution of the error term 0. The 
interested parameters of this model can be estimated using the maximum likelihood 








$	5I{	$ − >M − I{	$| − >M6 
where ! is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a top manager reports that 
indicator  take the value , ( = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), and   is the size of the sample of surveyed 
firms. 
Second, we investigate the relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and the 
actual cost of corruption and red tape, i.e. the actual amount of revenue spent on corruption 
and the actual percentage of time that senior management spent on dealing with 
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where y∗ ,	with		 = 	1, 2, ,stands for our measures of the actual cost of corruption and the 
actual cost of red tape respectively.0	 is the random error term which is assumed to 
follow a normal distribution. Other variables are defined as before. 
One problem with the linear regression model in Equation (5.2) is that we do not observe y∗  directly. Instead, we observe a variable y which is equal to y∗   if y∗  > 0 and 0 if y∗  ≤ 
0. In other words, the variables on the reported cost of corruption and red tape are censored 
from below at 0. Following Alexeev and Song (2013), we therefore employ the Tobit 
model which takes into account the probability that y∗   is censored at 0 by adding a 
correction term to the log likelihood function of the ordinary least squares log likelihood 
function. The correction term is the probability that y∗ ≤ 	0, which is (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005): 
Iq" = M = 	Iq"∗ ≤ M			 
= 5 	 + ." 	≤ 	6 = 5." 	≤ 	− 6 
=  ¡." 	≤ 	−  ¢ 
= ¡−  ¢ 
= 	 − 	 ¡ ¢ 
where  is the standard deviation of 0 , and e ≡ JGH8 +	1+GH8 ×W DEX8- +		& + b. J and 1 in Equation (5.2) can be estimated 
consistently by maximizing the likelihood function of the following form: 
$	" = 	  $	
q"

£	– 	Ф ¡ ¢¦ +	+	  $	q"§ £
¨ ¡q" − 	  ¢¦ 
where φ is the density function of a standard normal random variable.  
5.3.3 Control variables 
An important question is which firm-level variables should be included in &  and &  
in equations (5.1) and (5.2). Given the lack of a clear theory and the interrelatedness 
between the dependent variables, we have chosen to include the same set of variables in 
both equations. These variables aim at controlling for different firm characteristics to 
ensure that the estimated impact of government wages on corruption and red tape is not 
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Svensson (2003) we include 6 groups of firm level characteristics as control variables. 
These are firm location, legal status, size, ownership, age, and export activity. 
The location of a firm can affect its business opportunities as well as its profitability, which 
in turn will affect its ability and willingness to pay a bribe. Firms in more profitable 
locations, e.g. large cities, are also more likely to be targeted by government officials. We 
include three dummies to account for firms’ location. wWFX^ED1, wWFX^ED2 and wWFX^ED3 take the value 1 if the firm is located in a city: with a population of 250,000	to 1 million people, with a population of more than 1 million people or that is the capital city, 
respectively. With respect to a firm’s legal status, there  are also three dummies which take 
the value 1 if a firm has the legal status of privately limited (wWFX^8HG^1), publicly listed 
(wWFX^8HG^2), or sole proprietary (wWFX^8HG^3). Firms with different legal statuses 
are subject to different regulations on information disclosure and may, therefore, have 
different perceptions on, and experiences with, red tape and corruption. 
Svensson (2003) argues that small firms are less likely to pay bribes because it is easier for 
them to escape attention from corruptible officials. To control for this, we include two 
dummies which equal 1 if the size of the firm in terms of employment is between 5 and 19 
(_XG^^) or between 20 and 99 (X8\WfX). International investors, especially those from 
OECD countries, face extra regulations on corruption from home country authorities. As a 
result, we expect that foreign direct investment (FDI) firms are less likely to bribe. 
Government ownership provides firms with connections to authorities or access to 
resources that private firms can only get by bribing. Hence, enterprises partly owned6 by 
the state might face less red tape and can avoid some form of bribery faced by private 
firms. To take these considerations into account, we construct two dummies: E 8F_«W]1 which takes the value of 1 if a firm is an FDI enterprise, and E 8F_«W]2 which takes the value of 1 if the firm is partly owned by the government. 
wWFXGH8 and wWFX8&]EFY are the final explanatory variables. wWFXGH8 is the 
number of years since a firm started operation while wWFX8&]EFY is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if a firm sells its products abroad.7 Because new firms typically face 
more procedures to deal with, they may complain more about red tape and may have to pay 
more bribes. Similarly, exporting firms have to use more public services and may therefore 
have worse perceptions of and experiences with the government. 
5.3.4 Data sources and descriptive analysis 
Data on wages are taken from the worldwide database on industrial wages collected by Le 
et al. (2013b). This database provides the average wages for each of the 17 ISIC 3 
industries for 126 countries over the late 1980s – 2011 period. One part of the data is 
obtained from international household survey databases, such as the World Bank Living 
Standard Measurement Study, the Luxembourg Income Study, or the one from the 
International Labor Organization. The other part of the data is obtained by studying 
countries’ data archives. Next to the fact that survey data are more accurate than macro data 
obtained from statistical yearbooks (Le et al., 2013c), they also open a new path to 
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 100% state-owned enterprises are excluded from the Enterprise Surveys. 
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overcome the problem of missing data for developing countries, where reliable macro data 
on government wages and on employment are often lacking. We use data on wages for the 
public administration and the 9 industries that are included in the Enterprise Survey 
database.8 The relative government wage indicator is defined as the ratio of the wages in 
public administration to the average wages of the ISIC 3 industry that a firm is operating in. 
 
 
We first compute the relative government wages for all countries for which Le et al. 
(2013b) provide data. In the second step, this dataset is merged with the cleaned Enterprise 
Surveys dataset. We only retain firms with complete information on all explanatory 
variables and at least one dependent variable. The final sample consists of 43,568 firms 
from 52 countries. 
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for the main variables in our models. The relative 
government wage indicator varies between 0.2 and 3.16, with an average value of 1.49. 
There is also substantial variation in the perceptions of top managers on different aspects of 
government regulation. The average corruption perception score is about 1.55. Perception 
on tax administration has an average of 1.52, but the average scores on the extent to which 
business licensing and operating permits, labor regulation and the legal system are 
                                                          
8
 The 9 industries included in the Enterprise Survey database are: Mining and quarrying; 
Manufacturing; Electricity, gas and water supply; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade, repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods; Hotels and restaurants; Transport, 
storage and communications; Financial intermediation; and Real estate, renting and business 
activities. 
Variable O bs Mean StandardDeviation Min Max
1. WAGE 43,568 1.49 0.38 0.20 3.16
2. INCOME 43,568 9.24 0.67 7.28 10.72
3. WAGE x INCOME 43,568 13.78 3.59 1.65 31.11
4. Corruption 41,184 1.55 1.41 0 4
5. Legal System 39,470 1.22 1.28 0 4
6. Labor Regulation 42,842 1.19 1.21 0 4
7. License and Permit 41,913 1.12 1.19 0 4
8. Tax Administration 42,639 1.52 1.25 0 4
9. Red tape cost 40,492 10.18 15.73 0 100
10. Corruption cost 28,300 1.12 3.86 0 100
11. FIRM AGE 43,568 0.18 0.18 0 3.10
12. EXPORTER 43,568 0.23 0.42 0 1
13. OWNERSHIP1 43,568 0.13 0.33 0 1
14. OWNERSHIP2 43,568 0.05 0.21 0 1
15. LEGAL1 43,568 0.50 0.50 0 1
16. LEGAL2 43,568 0.07 0.26 0 1
17. LEGAL3 43,568 0.23 0.42 0 1
18. SMALL 43,568 0.49 0.50 0 1
19. MEDIUM 43,568 0.30 0.46 0 1
20. LOCATION1 43,568 0.18 0.39 0 1
21. LOCATION2 43,568 0.13 0.34 0 1
22. LOCATION3 43,568 0.31 0.46 0 1
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obstacles for firms’ operations are only 1.12, 1.19 and 1.22, respectively. The response rate9  
to the questions regarding top managers’ perception on corruption and red tape is always 
higher than 90%. 
With respect to the actual cost of red tape, the response rate is also high, equal to 93.30%. 
About 31% of the respondents in our retained sample report that they spend no time on 
dealing with government regulation, while only 2% report that they spend more than 50% 
of their time on the issue. On average, senior managers who report a positive amount of 
time dealing with the government spend about 14.70% of their time on the issue, while the 
variation between these firms is relatively large, with a standard deviation of about 17.05%. 
 
 
With respect to the actual cost of corruption, firms reporting to pay bribes indicate that they 
have to incur about 3.99% of their annual sales “to get things done”. There is substantial 
variation in the amount that firms pay, from about 0.001% to 100%, and the standard 
deviation of this variable is 6.44%. Most firms reporting a positive amount of bribery 
indicate that they have to pay an amount of about 10% or less and only 1% of the 
responding firms report that they have to pay more than 10%. However, we should 
emphasize that 35.07% of the surveyed firms refuse to answer this question. In our retained 
sample, only 28,300 out of 43,568 firms respond (equal to 64.96%) and only 7,952 firms 
report a positive amount of expenditure on bribes (equal to 18.25%). And, managers who 
answer may intentionally give the wrong information (Kraay and Murrell, 2013). The 
measurement of actual corruption cost is therefore probably the least reliable of our 7 
measures used. 
Table 5.3 presents the correlation between the main variables of our models. The 
correlation between GH8 and the interaction term GH8 × W DEX8 is very high, equal 
to 0.96. This is because the variable W DEX8, measured in natural logs, does not vary very 
much in our sample. The correlation between the variables capturing the top managers’ 
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 The response rate in this section is calculated based on the original sample, before the observations 
with missing information are dropped.  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. WAGE 1
2. INCOME -0.02 1
3. WAGE x INCOME 0.96 0.24 1
4. Corruption 0.11 -0.15 0.07 1
5. Legal System 0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.62 1
6. Labor Regulation 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.35 0.40 1
7. License and Permit 0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.42 0.44 0.40 1
8. Tax Administration 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.46 1
9. Red tape cost 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.12 1
10. Corruption cost -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.11 1
11. FIRM AGE 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.06 1
12. EXPORTER -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.15 1
13. OWNERSHIP1 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.25 1
14. OWNERSHIP2 -0.13 -0.08 -0.14 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.18 0.01 -0.04 1
15. LEGAL1 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.06 -0.22 1
16. LEGAL2 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.34 -0.27 1
17. LEGAL3 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 -0.08 -0.05 -0.11 0.01 -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.54 -0.15 1
18. SMALL -0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.17 -0.08 -0.04 -0.15 0.03 -0.25 -0.28 -0.17 -0.10 -0.24 -0.17 0.34 1
19. MEDIUM 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.03 -0.17 -0.64 1
20. LOCATION1 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.03 1
21. LOCATION2 0.01 -0.18 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11 0.04 -0.18 1
22. LOCATION3 0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.32 -0.26
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perception of corruption and the extent to which regulation is regarded as an obstacle is 
relatively low. Also the correlation between actual corruption cost and top managers’ 
perception of corruption and red tape is very low, varying from 0.02 to 0.16, suggesting the 
importance of studying the issue from different angles.  
Another important result is that the correlation between W DEX8 and different measures of 
corruption and red tape, presented in column (2) of Table 5.3, are mostly negative but 
relatively low. This is very different from the high correlation between W DEX8 and 
measures of corruption and red tape at the country level as generally reported in the 
literature. Such difference suggests that there is a substantial variation of corruption and red 
tape facing firms within a country that cannot be captured by aggregate corruption 
measures. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 The relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WAGE -1.07*** -0.80** -1.64*** -1.24*** -1.41***
(0.37) (0.31) (0.39) (0.46) (0.26)
WAGE x INCOME 0.11*** 0.08** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
FIRM AGE -0.06 0.07* 0.02 -0.13*** -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
EXPORTER 0.02 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.04** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
OWNERSHIP1 -0.05** -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
OWNERSHIP2 -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.11** -0.21*** -0.25***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
LEGAL1 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LEGAL2 -0.01 0.02 -0.06* 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
LEGAL3 -0.03 -0.08*** -0.06** -0.04** -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SMALL 0.06** -0.09*** -0.25*** -0.08*** -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
MEDIUM 0.07*** -0.01 -0.07*** -0.03* 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LOCATION1 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LOCATION2 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
LOCATION3 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 41,184 39,470 42,842 41,913 42,639
No. of surveys 104 104 104 104 104
No. of Countries 52 52 52 52 52
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.08
MAJO R O BSTACLE TO  FIRMS' O PERATIO N
Dependent
Variable
Notes: this table presents the est imation of Equation (5.1) using the ordered probit  model. The column header indicates the 
name of the dependent variable. The standard errors reported in the parentheses are corrected for within country-year clustered 
effects. 104 country-year dummies are included. *,**,*** indicate a significant  level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 5.4. The impact of inter-industry wage differentials on the top managers' 
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Table 5.4 presents the estimation results for Equation (5.1). The heading of each column 
shows the dependent variable. So, column (2) shows the relationship between inter-industry 
wage differentials and top managers’ general perceptions of corruption, column (3) shows 
the relationship between wage differentials and top managers’ perceptions of obstacles in 
the legal system, and so on. The number of observations in each column differs due to data 
availability. The largest number of observations is 42,842 for the model for perceptions on 
labor regulations. The smallest sample is 39,470 for the model on perceptions of the legal 
system.  
The signs of the coefficients of our variables of interest, namely GH8 and GH8 ×W DEX8, show a very clear pattern across different models in Table 5.4. The coefficient of GH8 is always negative. The coefficient of GH8 × W DEX8 is always positive and is 
about 10 times smaller than that of GH8. These results support our hypothesis that, in 
low-income countries, top managers of firms in high-wage industries find it more 
burdensome to deal with government regulation than top managers of firms in low-wage 
industries. 
However, due to the interaction effects the marginal impact of GH8 cannot be discerned 
directly from the magnitude of the two terms (Brambor et al., 2006). For this reason, we 
compute the marginal effect of GH8 as: 
Next, the 95% confidence intervals of these marginal effects are computed. In Figure 5.1, 
we graph the marginal effects (together with their 95% confidence intervals) for the case of 
the top managers’ perceptions on general corruption and the legal system. Similar figures 
for the perceptions related to labor regulation, business licensing and operating permits, and 
tax administration are included in Appendix 5.B. In all figures the marginal impact of 
WAGE on the respective dependent variable is on the vertical axis while the horizontal axis 
presents the level of income per capita. 
Figure 5.1 suggests that top managers of firms in high-wage industries are more likely to 
perceive corruption and regulations as an obstacle to their firms’ operations in low-income 
countries than in high-income countries. Consistent with the estimation results in Table 5.4, 
the marginal impact of GH8 on each of the dependent variables is negative when the 
income level of the country is relatively low. The negative impact reduces and eventually 
becomes positive as the level of income per capita rises. The negative marginal impact of GH8 is only significant when income per capita is lower than a certain threshold, which 
is explicitly noted in the top left of each graph. For example, the marginal impact of GH8 
on top managers’ perception of corruption is only significant if income per capita is 8,602 
dollars or lower. The corresponding income level for the perception of the extent to which 
the legal system is an obstacle is 12,785 dollars. The same pattern applies for perceptions 
related to labor regulation, business licensing and operating permits, and tax administration 
(see Appendix 5.B). The corresponding numbers for these cases are: 9,385 6,432; and 5,605 
dollars. 
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There is no significant relationship between GH8 and the top managers’ perceptions of 
corruption and the legal system as an obstacle when the income level is higher than 8,602 
and 12,785 dollars, respectively. This finding supports our expectation that high-wage firms 
are not targeted by corruptible bureaucrats in the richer countries, because corruptible 
bureaucrats in these countries do not have the incentive to harass the high-wage firms to 
extract petty bribes. Note, however, that the impacts of GH8 on the perceptions of labor 
regulation, business licensing and operation permits, and tax administration are positive and 
significantly different from zero when the income level is higher than 22,584; 28,917; and 
12,090 dollars, respectively. This finding is in line with our expectation that in relatively 
rich countries high-wage firms are more likely to be able to meet the costly government 
regulations. Therefore, top-managers of high-wage firms in relatively rich countries 
consider labor regulation, business licensing and operation permits, and tax administration 
less of an obstacle to their firms’ operations than do top managers of low-wage firms (in the 


















Log of GDP per Capita
The estimated marginal effect is only significant at 5% level
when the natural logarithm of income per capita is lower than 


















Log of GDP per Capita
The estimated marginal effect is only significant at 5% level when
the natural logarithm of income per capita is less than 9.46,
equivalent to the GDP per capita level of 12,785
PPP dollar in 2012 prices.
Figure 5.1. The marginal impact of inter-industry wage differentials on top managers' 






Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
5.4.2 The relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and the 




Table 5.5 presents the estimation results for Equation (5.2). Columns (2) and (3) are the 
estimates for the actual costs of corruption, while columns (4) and (5) present the estimates 
for the costs of red tape. Following Alexeev and Song (2013), we first estimate the models 
when we only put a lower limit of zero to the dependent variables. Next, we impose some 
upper limit to both dependent variables because some top managers report unusually high 
costs. For example, most respondents report that their firms spend less than 10% of annual 
sales on corruption, but few respondents report a (sometimes much) higher percentage, 
LL=0 LL=0, UL=10.01 LL=0 LL=0, UL=50.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WAGE -4.46* -3.10* -14.39** -12.40**
(2.52) (1.80) (7.10) (6.05)
WAGE x INCOME 0.44* 0.30 1.33* 1.15*
(0.27) (0.19) (0.77) (0.66)
FIRM AGE -1.48*** -1.01*** 0.66 0.70
(0.51) (0.29) (0.69) (0.58)
EXPORTER 0.24 0.15 0.79** 0.76***
(0.22) (0.15) (0.34) (0.29)
OWNERSHIP1 -0.74*** -0.56*** 0.18 0.12
(0.20) (0.14) (0.38) (0.32)
OWNERSHIP2 -2.61*** -1.86*** 0.18 0.40
(0.66) (0.46) (0.60) (0.54)
LEGAL1 0.13 0.12 -0.02 0.07
(0.31) (0.20) (0.43) (0.37)
LEGAL2 -0.17 -0.24 1.33** 1.11**
(0.46) (0.30) (0.63) (0.53)
LEGAL3 -0.51* -0.28 -2.16*** -1.81***
(0.30) (0.21) (0.55) (0.47)
SMALL 1.34*** 0.94*** -2.88*** -2.49***
(0.37) (0.25) (0.73) (0.62)
MEDIUM 0.96*** 0.65*** 0.02 0.07
(0.28) (0.18) (0.39) (0.35)
LOCATION1 0.17 0.17 0.70 0.66
(0.46) (0.32) (0.64) (0.56)
LOCATION2 0.53 0.44 -1.01** -0.77*
(0.55) (0.39) (0.48) (0.42)
LOCATION3 0.74** 0.40* -0.41 -0.21
(0.34) (0.22) (0.57) (0.48)
Constant 1.63*** 2.34*** 17.66*** 16.66***
(0.58) (0.37) (1.36) (1.14)
Uncensored observations 7,952 7,604 27,055 27,055
Left-censored observations 20,348 20,348 13,527 12,436
Right-censored observations 0 348 0 991
No. of surveys 104 104 104 104
No. of Countries 52 52 52 52
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.04
Dependent
Variable
Notes: this table presents the est imation of Equation (5.2) using the Tobit model. The name of the column is also 
the name of the dependent variable. T he standard errors reported in the parentheses are corrected for within 
country-year clustered effects. 104 country-times-year dummies are included. *,**,*** indicate a significant  level 
of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
CO RRUPTIO N CO ST RED TAPE CO ST
Table 5.5. The impact of inter-industry wage differentials on the top managers' reports 
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even up to 100% of annual sales. The same is true for the reported costs of red tape. Most 
managers indicate that they spend less than 50% of their time on dealing with government 
regulations. Observations with unusually high numbers can be influential and may distort 
the estimation results. For this reason, we impose an upper limit of 10.01% for the costs of 
corruption (column 3) and 50.01% for the costs of red tape (column 5).  
The findings reported in Table 5.5 are similar to those of Table 5.4. The coefficient of GH8 is negative while the coefficient of GH8 × W DEX8 is postive, and about 10 
times smaller in magnitude. The coefficient of GH8 is significant at the 10% level when 
the dependent variable is corruption costs and significant at the 5% level in the case of red 
tape. The coefficient of GH8 × W DEX8 is significant at the 10% level in three out of 
four regressions. When the upper limit is imposed, both coefficients become smaller, 
supporting our argument that it is necessary to correct for the cases of unusually high 
reported costs of corruption and red tape.  
The results in Table 5.5 indicate that the impact of GH8 is moderated by income per 
capita. From Equation (5.2), the marginal impact of GH8 on D¬­­®PO¬	¯¬°P and F±²	P³±	¯¬°P can be computed as:  
cq"∗ 	c>?2 	= 	=" 	+ 	*"	 × R#:;S2 
Again, we compute the marginal impacts and their 95% confidence intervals for the models 
in columns (3) and (5) of Table 5.5 and graph the results in Figure 5.2. As before, the 
vertical axis represents the impact of GH8 on the costs of corruption and red tape when GH8 increases by one unit. The horizontal axis shows the level of income per capita. 
Figure 5.2 shows that the marginal impact of GH8 on firms’ corruption expenditure is 
negative and significant at the 5% level when income per capita is about 6,121 dollars or 
lower. Above this income level, no significant result can be established. The corresponding 
number in the case of red tape is 14,744 dollars.  
The results show that managers of high-wage firms spend more time on dealing with the 
government and also to pay a larger amount “to get things done”. However, the effects are 
statistically significant in low-income countries only. With respect to the size of the effects, 
take, for example, two industries in a country with an income level of about 3,000 dollars 
(equivalent to 8 in natural logs). In the case of corruption in column (3), we have that ´y∗ /´GH8 = −0.7. If the wage level of one industry is about 10% higher than the wage 
level of the other industry, firms in the former have to pay an extra amount of about 0.07% 
of their annual sales on corruption. At the same time, their senior managers spend about 












5.4.3 The impact of other variables 
A general pattern across the models in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 is that firm age, government 
ownership and foreign ownership are associated with less negative perceptions of 
corruption and government regulations, and lower spending on corruption. In comparison 
with large firms, small and medium-sized firms have less negative perceptions of 
corruption and red tape but they have to pay a significantly larger amount of annual sales 
on corruption. The variables on the firms’ legal status appear to be less significant 
determinants of corruption perceptions, time spent on red tape, and corruption expenditures. 
Only firms with the sole propriety legal status report better perception of government 
regulations, spend less time on dealing with government regulations and, to some extent, 
pay less bribes. 
There is strong evidence that firms located in capital cities pay more bribes and have worse 
perceptions of corruption and government red tape. Finally, exporting firms report mixed 
results on corruption and regulation perceptions, red tape cost and bribery expenditure. 
There is no evidence that these firms pay more bribes or have worse perceptions of general 

















Log of GDP per Capita
The estimated marginal effect is only significant at 5% level when the
natural logarithm of income per capita is less than 8.72, equivalent















Log of GDP per Capita
The estimated marginal effect is only significant at 5% level when the
natural logarithm of income per capita is less than 9.60, equivalent
to the GDP per capita level of 14,744 PPP dollar in 2012 prices.
Figure 5.2. The marginal impact of inter-industry wage differentials on top 
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spend more time on dealing with government regulations. Perhaps, this is because 
exporting firms have to deal with these aspects of the government more frequently. 
5.4.4 Robustness checks 
Our results thus far indicate that managers of firms in high-wage industries in low-income 
countries have worse perceptions of corruption and government regulations as obstacles to 
run their firms, spend more time on dealing with government regulations, and pay a larger 
share of annual sales on corruption. The results in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 thus lend support to 
our hypothesis that corrupt government officials in low-income countries use wage 
differentials as an indicator to target firms to extract bribes.  
However, one alternative explanation to this finding might be that high-wage industries are 
highly concentrated industries. According to Alexeev and Song (2013), corruption happens 
when corruptible government bureaucrats collude with firms to share the rent. When 
concentration is high and competition for public services is low, firms have to spend less on 
bribery. However, when concentration is low and competition is high, more firms compete 
for public services and they have to spend more on bribery (Alexeev and Song, 2013). 
Following Alexeev and Song (2013) we compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (««W), 
which is a conventional measure of industry concentration and has been used frequently to 
measure competition at the industry level.10 This index is defined as the sum of squares of 
the ratio of the respondent firm’s sales to total sales in the respondent firm’s industry. To 
reflect market power of firms, it is better to define the industries at a finer level than the 
ISIC 3 one-digit level. For this reason, the ««W is calculated for the ISIC 3 two-digit level 
industries. Higher values of the ««W are associated with more concentration, and thus 
weaker competition.  
We estimate the models in Equation (5.1) and add ««W into & . The results are reported 
in Table 5.6. The results suggest that our findings are not affected by the inclusion of ««W. 
All coefficients, including those of GH8 and GH8 × W DEX8, remain almost the 
same. The coefficient of ««W is only negative and significantly different from zero when 
perception on labor regulations is the dependent variable. In the other models the 
coefficient of ««W is not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. 
 
  
                                                          
10
 Some authors have argued that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index may not be a good measure of 
competition (see, for instance, Bikker and Haaf, 2002). We have therefore also used markups as an 
alternative measure of competition. In that case, the main results of our models as well as our 
empirical conclusions remain unchanged. However, the number of observations drops by almost 50% 
to missing data in sales and operating costs, which are necessary to compute the markups. The results 











Next, we estimate Equation (5.2) and add ««W into & . The results are reported in 
Table 5.7. Again, our estimation results remain largely the same when ««W is included in 
the model, except for a small increase in the coefficients for GH8. This also causes the 
marginal impact of GH8 on the cost of corruption to become less negative. As a 
consequence, the level of income per capita below which the marginal effect is significant 
(see Figure 5.2) at the 10% level is 5,047 dollars. For the case of the cost of red tape, the 
marginal impact of GH8 is significant at the 5% level for per capita incomes of 16,069 
dollars or lower. The coefficient of ««W is negative in both cases, but is only significantly 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WAGE -1.08*** -0.81** -1.63*** -1.24*** -1.41***
(0.37) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46) (0.26)
WAGE x INCOME 0.11*** 0.08** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
FIRM AGE -0.06 0.07* 0.02 -0.13*** -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
EXPORTER 0.02 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
OWNERSHIP1 -0.05** -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
OWNERSHIP2 -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.11** -0.21*** -0.25***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
LEGAL1 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LEGAL2 -0.01 0.02 -0.06* 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
LEGAL3 -0.03 -0.08*** -0.06** -0.04** -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SMALL 0.06** -0.09*** -0.25*** -0.08*** -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
MEDIUM 0.07*** -0.01 -0.07*** -0.03* 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LOCATION1 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LOCATION2 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
LOCATION3 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HHI 0.01 0.02 -0.04** 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 41,184 39,470 42,842 41,913 42,639
No. of surveys 104 104 104 104 104
No. of countries 52 52 52 52 52
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.08
Depedent
Variables
MAJOR O BSTACLE TO  FIRMS' O PERATION
Notes: this table presents the estimation of equation (5.1) with the HHI index as an additional control variable, using the Ordered 
Probit model. T he name of the column is also the name of the dependent variable. T he standard errors reported in the parentheses are 
corrected for country-year clustered effects. 104 country-times-year dummies are included. *,**,*** indicate a significant level of 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 5.6. The impact of inter-industry wage differentials on the top managers' 












In this chapter we have used a large sample of firms from all over the world to examine the 
relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and corruption and red tape. 
Corruptible bureaucrats in relatively low-income countries may not have precise 
information about firms’ ability to pay bribes. Therefore, they may use information on the 
average wage level of the industry in which the firm operates as an indicator, and ‘rattle’ 
firms in high-wage industries by more burdensome red tape to extract petty bribes. For this 
reason, firms in high-wage industries in poor countries may have worse perceptions of 
government corruption and government regulations, suffer from more red tape, and spend 
more on bribery. Although the inter-industry wage structure is relatively stable across 
countries (and over time), high-wage firms in relatively rich countries may not suffer from 
such discrimination. This is because petty corruption is not common in countries with 
relatively high-income levels and firms may have enough financial resources to meet costly 
government regulations.  
Based on a sample of 43,568 firms and controlling for country as well as firm 
characteristics, we find significant evidence that firms from high-wage industries in 
relatively poor countries complain more about red tape and corruption. This supports our 
hypothesis that corruptible bureaucrats in low-income countries use information on inter-




(1) (4) (5) (2) (3)
WAGE -2.87* (1.68) -12.31** (5.98)
WAGE x INCOME 0.29 (0.18) 1.15* (0.65)
FIRM AGE -1.02*** (0.29) 0.69 (0.58)
EXPORT ER 0.11 (0.14) 0.73** (0.29)
OWNERSHIP1 -0.55*** (0.14) 0.12 (0.32)
OWNERSHIP2 -1.88*** (0.46) 0.39 (0.54)
LEGAL1 0.11 (0.20) 0.07 (0.37)
LEGAL2 -0.24 (0.30) 1.10** (0.53)
LEGAL3 -0.28 (0.21) -1.82*** (0.47)
SMALL 0.96*** (0.25) -2.48*** (0.63)
MEDIUM 0.65*** (0.18) 0.08 (0.35)
LOCAT ION1 0.17 (0.32) 0.67 (0.56)
LOCAT ION2 0.44 (0.39) -0.78* (0.42)
LOCAT ION3 0.41* (0.22) -0.20 (0.48)
HHI -0.53** (0.21) -0.31 (0.37)
Constant 2.44*** (0.38) 16.69*** (1.54)
Uncensored observations 7,604 27,065
Left-censored observations 20,348 12,436
Right-censored observations 348 991
No. of surveys 104 104
No. of Countries 52 52
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.04
Notes: T his table presents the estimation of equation (5.2) with the HHI index as an addit ional control variable. The name of the column 
is also the name of the depdendent variable. T he standard errors reported in the parentheses are corrected for within country-year clustered 
effects.  *,**,*** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES
CO RRUPTIO N CO ST RED TAPE CO ST
LL = 0, UL = 10.1 LL =0, UL = 50.1
Table 5.7. The impact of inter-industry wage differentials on the top managers' 
reports on the costs of corruption and red tape with industry concentration as 






Wage differentials and government corruption: A micro survey data approach 
We find similar results for the relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and 
the reported amount of money spent on corruption (measured as the percentage of annual 
sales spent on bribes) and the cost of red tape (measured as the percentage of senior 
management time spent on government regulation). When income per capita is less than 
6,121 dollars, firms in industries with a higher average wage have to pay more gifts and 
informal payments “to get things done”. When income is less than 12,785 dollars, senior 
management in industries with a higher average wage spends a significantly larger share of 
their time on dealing with government regulations.  
Our findings on the relationship between inter-industry wage differentials, corruption and 
red tape are robust, even when we control for the possible alternative explanation of the 
variation in the top managers’ perception of corruption, such as the level of concentration at 
the ISIC 3 2-digit industry level.  
Our findings shed new light on the nature of corruption in developing countries. Anti-
corruption policy should take account of the fact that—for the extraction of bribes— 
corruptible bureaucrats discriminate firms according to average wage level of the firm’s 
industry. Monitoring, detection and punishment of corruption should be focused on 
bureaucrats responsible for regulating high-wage industries. 
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5.7 Appendices 
5.7.1 Appendices 5.A. List of countries and years included in this chapter 
 
Country Year Number of firms Country Year
Number of 
firms
Albania 2002 136 Kyrgyzstan 2002 172
Albania 2005 166 Kyrgyzstan 2003 102
Argentina 2010 1042 Kyrgyzstan 2005 202
Armenia 2002 170 Latvia 2002 172
Armenia 2005 351 Latvia 2005 205
Armenia 2009 369 Latvia 2009 269
Azerbijan 2002 170 Lithuania 2002 199
Azerbijan 2005 349 Lithuania 2004 229
Azerbijan 2009 350 Lithuania 2005 205
Bosnia & Herzgovina 2002 145 Lithuania 2009 269
Brazil 2003 1634 Macedonia 2002 170
Brazil 2009 1113 Macedonia 2005 200
Bulgaria 2002 247 Macedonia 2009 351
Bulgaria 2004 517 Mauritius 2009 353
Bulgaria 2005 300 Moldova 2002 174
Bulgaria 2007 1015 Moldova 2003 103
Bulgaria 2009 270 Moldova 2005 350
Chile 2010 1027 Moldova 2009 362
China 2002 1442 Mongolia 2009 359
Colombia 2010 900 Montenegro 2009 115
Costa Rica 2005 338 Nicaragua 2010 287
Costa Rica 2010 514 Panama 2010 346
Croatia 2002 176 Paraguay 2010 359
Croatia 2005 232 Peru 2010 991
Croatia 2007 520 Philippines 2009 1293
Czech Republic 2002 264 Poland 2002 497
Czech Republic 2005 338 Poland 2003 108
Czech Republic 2009 215 Poland 2005 974
Dominican Republic 2005 109 Poland 2009 385
Dominican Republic 2010 341 Portugal 2005 503
Ecuador 2010 352 Romania 2002 254
El Salvadar 2003 175 Romania 2005 600
El Salvadar 2010 328 Romania 2009 491
Estonia 2002 169 Russian Federation 2005 600
Estonia 2005 219 Russian Federation 2009 975
Estonia 2009 270 Serbia 2002 182
Georgia 2002 174 Serbia 2005 300
Georgia 2005 200 Serbia 2009 384
Georgia 2008 365 Slovakia 2002 162
Germany 2005 1186 Slovakia 2005 215
Greece 2005 541 Slovakia 2009 236
Guatemala 2003 109 Slovenia 2002 186
Honduras 2003 163 Slovenia 2005 221
Honduras 2010 320 Slovenia 2009 272
Hungary 2002 247 South Africa 2003 182
Hungary 2005 608 South Africa 2007 874
Hungary 2009 288 Spain 2005 601
Indonesia 2009 1387 Tajikistan 2003 106
Ireland 2005 491 Ukraine 2002 453
Kazakhstan 2002 247 Ukraine 2005 593
Kazakhstan 2005 585 Ukraine 2008 801
Kazakhstan 2009 531 Uruguay 2010 569
Venezuela 2010 292
   
5.7.2 Appendix 5.B 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Marginal impact of WAGE on the top managers’ perception of labor regulation, 



























Log of GDP per Capita
The estimated marginal effect is only signif icant  at 5% level when the
natural logarithm of income per capita is less than 9.15 or larger than 
10.02, equivalent to the GDP per capita level of 9,385 and 22,584



























Log of GDP per Capita
The estimated marginal effect is only signif icant  at 5% level
when the natural logarithm of income per capita is lower than 
8.97 or higher than 10.60, equivalent to the GDP per capita




























8 8.63 9.4 10.5
Log of GDP per Capita
The estimated marginal effect is only signif icant  at 5% level when the
natural logarithm of income per capita is less than 8.63 or larger than 
9.40, equivalent to the GDP per capita level of 5,605 and 12,090
PPP dollar in 2012 prices.
   
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
6.1 Main findings 
Two research questions have been addressed in this thesis:  
• First, how can a reliable dataset on government wages that covers a large number of 
countries over a reasonably long period of time be collected to facilitate further 
empirical research on the relationship between government wages and corruption? 
• Second, what is the impact of government wages on corruption? 
By addressing these questions, the thesis makes four contributions to the literature. First, it 
proposes a new approach to measure wages at the aggregate level using micro survey data. 
Second, it introduces a new worldwide database on wages to facilitate future research on 
economic issues related to wages at the ISIC 3 industry level. Third, it demonstrates that 
government wages imputed from the government wage bill and government employment 
are unreliable. Fourth, it sheds new light on the mechanisms through which government 
wages influence corruption. Raising government wages only reduces corruption at a 
relatively low level of income per capita. Also, in relatively poor countries corrupt 
bureaucrats target firms in high-wage industries to extract petty bribes. 
6.1.1 A new dataset 
Defining industrial wages as the average nominal wages and salaries of all employees 
working in an industry, Chapter 2 introduces a micro-based database of wages for 17 ISIC 
3 one-digit industries and for the whole economy. The database covers a large number of 
developing—next to developed—countries. It thus makes it possible to extend analyses to 
countries which have so far been neglected due to the lack of data. The database consists of 
4 datasets. The first three datasets contain data collected by the ILO and SEDLAC, and the 
original micro survey datasets which were collected from 6 international databases and 
several national archives. The fourth dataset combines these three datasets into a unified 
dataset. This unified dataset covers 126 countries over a period of about 12 years with 
1,488 observations. As more survey data will become available, the database will be 
updated regularly in the future. 
Although the concepts of wages, time basis and worker coverage vary from one country to 
another, the database is suitable for studying relative wages between industries within the 
same country and between countries. This is because the concepts of wages, time basis and 
worker coverage are consistent for each country-year. Therefore, analyses based on relative 
wages are not likely to suffer from any loss of precision. Authors who are interested in 
comparing the levels of industry wages between countries or analyzing the trend of wages 
over time should consult the explanatory notes as well as the flag variables which are 
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6.1.2 A new approach to measure wages at the aggregate level 
Chapter 3 shows that the macro data approach to calculate average government wages—by 
dividing the government wage bill by government employment—is unreliable. The micro 
data approach estimates government wages as the weighted mean of wages in a random and 
representative sample of government employees. This mean yields an unbiased estimate of 
the true population average government wage. Both macro-based and micro-based 
government wages were estimated for 20 countries, using data from the OECD STAN 
database and a large number of high-quality household survey micro datasets from the EU-
SILC database. The two wages are compared and the outcomes show serious discrepancies 
between the micro and macro results. Given the unbiasedness of the micro wages, this 
indicates that government wages computed from macro data sources are biased.   
For some countries, the macro government wages are lower than the micro wages while the 
opposite is true for other countries. Only in a few countries are the macro government 
wages in line with the micro wages. The bias varies from one country to another but 
appears to be relatively constant over time within each country. Similar findings also hold 
for other ISIC 3 industries. It is also found in Chapter 3 that the bias is not only caused by 
inappropriately measuring employment, suggesting that there are also errors in the data for 
the government wage bill. Because the macro data approach has been widely applied in 
empirical research, this may have important consequences for the results. Future research 
should adopt the micro data approach in measuring not only government wages but also 
wages at other aggregate levels such as the ISIC 3 industries. 
6.1.3 The impact of higher government wages on corruption 
Using the fixed effects econometric model and a sample of 76 countries with 898 
observations over the late 1980s – 2010 period, Chapter 4 finds that the impact of 
government wages on corruption is moderated by the level of per capita income. When 
income per capita is relatively low, an increase in government wages reduces corruption. 
This negative impact becomes smaller when the level of income increases, and eventually 
becomes positive (though insignificant). These results are robust, even when an alternative 
(micro-based) measure of corruption is employed. The impact of government wages on 
corruption remains also significant when the lags of the government wage indicator are 
used in order to deal with possible reversed causality. Likewise, using latitude instead of 
income to deal with multicollinearity problems does not change the main results. 
Intuitively, petty corruption is more prevalent in poor countries, and well-paid bureaucrats 
forgo such type of corruption. However, when incomes in a country are higher, petty 
corruption becomes less important. Grand corruption, involving more secret transactions 
that violate the laws and regulations, becomes prevalent. This type of corruption brings 
about larger revenues that outweigh any realistic compensation package to the corrupted 
bureaucrats. It is also more difficult to detect. To combat the latter form of corruption, 









6.1.4 The relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and 
corruption 
Based on a sample of 43,568 firms from all over the world and non-linear Ordered Probit 
and Tobit econometric models, Chapter 5 presents evidence that firms in high-wage 
industries in relatively poor countries complain more about red tape and corruption. It also 
shows similar results for the relationship between inter-industry wage differentials and the 
reported amount of money spent on corruption (measured as the percentage of annual sales 
spent on bribes) and the cost of red tape (measured as the percentage of senior management 
time spent on government regulations). When income per capita is less than 6,121 dollars, 
firms in high-wage industries have to make more informal payments “to get things done” 
than firms in industries with a lower wage. When income is less than 12,785 dollars, senior 
management of firms in high-wage industries spends a significantly larger share of their 
time on dealing with government regulations than that of firms in industries with a lower 
wage. These results are robust even when we control for industry concentration (or 
competition) as an alternative explanation. 
Corruptible bureaucrats in relatively low-income countries may not have precise 
information about firms’ ability to pay bribes. However, they may use the information on 
the wage level of the industry in which the firm operates as an indicator, and ‘rattle’ high-
wage firms by more burdensome red tape to extract petty bribes. For this reason, firms in 
high-wage industries in poor countries have worse perceptions of government corruption 
and government regulations, suffer from more red tape, and spend more on bribery. 
Although the inter-industry wage structure is relatively stable across countries (and over 
time), high-wage firms in relatively rich countries do not suffer from such discrimination. 
This is because petty corruption is not common at relatively high-income levels and these 
firms may have enough financial resources to meet costly government regulations.  
6.2 Policy implications 
Several policy implications can be drawn from the finding on the relationship between 
higher government wages and corruption in Chapter 4. Higher government wages only 
reduce corruption in low-income countries. Government wages may not be an efficient 
policy tool to reduce corruption in upper middle- or high-income countries with a relatively 
high level of corruption, such as Greece and Italy. In low-income countries, increasing 
wages may substantially reduce corruption. 
An increase in average government wages with an amount that equals the average wages in 
manufacturing leads to a decrease of about one point in corruption (measured on a 0 to 6 
scale) for countries with an income level between $1000 and $2000 (in 2012 prices). This 
drastic pay rise, which, in many cases, is equivalent to doubling the government wages, 
seems to be unrealistic. However, this is what happened in successful anti-corruption 
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Vietnam.1 A more recent example is Georgia (the former Soviet Republic). Government 
wages relative to the wages in manufacturing in this country increased from 0.87 in 2003 to 
1.70 in 2008. At the moment of writing this conclusion, Georgia is being praised as a 
successful example of combatting corruption.2  
A reduction of corruption in combination with other policy reforms can improve the 
investment climate substantially, moving a country to a new equilibrium with less 
corruption and more productive economic activities. Such a scenario is in contrast with 
theoretical studies arguing that governments in highly corrupted countries should pay low 
wages and maintain a corrupt bureaucracy (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Chang and Lai, 
2002). The results of in this chapter suggest that higher government wages might be used to 
combat corruption in the poorest and most corrupted countries. 
The findings in Chapter 5 shed new light on the nature of corruption in developing 
countries. Anti-corruption policy should take into account the fact that corruptible 
bureaucrats discriminate firms according to the industry’s average wage level in order to 
extract bribes. Firms in high-wage industries, therefore, face more red tape and spend more 
on corruption. Monitoring, detection and punishment of corruption should be focused on 
bureaucrats responsible for regulating high-wage industries. Combining the finding of 
Chapters 4 and 5, increasing government wages for bureaucrats regulating high-wage 
industries, it should be taken into consideration that there are possibly more corruptible 
government officials regulating high-wage industries than other industries. When using 
wage measures is too costly, it may be more efficient to selectively raise government wages 
in areas where the incentives to become corrupt are strong. 
6.3 Limitations and implications for future research 
The impact of government wages on corruption may be much stronger if wage policies are 
accompanied by complementary measures. In other words, reducing corruption by one 
point in a 1,000-dollar-per-capita country may require a pay rise less than the average 
wages in manufacturing if this measure is taken in the context of a comprehensive strategy 
against corruption. Successful examples against corruption often combine higher 
government wages with other reform measures or strong monitoring mechanisms. The 
Independent Commission against Corruption in Hong Kong and the Anti-Corruption 
Agency in Singapore are examples of powerful and effective anti-corruption agencies. 
Future research may shed more light on this issue by studying in more detail successful 
anticorruption strategies. 
Some authors argue that not only low average government wages but also wage 
compression may lead to corruption (Klitgaard, 1989; Ul Haque and Aziz, 1999; Ul Haque, 
                                                          
1
 Detailed information is given on the Vietnamese website http://vnexpress.net/gl/xa-hoi/2012/03/da-
nang-ho-tro-csgt-5-trieu-dong-moi-thang/. The city authority decided to pay an extra 5 million VND 
per month to each policeman to stop traffic bribery. This pay rise was then equivalent to 
approximately twice the average manufacturing wages in Vietnam. However, it applied only to a 










2007). Wage compression implies flat salary scales between lower and upper levels of 
government employees. There are almost no wage premiums to high level government 
employees who have the most opportunities to corrupt. This compression results in brain 
drain, inefficiency, moonlighting, demoralization, and especially corruption. The business 
of government shifts from development to predation (Klitgaard, 1989). 
Therefore, future research should focus also on the impact of wage compression on 
corruption. It may also be interesting to consider the interaction between higher government 
wages and the degree of wage compression. For example, are higher government wages 
more effective in combatting corruption if the wage differentials between senior 
government officials and low skill government employees are higher?  
Finally, focusing on ISIC 3 one-digit level industries ensures that the database in Chapter 3 
and the subsequent analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 can be extended to a larger number of 
countries. However, it can also be more efficient to consider the impact of inter-industry 
wage differentials on corruption in Chapter 5 at finer levels, such as the ISIC 3 two-digit 
industries.  
Together with including more countries as more micro data become available, future 
versions of the database will also provide data at ISIC 3 two-digit level and wage 
compression measures for a number of countries with data of sufficient quality.  
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
Corruptie wordt gedefinieerd als “het misbruiken van een openbaar ambt voor eigen gewin” 
of “een daad, waarin een openbaar ambt wordt gebruikt voor persoonlijk gewin op een 
manier die in strijd is met de spelregels”. Corruptie wordt vaak gelijkgesteld aan omkoping 
die ontstaat wanneer werknemers bij de overheid – met een zekere discretionaire 
bevoegdheid om schaarse publieke goederen naar andere agenten te distribueren of om hen 
kostbare regels op te leggen – betaling voor bepaalde gunsten vragen. Corruptie omvat 
echter ook een breed scala van andere illegale misdragingen zoals verduistering (het stelen 
van publieke middelen), fraude (het misbruiken van een openbaar ambt om mensen te 
bedriegen om zo geld te verdienen), zelfverrijking (het misbruiken van een openbaar ambt 
om transacties te organiseren om persoonlijk van te profiteren), vriendjespolitiek (het 
oneerlijk bevoordelen van een persoon of groep ten koste van een ander) en nepotisme (het 
begunstigen van familieleden). 
Economisch onderzoek naar corruptie wordt gekenmerkt door een aantal fasen. Corruptie 
werd aanvankelijk gezien als een principaal-agentprobleem en onderzoek was gericht op 
een positieve analyse van mechanismen die het probleem veroorzaken. Sommige auteurs 
beweerden dat corruptie slecht is en suggereerden correctiemaatregelen, terwijl anderen een 
toleranter standpunt innamen en betoogden dat corruptie niet per se strijdig met 
economische ontwikkeling hoeft te zijn. Corruptie werd echter als een van de ernstigste 
groeibelemmeringen gezien naarmate economische ontwikkeling een belangrijker 
beleidsterrein werd. Onderzoek naar corruptie is sindsdien sterk gegroeid. Inmiddels 
worden meer dan 70 factoren genoemd als mogelijk oorzaken van corruptie. Nieuwe 
inzichten in de oorzaken en de gevolgen van het probleem zijn blootgelegd. 
Onderzoeksvragen 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de literatuur door de invloed van het beloningsbeleid van 
ambtenaren op corruptie te bestuderen. Het onderwerp is de afgelopen decennia al in een 
groot aantal studies onderzocht. De meeste overheden zijn nog steeds terughoudend in het 
toepassen van dit beloningsbeleid ter bestrijding van corruptie, mogelijkerwijs omdat 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek tot nu toe geen sluitend bewijs over de effectiviteit van dit 
instrument aan heeft kunnen tonen. Twee onderzoeksvragen zijn in dit proefschrift aan de 
orde: 
• Ten eerste: hoe kan een betrouwbare dataset worden samengesteld waarin ambtelijke 
lonen voor een groot aantal landen en een redelijk lange periode zijn opgenomen teneinde 
empirisch onderzoek naar het verband tussen ambtelijke lonen en corruptie te faciliteren? 
• Ten tweede, wat is de impact van ambtelijke lonen op corruptie ? 
Waar de literatuur doorgaans ambtelijke lonen met macrodata berekent, hanteert dit 
proefschrift een bottom-up-strategie op basis van micro-enquêtes. Deze micro-enquêtes zijn 
representatief op landenniveau en worden vaak jaarlijks uitgevoerd door de nationale 
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informatiebronnen voor sociaaleconomische zaken in zowel ontwikkelde als 
ontwikkelingslanden. Data uit micro-enquêtes worden steeds belangrijker in 
sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoek en beleidsanalyses. Vrijwel alle landen hebben enquêtes 
op het gebied van werk en inkomen gehouden. Hierdoor is het steeds beter mogelijk om 
microdata voor een groot aantal ontwikkelings- en ontwikkelde landen te verzamelen.  
Bevindingen 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een uiteenzetting van een nieuwe database van loongegevens met 1488 
observaties voor 126 landen en een periode van gemiddeld 12 jaar. Ondanks conceptuele 
verschillen is het mogelijk om met deze database relatieve lonen tussen industrieën zowel 
binnen een land als tussen meerdere landen te analyseren. Dit komt doordat er grote zorg is 
besteed aan het consistent maken van loongegevens, de frequentie waarop deze gegevens 
gemeten worden en de dekkingsgraad. Hierdoor is het mogelijk relatieve lonen te 
analyseren zonder dat dit ten koste gaat van precisie. 
Met behulp van deze meer betrouwbare en nieuwe database worden mogelijke 
tekortkomingen blootgelegd van overheidslonen die op basis van macro-gegevens zijn 
samengesteld. Hoofdstuk 3 toont aan dat de macro-databenadering om de gemiddelde 
ambtelijke lonen te berekenen – namelijk het totaal aan ambtelijke lonen delen door het 
aantal ambtenaren – onbetrouwbaar is. Met de micro-databenadering worden ambtelijke 
lonen geschat op basis van gewogen gemiddelden van lonen in een willekeurige en 
representatieve steekproef van ambtenaren. Dit gemiddelde geeft een zuivere schatting van 
het ware populatiegemiddelde. Zowel de macro- als de microbenadering zijn toegepast om 
ambtelijke lonen van 20 landen te schatten. Hiervoor is gebruik gemaakt van gegevens uit 
de OECD STAN database en een groot aantal huishoudelijke micro-enquêtes van hoge 
kwaliteit uit de EU-SILC database. De uitkomsten van beide benaderingen worden naast 
elkaar gelegd en substantiële verschillen worden aangetoond. Ambtelijke lonen berekend 
op basis van de macrobenadering zijn, gegeven de zuivere schattingen met de micro-
benadering en de grote verschillen tussen de micro- en macro-methoden, onbetrouwbaar. 
Vervolgens wordt de nieuwe database gebruikt om het effect van ambtelijke lonen op 
corruptie te onderzoeken, zowel op landen- als op bedrijfsniveau. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt 
gebruikt gemaakt van een econometrisch model met fixed effects en een steekproef van 76 
landen met 898 waarnemingen voor de periode tussen de late jaren 1980 en 2010. Er wordt 
aangetoond dat het effect van ambtelijke lonen op corruptie gemodereerd wordt door het 
inkomen per capita. Als het inkomen per capita relatief laag is, leidt een toename van 
ambtelijke lonen tot minder corruptie. Dit negatieve effect wordt kleiner naarmate het 
inkomensniveau stijgt en is zelfs positief (maar niet significant) voor een hoog 
inkomensniveau. De bevindingen zijn robuust, zelfs wanneer er gebruik wordt gemaakt van 
een alternatieve (micro) maatstaf van corruptie. Het effect van ambtelijke lonen op 
corruptie blijft ook significant wanneer er rekening wordt gehouden met mogelijke 
endogeniteit. De bevindingen veranderen ook niet wanneer latitude in plaats van inkomen 
wordt gebruikt om problemen met multicollineariteit tegen te gaan. 
De intuïtie is dat onbeduidende corruptie (petty corruption) gangbaarder is in arme landen 
en dat goedbetaalde ambtenaren hiervan afzien. Naarmate het inkomensniveau stijgt, neemt 
corruptie echter ook een meer omvangrijke vorm aan (grand corruption) waarin er sprake is 
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waartegen, in de ogen van de corrupte ambtenaar, een hoger salaris niet opwegen.  Grand 
corruption is ook moeilijker om op te sporen. Het verhogen van ambtelijke lonen is dan 
geen efficiënte maatregel om deze vorm van corruptie tegen te gaan. 
Tot slot verkent hoofdstuk 5 het effect van loonverschillen tussen industrieën op 
bureaucratische rompslomp en corruptie. Er wordt gebruik gemaakt van een steekproef van 
43568 bedrijven vanuit de hele wereld en non-lineaire Ordered Probit en Tobit modellen. 
Bij een inkomen per capita van minder dan 6121 dollar moeten bedrijven in bedrijfstakken 
met hoge lonen meer informele betalingen verrichten om “zaken gedaan te krijgen” dan 
bedrijfstakken waarin het loon lager is. Bij inkomens lager dan 12785 dollar besteden 
managers van bedrijven in bedrijfstakken met hoge lonen significant meer tijd aan 
regelgeving dan bedrijven in bedrijfstakken met lage lonen. Een alternatieve verklaring 
heeft te maken met de mate van concurrentie binnen of concentratie van een bedrijfstak, 
maar de bevindingen blijven hetzelfde.  
Corrumpeerbare ambtenaren in landen met een relatief laag inkomen beschikken wellicht 
niet over exacte informatie over de mate waarin een bedrijf in staat is om smeergeld te 
betalen. Het is echter wel mogelijk dat zij informatie over de hoogte van lonen in de 
bedrijfstakken als een indicator gebruiken om hun doelwit te kiezen, waardoor bedrijven 
met hoge lonen vaker met bureaucratische rompslomp geconfronteerd worden en smeergeld 
moeten betalen. Om deze reden hebben bedrijven in bedrijfstakken met hoge lonen in arme 
landen een slechtere perceptie van publieke corruptie en regelgeving, hebben zij meer last 
van bureaucratische rompslomp en wordt meer smeergeld betaald. Hoewel de 
lonenstructuur tussen bedrijfstakken over de jaren en tussen landen vrij stabiel is gebleven, 
hebben bedrijven uit bedrijfstakken met hoge lonen in landen met een hoog inkomen geen 
last van deze vorm van discriminatie. Dit komt doordat petty corruption in deze landen niet 
gebruikelijk is en deze bedrijven mogelijk voldoende financiële middelen hebben om aan 
kostbare regelgeving te voldoen.  
Naast het leveren van nieuw empirisch bewijs ten aanzien van het effect van lonen op 
corruptie, biedt dit proefschrift een goede database voor verder onderzoek naar dit 
onderwerp. Deze database zal in de toekomst worden bijgewerkt als meer gegevens uit 
micro-enquêtes beschikbaar worden gesteld. 
 
